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Preface
This collection of papers originates from a seminar organised around the theme
Construetion of Gender relations in proeesses of Modernisation - Women and
Islamisation at Chr.Michelsens institute. The seminar received funding from the
Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities and the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-sponsored the work on editing and publication of
the papers. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the
above mentioned ageneies and institution.
Much of the material has been changed since the original seminar, and some
of the participants who presented papers and contributed to the development of
arguments in the seminar in late 1994 have for various reasons been unable to
publish their papers in this volume. We like to thank Trude Eide, Aynur Ilyasoglu,
Kirsten Sandborg, Heidi Skramstad and Annika Rabo for their contribution to the
seminar that encouraged the advaneement of the project! Three of the chapters in
this volume written by Marjo Buitelaar, Wily Jansen and Soroya Duval have been
inc1uded by invitation.
The different chapters in this volume grapple with the understanding of persons,
groups and phenomena that in Western popular and scholarIy presentations of ten
are defined and presented under the label 'religious fundamentalism'. We probe
what unites these groups apart from aur ascription of a specific negatively defined
identity to them by the attributes non-modern, non-democratic, ir-rational.
To highlight substantive differences and similarities among the groups presented
we attempt to give meticulous ethnographic descriptions of how religious and
ritualistic devotions and practice form an important part of present-day life of
certain categories of women in Muslim communities from Senegal to Jordan.
Implications of the analysis presented of women's active involvement in Islamist
practices and organisations presents us for several paradoxes; Why do women seek
their submission under religious authority and dogma that deprive them of free
judgement and command over specific areas of their life ? How is the believing
female subject constituted in one of the worId's major patriarchal religions? Are
there specific pragmatie gains in the secular realm for the women seeking religious
involvement ? How may religious merit be converted into secular prestige? The
dominant approach to understand the contagious effect of Islam is to appeal to
extra-religious factors produced by a sense of threat from the dislocation wrought
by modernisation and explain the attraetion of Islamic movements as a reactive
response to the impure West, that is, one seeks to bolster and protect own identity
by purifying religious practice. A common ground for the different papers
presented at the seminar was to seek to explain ways practicing Muslim women
cultivate and seek an active voice in religious discourse.
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All of the ethnographic cases presented in various ways highlight the active
creation of rooms of their own by the women engaged in IslamIst revitalisation -
encountered in their particular socio-historical realities. The implications of the
cases presented and the questions we raise mark an opposition to generalisation
where women' s relation to Islam is reduced to its victims par excellence. Our
analytical approach seek to conceptualize the ways that religious involvement by
women challenge traditional representations of gender and ariculates interests
through self presentation and identity management that also challenge restrictions
imposed from above that curtails women' s freedom in the name of religion.
We explore how women are engaged in lifeprojects that are encompassed in
and regulated by religious dogma and ritual practice. Attempting to give reasons
for women's active involvement in Islamist practices and organisations presents
us for paradoxes; Why do women seek their submission under a system that
deprives them of their free wil and power. So, what is in it for the women
seeking religious discipline ? One approach to understand the contagious effect of
IslamIsation is to appeal to the extra-religious appeal produced by a sense of threat
from the impure west, that is one seeks to bolster and protect own identity by
purifying religious practice. All of the ethnographic cases presented in various
ways show the active creation of rooms of their own by the women engaged in
IslamIst revitalisation - with this focus on practice we wanted to mark opposition
to a reduction of questions on women's relation to Islam as its victims par
excellence.
The unifying analytical approach aspires to conceptualize ways that religious
rituals and beliefs challenge dominant representations of gender in traditional
Islam through creative, voluntar reworking and presentations of self in religious
discourse. In this subdomInant discourse female identity management emerge also
as counteraction to restrictions imposed that curtails women's freedom in the name
of religion.
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Introduction
Karin Ask and Marit Tjomsland
What is Islamism? More than fifteen years have passed since the Iranian
revolution first revealed the potential power of this phenomenon and elevated it
from a status as one scarcely recognised religious interpretation among others to
a mass mobilising force at the centre of the worId' s attention. Since then, it has
come to play an increasingly important political role in more Muslim countries
than not, and it has become part of everyday language way beyond the Muslim
communities of the worId. On a generallevel, most people - with the eager
assistance of the mass media - have acquired a layman's understanding of the
concept based on images of extremism and women' soppression, guns and veiIs.
On a specialised level and thus more interesting in this connection, social
scientists, orientalists, and most other research disciplines dealing with the Muslim
W orId have during the last fifteen years produced an abundance of studies of the
phenomenon. Stil, one has as yet failed to reach a general understanding of what
it is; in fact, there may be reason to argue that one today is as far from a c1ear and
unanimous comprehension of it as ever before. This is evident already at the most
basic conceptual level: A multitude of concepts are currently applied to connote
the phenomenon, some of the more frequently used being Islamic fundamentalism,
Islamism, Islamic resurgence, political Islam, and radical Islam. The different
valeurs of these concepts c1earIy indicate that divergent perceptions of the
phenomenon are at play. In addition, there is a sizeable field of conceptual
derivatives of what wil here be called Islamism. Islamisation, which is a central
focus of the contributions to this book, is one such derivative, and refers not so
much to organised political expressions of the phenomenon as to wider impacts -
cultural, religious, or others - it has come to have on contemporar Muslim
societies. How can one make sense of this jungle of approaches to apparently the
same phenomenon?
Attempts at explaining Islamism may be usefully categorised according to what
aspects of the phenomenon they give importanee to. While some concentrate on
what has brought Islamism about, thus seeking the 'real' reasons behind the
IslamIc resurgence, others focus on the ideas and practices it implies, applying a
basically descriptive approach. The first of these approaehes tended to be more
widespread in the Eighties, while the latter has been gaining ground during the
Nineties. This shift in emphasis over time should be understood in a broader
theoretical context: The Iranian revolution was the first in a row of political events
of international dimensions which forced the social sciences to seriously reconsider
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central established truths about the nature of socIal development. It was the first
major 'incomprehensible' popularIy supported take-over of power of the post-
colonial era, in the sen se that it contradicted the until then hegemonious c1assical
theory of modernisation, which approaehes modernisation mainly as a historie al
and ideological proeess first undergone by the West but necessary anywhere if
development is to be reached, and at the same time as a self-evident good which
all societies wil asp ire to achieve. The Iranian revolution provided a first time
experience with a popular revolt seemingly aiming at retreating to a previous stage
of development, voluntarily stepping off the path to modernity. Thus, Islamism
from the beginning was labelled an anomaly, a deviation, and as a consequence,
the initial theoretical approaches to understanding Islamism tended to focus on
what had gone wrong. One were looking for the causes behind the Islamist revival,
for the 'real' problem of which Islamism was perceived to be a symptom.
Analyses of Islamism presented within this frame of understanding vary
considerably with regard to the causes they identify as crucIal in having brought
the derailment about. However, for instanee Dekmejian's (1985) approach to
Islamism as result of crises in relation to modernisation proeesses is representative
of a bulk of the contributions. From this analytical point of departure he seeks to
explain both individuals' disposition for supporting what he chooses to term
Islamic fundamentalism, states' disposition for developing a fundamentalist mass
movement, and Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab W orId as a whole. Some of
the key crises in his analysis on the two latter levels are those of identity, misrule,
miltary impotence, and culture (Dekmejian 1985:7). Such crises constitute,
according to Dekmejian, the underlying, 'real' causes of Islamic fundamentalism
as mass movement. On the individual psychological level, he identifies personality
traits like alienation, complexes of inferiority, aggressiveness, authoritarianism,
paranoia and several more equally unattractive features as characteristics of the
fundamentalist Muslim (1985:33-35). Thus, his theory is one of social and
psychological defects, of modernisation - in the c1assical sense - gone wrong.
Daniel Pipes (1983) represents an other way of approaching this empirical field.
His main hypothesis is that high oil-prizes have produced the current resurgence
of what he, too, prefers to call Islamic fundamentalism. He bases his analysis on
the fact that most Islamist movements are subsidised by Saudi Arabia, Iran or
Libya, subsidies afforded by these states due to their large oil resources. Their
regional political ambitions make support to neighbouring countries' Islamist
movements instrumental in that it keeps their rivals busy with internal political
problems. Hence, to Pipes Islamic fundamentalism is basically a political artefact
which existence depends on the economic state of the international oil-market as
much as on anything else, and thus without a genuine belonging in modernising
Muslim societies.
Though representing distinetly different ways of explaining Islamism, these two
examples of earIy analytical approaehes to Islamism have a lot in common. First,
they tend to concentrate on what makes Islamism occur. On an aggregate leve!
they seek to explain what makes Islamist movements spring into existence, and if
operating on an individual leve!, they look for what makes people become
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Islamists. Considering that these studies were conducted at a time when the bulk
of contemporary Islamist mass movements were in creation, they can hardly be
blamed for this. However, one should keep in mind that what makes a
phenomenon spring into existence not necessarily is the same that makes it stay
in existence. Second, and in spite of due remarks about the complexity of the
phenomenon of scrutiny, they tend to trust their analysis to one-factor
explanations. Pipes concentrates on oil wealth, while Dekmejian focuses on
modernisation crisis. Finally, and connected to the above mentioned problem, they
both treat Islamsm as a substantially homogenous phenomenon. That is, it is a
precondition of their studies that Islamism everywhere is result of the same or
very similar proeesses, and that it rises and decreases everyw here for the same or
very similar reasons. Moreover, it is assumed that all expressions of the
phenomenon contain some basic elements, among which anti-Western sentiments
hold a central position. When drawing on a perception of modernity as a basically
Western phenomenon, the conc1usion that Islamism is also anti modern is thereby
c10se at hand. This is, however, a problematie conc1usion in the sense that many
Islamist movements do in fact not perceive themselves as anti modern - on the
contrary, the project of developing an Islamic modernity is central to quite a few
of them. Needless to say, they have a different understanding of modernity,
characterised by a separation of its ' hardware' - its technical and scientific
achievements - and its ' software' - the social and cultural aspects of modernity as
it exists in the Western societies. Accepting the hardware, they are reluctant to the
software - the atomization of society, consumerism, what they perceive as moral
decay - and seek to develop their own modern cultural code, based on the values
of Islam.
This brings us to the question of how one may most usefully understand
modernity. Central to the already mentioned ongoing proeess within the social
sciences of redefining this concept is the recognition that contemporary modernity
is a genuinely global phenomenon. Global modernity is characterised by certain
fundamental characteristics, but has at the same time taken on culturally specific
forms, depending on the local contexts within which it exists. As a consequence
of this empirical fait accomplis, it has become necessar to reconsider the
assumption of an inherent connection between modernity and the Western
civilisation that until recently dominated this field. This is being done in various
ways. For instance, Antony Giddens - a central contributor to this project -
detaches modernity from the specific Western context by focusing on the
institutions of modernity rather than on its historie and cultural origin. Modern
institutions are, according to Giddens, based on certain fundamental preconditions,
such as the separation of time and space that is a necessity for the modern
perception of time as ' empty' , independent from what happens during it and where
it happens. Closely related to the time-space separation is the disembedding of
social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across
indefinite spans of time-space (1990:21). Thus, it is the de-connection of society
from a specific setting, the' stretching' of social relations, which to Giddens is at
the core of modernity, and which makes it both a continuously changing and
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genuinely global phenomenon. Such a 'virtual' way of approaching modernity
differs quite radically from the conventional approach, and makes it possible to a
much larger extent than before to relate to the thought of modernity as a culturally
diversephenomenon. Consequently, it also opens up for new ways of
understanding the relationship between Islamism and modernity, and encourages
approaches focusing on variety and complexity rather than normative studies
applying the Western project as template for ' correct modernity.
This is not to say that the analytical approaehes such as those of Dekmejian and
Pipes are invalid. Their problem is not necessarily in choice of explanatory factors,
but rather in their tendency toward exc1uding others. As contemporar IslamIsm
is maturing in the Nineties, it becomes increasingly c1ear that its complexity is so
vast that one-factor approaches to it are meaningless - in fact, it appears to be so
complex that one may question the usefulness of treating it as one single
phenomenon at all. This is a view supported also by people at the inside of the
movements. For instance, Rashid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Tunisian Islamist
movement En-Nahda, defines an Islamist as a militant Muslim. Beyond that, he
acknowledges no substantial commonalties uniting the different contemporar
IslamIst movements (interview 1996). Correspondingly, Francois Burgat, French
social scientist symphatetic to the current Islamic resurgence, defines Islamism as
'the recourse to the vocabulary of Islam, used in the post-colonial period to
express within the state, or more of ten against it, an alternative political program
that uses the heritage of the West as foil, but allows nevertheless the
reappropriation of its principal references ' (1993:41), thus portraying it as a
basically rhetorical framework drawing on IslamIc concepts as alternatives to
Western ones, and applied by highly diverse political projects to reach highly
diverse political ends.
The diversity within the c1uster of movements commonly referred to as Islamist
has a number of sources. First of all, it is evident that movements spread across
a geographical and cultural area as vast as the Muslim W orId unavoidably wil be
coloured by their respective local contexts. Furthermore, as basically political
projects, most of them are developed as response to concrete national political
settings, which further diversifies them. Moreover, within such national political
settings the status of the movements vary radically , from guardians of state
ideology, like in Iran or Sudan, via positions as legitimate political opposition, like
in Jordan or Turkey, to an existence as criminalised rebels, like in Tunisia or
Algeria. Obviously, such differences in status are likely to lead to differences in
choice of strategy as well as in the ideological appearance of the movements. In
addition, in a number of Muslim countries there exists a variety of different
IslamIst movements with competing political interpretations of Islam; this further
complicates the picture. It should also be added that a considerable difference in
political and religious views seems to exist in many movements between the elite
and the common symphatisers. And last but by no means the least, as IslamIsm
is maturing into an established factor of influence in many Muslim societies, the
demarcation line between the Islamists and the ' others' becomes increasingly
blurred, due to the proeess of Islamisation of society. This proeess is characterised
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by a general strengthening of the Muslim identity, and takes various forms:
Regimes adopt aspects of Islamist ideology and generally emphasise their respect
for Islam as a strategy to increasing popular support, women adopt what originally
was the Islamist dress-code without meaning to state more by that than that they
consider themselves sincere Muslims, traditional forms of worship such as sufi-
movements integrate new religious ideas in their repetoir, public discourse takes
place within an increasingly religious rhetorical framework, and so on. Thus,
Islamisation refers to the increasing number of recently developed politico-
religious hybrids and syntheses between the new and the old, the popular and the
intellectual, the local and the universal which charaeterise a majority of
contemporary Muslim societies. Furthermore, this proeess of renewal more than
anything else suggests that the initial perception of Islamism as a derailment from
the path of modernisation may be erroneous, and rather poses the opposite
question of whether it was the after all quite brief period of post -colonial ' normal'
proeess of modernisation that was the anomaly. At the very least, it ought to lead
to a shift in focus of interest of the social sciences from the occurrence of
Islamism to its existence as an established, influential aspect of contemporary
Muslim societies.
Ernest Gellner has suggested that the current revitalisation of religion in
Muslim modernising societies, which contradiets the conventional perception of
secularisation as central aspect of modernity, may be explained in terms of the
ancient division between the scripturalist 'high Islam' of the scholars and urban
elite and the less correct 'low Islam' of the basically rural commoners. The
relationship between these two versions of Islam has historically never been
dynamic. 'High Islam's' attempts to convert the adherents of 'low Islam' have
only temporarily been successful, as tradition and folk belief have always re-
conquered the minds of the commoners and brought the proeess back to square
one. The recent modernisation of Muslim societies has, however, finally put an
end to this infertile circle, as it has removed what 'low Islam' has been feeding
on for centuries, traditional mind and society. This is, according to Gellner, the
background for Islamism's - as the currently most vital expression of 'high Islam'
- astonishing strength and vitality. Modernisation decreases the part of the
population inclined to identify with 'low Islam', but since 'high Islam' provides
a more sophisticated religious interpretation attractive to the growing modernised
parts of the population, Islam does not suffer from the secularisation that has come
with modernisation in other religions (1992:22). The dichotomy of 'high' and
'low' Islam is toa simplistie and thus misleading as a presentation of the religious
state of affairs in the Muslim world. All the same, Gellner' s argument adds an
interesting perspective to the current proeesses of Islamisation. Islamism, as a vital
vers ion of 'high Islam', seems to serve as a sort of 'database' from which
modernising Muslims in search for fulfiment of personally felt needs for meaning
pick and choose what best serves their purposes. While some are content with
fragments of it, others adopt Islamist ideology to a fuller extent. At least in the
latter case, opting for Islamism as a way of life appears to be a modern
phenomenon: In more cases than not, adherenee to it seems to be result of
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personal choices made by individuals, often in spite of the attitudes of social
surroundings, and in line with personal conviction, and is thus the act of
profoundly individualised modern human beings. In that sense, little separates
adherents of the Islamist movements from the followers of any other modern
social movement. When it comes to more fragmentary application of Islamist
ideas, or Islamisation, the variation in motivation and purpose is so vast that few
valid generalisations can be made. However, one rather interesting general point
should be mentioned: Attempts at generalising these matters appear to be rather
irrelevant for a majority of those actually involved in the current proeesses of
Islamisation, and the urge to classify and define them according to concepts like
Islamism or Islamisation seems to be significantly stronger in the West than in the
areas where they actually have an impact. An ilustration of the point: In Tunisia,
no parallels to these concepts exist in daily language - in stead, one wil tend to
apply concepts like 'the religious' or 'the brethren', which both have their own
distinet meanings. Concerning the various expressions of the proeess of
Islamisation, one wil tend to perceive them as separate phenomena, and generally
grant them an independent existence. This is not to say that concepts like Islamism
and Islamisation are useless. It is, however, areminder that they should be applied
with caution, and with awareness that they are analytical construets rather than
descriptions of actually existing empirical phenomena.
Thus, grasping the total picture of contemporary Islamism, let alone
Islamisation, is not only an unrealistic ambition, but also one that builds on a
wrong perception of the issue at hand. We find the provision and comparison of
concrete expressions of these phenomena a more instrumental approach to
understanding the current proeesses of Islamisation in the Muslim worId, and this
volume is meant as a contribution to such a project.
The following focuses up on specific cases of interactions between gender and
Islam. Historically the politicizing of gender relations has often emerged as a
salient trait of modernisation and as argued by Valentine Moghadam 'the politIcs
of gender may be especially strong in patriarchal societies undergoing development
and social change' (1992:4).
Modernisation is frequently associated with liberation from oppressive
traditions. Thus, to equate Islamisation with modernisation appears to be a
contradietion in terms. However, as argued above we perceive the current
Islamism as genuinely oriented toward creating a modern future Muslim society.
In focusing upon women's perspectives and motivations for committing themselves
to religious practice, a prominent vantagepoint emerge where Islamisation
proeesses materialise as a kind of mediator between 'tradition' and
'modernity'(See Eva Evers Rosander chapter 6 this volume).
From the publication of Women in the Muslim World in 1978 the study of
women in Muslim communities has shown a tremendous increase. In the preface
to the second edition of their book Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie noted the
strengthening of Islamic Law in various fields relating to women and the family
together with the spread of veiling among urban groups where the female dress
code had been more westernized. However, they underIine that 'this trend is less
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directed at women per se than it is at political and cultural goals - such as
breakng with a West perceived as imperialist..' (ibid. viii) .
Since then several publications, academic and popular, have put emphasis on
this trend as a central part of policy of various Islamist groups. Debates about
women' s position have become an integral part of modern Islamic discourse,
where challenges are made to go beyond the traditional statements on reiterating
the prophet s liberating effects on pre- Islamic gender structures. As noted by Ziba
Mir-Hossein (1996) the rhetoric and arguments used in this discourse acquires a
distinetly different quality if it appears in an oppositional discourse of national
politics or is appropriated by the ruling powers. The cases presented in this
volume draws on ethnographic fieldwork in local communities in Algeria, Egypt,
Jordan, Iran, Senegal and Turkey, thus potentially covering both situations of
active opposition as well as the ruling powers that be.
While women's positions in the secular and sacred realms is debated by all
Islamist groups as a prominent religious and political issue, there is as yet no
authoritative Islamist agenda concerning women, or set by women themselves.
Publications by various IslamIst groups reve al a persistent gap between public
discourse and social practice. While discourse remains largely frozen in a
conventional mould, practice is beginning to take many divergent and sometimes
unorthodox directions where also women emerge as active interIocutors that
influence the shaping of religious movements. As argued by Lisa Taraki
(1996,159-178) this is ' one area of the Islamist agenda w hich is most open to
debate and most amenable to experimentation.'. In the pages that follow we try
to capture and analyze parts of this debate.
In the West both scholarIy and popular debates seem to presume that there are
only one authoritative Islamist agenda that proscribes further development. Most
analyses of women's relation to or involvement in Islamc movements, continue
to build up on models depicting their position either as instances of false
consciousness (on the part of the women) and/or examples of victimization and
curtailment of their individual liberty by religious fanatics. While not denying the
relevanee of these positions, we contend that both women's resistance to and
, complicity' with these movements must be specified in context rather than
assumed in advance.
Two edited volumes were recently published that focus specifically on gender
and women's relationship to religious fundamentalist movements. In the
introduction to one of them, Refusing Holy Orders (Eds. G.Sagal and Nira Yuval-
Davis 1992) suppression of women is given as a prominent defining characteristic
of fundamentalism, while in Fundamentalism and Gender (Ed. John Hawley 1994)
the possibility of women's involvement is acknowledged and it is argued that
, differences of perspective are apt to ensue when women, not men, speak the
language of fundamentalism' and 'fundamentalism perspectives on gender east a
uniquely revealing light on the nature of fundamentalist as a whole'(Ibid:25 and
33). However, as noted above, we do not enter a general debate on religious
fundamentalism, but concentrate up on concept Islamism as a primarily descriptive
concept to denote phenomena often referred to in Western media as
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fundamentalism, radical Islam etc. The concept is used as a working definition for
groups that share a family likeness in the way they make religion relevant to
spheres of socIal organisation. A shared aspect among the cases presente d in this
volume is that they depict women who invest in religion as an essential part of
their identity and self-presentation. The cases ilustrate Henrietta Moore' s
reasoning that 'individuals take up a variety of subject positions through several
often mutually contradictory subject positions ' (Moore 1994:55).
The different contributions reflect upon and suggest perspectives where women
are dislocated from positions as passive signpost for moral boundaries that
demarcate the territory between believer and infidel and materialise as active
agents defining what Islam is and ought to be. In this proeess Islam, as the other
monotheistic worId religions, is opened up to reinterpretation and change. During
this proeess a range of practical and moral problems are presented to the believers,
and women are active contributors suggesting manners of resolutions both through
direct intellectual discourse and not the least through current revitalisation and
reinterpretation of religious practices.
Several of the comparative studies on religious 'fundamentalism' argue that
fundamentalist groups in their policy and rhetoric show apersistent concern with
the various others, implying a continuous re-definiton of self by drawing
boundaries between believer and non-believer, faithful and apostate. In the
symbolic marking of these boundaries women appear as a metonym for
overarching themes of religious purity and control. This preoccupation with
various representations of otherness confront the external other, often identified
with the secular West, but also internal others such as the 'opposite sex' (Hawley
1994:27). This argument about the theoretical importanee of otherness builds and
elaborate upon the 'universal inevitability' that the mother is recognized as the
first other against whom child strives to get independent identity, particularIy so
boys. However, we should note Harris' charge that the argument on female
otherness and its position within fundamentalist discourse, serves to deflect
attention from an un-examined ethnocentrism - our own feminist perceptions about
equivalency between women and men.(Ibid:29).
Making religious beliefs and practices relevant in new ways that expand its
application to new socIal spheres entails a distanciation which make people, men
and women, reflect upon the objective consensus on the worId, and start to put
questions to essentials that have gone 'without saying because it comes without
saying' (Bourdieu 1977:167). This proeess of putting into words what may have
earlier been taken for granted, engenders debates, conflcts and controversies
where assumed consensuses are liable to break down. In this proeess, religious
beliefs and practices are lifted out, politicised, and made emblematie for marking
identities and interests of larger collectivities. As noted by Deniz Kandioty, areas
linked to family and women are often entrusted as boundary markers for the
culturally uncontaminated, figuratively threatened by invading forces in times of
rapid social change.
The understanding of Islamist discourse has been firmly wedded to theorizing
about the resurgence of religious fervour as a reaction to deprivation and loss in
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the face of thwarted modernisation, the loss of authority and self assuranee of
local traditions by forces of globalisation. While not disputing such a macro
structural explanation of the fact that Islamisation policies gain ground in several
third worId societies, we chose to star from the perspective where we want to
understand not only political, but also religious aspects of the adherence to these
groups - which leads us to seek analytical concepts that serves to reveal religion
as 'something that actually takes place in human life'.
Modernity
Gellner's formulation that 'the secularisation thesis do es not apply to Islam'
(Ahmed and Hastings xiii;1994) undermine essentialist bifurcating models where
tradition opposes modernity and rationality religious faith and indicate our
common point of departure in a fruitful way.
We use the concept of modernity to refer both to indicators of technological
and economical change and to indicate a frame of mind where the authority of the
past has been displaced. As noted by several scholars (cf.Rippin 1993:6) the
definitional stanee between modern and traditional is in far more of a flux than the
dichotomy modern:traditional suggests. Hence the retention and reinterpretation of
tradition does not imply a wholesale rejection of the modern, but the continuation
of certain aspects of life in a mode authorized by the past'. Secularisation is
usually presented as a defining trait of modernisation. We have no ambition to go
beyond the formulation of middle range generalisations.
High and Low Tradition
The dialeetie between an authoritative scripturalist tradition and what is often
called mystical Islam, has a long intellectual and religious history. The historical
relation between these two types of religious traditions varies, from situations of
contradiction where the ulama attacks the tariqa for being toa close to folk Islam
and too far from sharia, to situations where the two exist in peaceful accord, the
individual adherent combining mystical devotion and traditional worship, often
described as paralleI Islam. Two contributions, by Eva Evers Rosander and
Catharina Raudvere, (see chapter 5 and chapter 6 this volume) describe and
analyse women's involvement in sufi sects. The formal leadership in both these
segments of religious practice rests with male authorities. Often the traditions and
folk beliefs associated with paraBel Islam is labelled un-islamic and heretie and
associated with the unlettered and would in most cases include women. Female
piety, their knowledge and interpretation of religion are expressed in local Islam
in ways that often raises issues concerning authenticity and orthodoxy. The
specific relation - dynamic or otherwise - between folk beliefs and scripturalist
high tradition, is one important indicator of the differentiation and changes
inherent in modernisation.
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Recruitment to Islamist groups draw heavily on the educated young, both male
and female, and several groups offer a wide choice of activities that get respons e
also among those without a job. This important characteristic of the Islamist
movement blur the high:low dichotomy and expand its appeal beyond the range
of the political and religiously active masses. While the various groups in the
movement are popular in the sense of engaging in a discourse involving 'lay'
Muslims they are certainly not 'low' in the sense of promoting beliefs and
practices deemed superstitious/heretic or erroneous by the scripturalists.
Modernisation proeesses influence the relation between scripturalist 'high'
tradition and largely non-scriptural local practices, so called 'low tradition'. While
women seldom have formal positions in the 'high' tradition linked to central
institutions like the mosque, we do find them active in the retention of a religious
orientation implied in a multitude of local settings.
Outline of the volume
The contributions are for the most part descriptive, but we seek to raise
comparative issues of a general kind. We do this by analysing religious practices
in the lives of women in various Muslim communities from Senegal to Iran. We
seek actor oriented perspectives for participation in religious activities and groups
from local perspectives and try to analyze the women and the group they are a
part of as cases encompassed and regulated by religious creed and practice on a
generalIeveL. A central focus for Islamsation proeesses is the active interference
of the state in matters of society, even though the mode and scale of this
intervention is vastly different between say Iran and Senegal. The different
contributions also indicate some of the differences state interferenee makes to
gender issues when Islamisation is linked to legitimation of the politics of the
rulers, as opposed to an ideology for the mobilisation of the opposition. ( see the
chapters of Zahra Kamalkhani and Wily Jansen this volume.)
Identity
The identity markers of sex and religion are challenging as they share in a quality
of ascribed status and deeply ingrained emotional patterns of behaviour. The
freeing of individual identity from predetermination by class, race, biological sex,
and caste have be en major issues in the historical movements of liberation in this
century, not least the struggle for women's emancipation. Religious movements
seem on the surface to go against this proeess of individuation by defending
traditional value hierarchies against the attacks that leaves the individual as the
only ultimate value that can be agreed upon (Dumont 1986). Non modern models
of the relation between the individual and her social surroundings are seen as
representing vestiges of suppression of individual human rights, or embodies
cultural systems that subordinates the individual to the collective. In an Islamic
cultural context the case ofwomen as embodiment oftheir family's social pre stige
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and symbols of male honour is often depicted as a 'hard programmed' cultural
value. Several of the cases presented analyze how women renegotiate their
location and gain larger mobility and easier access to the public arena. Crossing
the demarkation line between private and public by drawing on resources from the
formal religious discourse is a strategy used by many of the women described in
the chapters of this volume.
The debates and controversies surrounding the use of the veil in its various
forms constitute one intake to analyzing the reasoning among women around
individuation and agency. As several of the cases in this volume show, women
may don the veil as a strategic measure and pragmatic choice to enhance their
mobility and freedom of action in the non-domestic arena. On the other hand, the
imposing of the so-called Islamic dress code by political powerholders may create
an active opposition by women. During the rule of Zia UI-Haq in Pakstan the
slogan Chader aur Char Diwari lit. 'The veil and the four walls' was used to
project the political programme for Islamisation of society. Ironic comments from
women pointed to the fact that the morals and demeanour of women as well as
men were dependent on self-control manifest in Ankhoon ki Purdah, not in the
outward signs of a conservative burqa.
Women's position and role in the debates on and analysis of Islamist
movements warrants a doser attention not least for the analytical insights it may
provide into general comparative perspectives on the development of movements
of this type. Exploring perspectives and positions on the margin may also reveals
hot-be ds for the continuing appeal of the message.
As argued by several of the contributors to this volume, women are carving a
space for their own identity and thereby push against the fixed traditional
patriarchal forms of domination in several spheres. However, women are stil
marginal figures in the authoritative writings of the leadership of the various
movements, their activities and positions are explicated on the basis of
interpretations of sacred texts by male scholars, and the discourses of Islamist
groups are dearly male dominated and textual interpretation and rendition are a
highly contested and coveted expertise. Nevertheless, Anne Sofie Roalds
comparison between Christian and Muslim theological debates concerning creation,
women and the sacred (chapter L this volume) analyze an emerging intellectual
debate where female perspectives are prominent.
Dominant and subdominant discourses
The intellectual leadership in Islamist movements is in the hands of educated elite
males - but if we look for aspects of moral leadership we may begin to hear
female voices also. At first glanee women appear as mute embodiments of Islamic
princip1es emerging through a male dominated authoritative discourse. However,
the shaping of every-day religious practice and beliefs are dependent upon the
active paricipation of women. Analysis of confrontations over the correct
interpretation and implementation of religious principles related to gender relations
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opens up for readings at different leveIs. One such level is the textual exegesis and
discussion of central emblems and practices of the religion, other levels relates to
the non-verbalised code and conduct of the believers in every day life. We present
both types of discourses in this volume and while we suggest a gendered labour
division of the type where men stil dominate the hegemonic discourse, while
women are mainly visible in the rituals of piety associated with the subdominant
discourses referred to above. We fin d these qualifications important to make as
they also impinges upon explanations for the recruitment to Islamic movements
where frustrations and disappointments with promises of modernity mIght be
different for women from men.
Personal motivation and reflections upon own li fe before and after activating
commitment to Islamic religious and ritual practices emerge as central in several
of the contributions. The divide between before and after may appear more or less
dramatic in the individual cases, from the woman who spe aks of her life in terms
of before and after her big Jahiliya,(Soraya Duval chapter 2 this volume) to the
type of gradual change implied in reorganising lifestyle and shifting commitments
between work outside the home and domestie dutIes implied in the cases presented
by Wily Jansen (chapter 3).
The religious tenets for the two genders' performanee of the five pilars of the
religion - Kalrna, Namaz, fasting, Zakat and Haj are as we know different. The
reasons given why women should postpone their ritual performanee of prayer etc.
refer to female bodily functions like menstruation, childbirth or, for both genders,
sexual intercourse.
Ritual impurity are thus inherent and inscribed in the female body - a body that
both serves as a metonym and a tangible site for the honour of family groups
related to the women. Women's self awareness and changing routines for bodily
practices such as takng a bath, impinges upon and invItes further reflections on
changing borders between private and public in utilising modern amenities such
as the shower (see M. Buitelaar chapter 5 this volume).
A defining element of Christian as well as of IslamIc religious practice is the
notion of hierarchy, that is not easily translated into a secular one where ranking
implies a superior/inferior ranking system. Here, the ordering connotes a
proximity/ distance relation to God and one ethnographic theme that runs through
the different chapters in this volume is the position and quality of female piety in
relation to seeking religious merit and divine blessing on behalf of self and others.
Accepting that the female subject has to submit to other and more cIrcumscribed
domains from where to seek divine blessing, we should note their contribution to
and submIssion to acts which are classified as mandatory (jarz), their initiative to
go beyond and undertake acts of devotion that bring religious merit (sawab), and
those that may acquire Gods blessing (barakat) and avoid the category of acts
that are deemed (gunnah) 'sinful' or classified as absolutely forbidden (haram).
The various chapters in this volume present detailed analyses of ways women
participate in and contribute to an Islamic construetion of reality, demonstrate how
religious experience always is gendered, and lift out women's activities in 'high'
as well as 'low' Islam.
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Feminist Reinterpretation of Islamic Sources:
Muslim Feminist Theology in the Light of the
Christian Tradition of Feminist Thought
Anne Sofie Roald
Introduction
In the last decade there has been an increasing concern with women's rights in
Islam. Not only have Muslim feminists highlighted the status of women in Muslim
societies but Islamists, l male and female, have also joined the debate, stressing
the liberating potential Islam has for women. During my fieldwork which in
Malaysia in 1991-92, I came across a group called 'Sisters in Islam'. It consisted
mainly of highly educated Malay women, but also included some Western
converts to Islam. They had an Islamic profie and they distributed pamphIets with
titles such as Are Muslim men allowed to beat their wives ? In Karachi, Pakistan,
in February 1992 I met a group of women at Karachi University with a very
simIlar perspective. During my visit to Jordan in April 1992, I found that in regard
to women issues, female perspectives were mainly a matter for the more
secularised forces of society. However, on revisiting Jordan in the summer of 1995
I was thrown directly into the debate on the Muslim woman' s position in society.
It was interesting that this debate was conducted inone of the headquarters of the
Islamists in Jordan, in the Islamic Studies and Research Association (ISRA), also
known as the Jordanian centre for the International Institute of Islamic Thought
(HIT). In a period of three years Islamists' attitudes towards gender and gender
relations had changed character. Muslim women's reinterpretation of Islamic
sources is thus a matter of interest as it is not only an intellectual discussion
within a feminist sphere but has entered the contemporary Islamist debate, as well.
This study wil focus on the feminist intellectual discussion: what has been
done in this respect and which subjects have been considered significant. Can
feminist reinterpretation of Islamic sources be set in the context of Islamic
theology, Le. is it possible that this trend might influence established Islamic
I use the term 'Islamism' and avoid using the term IslamIc fundamentalism as fundamentalism
denotes a Christian direction with aliterar reading of the Bible. Islamism does not imply a
literary reading of the IslamIc sources, rather it promotes the idea of regarding Islam as "a
complete system", a body of ideas, values, beliefs and practices encompassing all spheres of
life (cf. Haddad 1987; Roald) 1994.
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theology? It is also of importanee to examine the Muslim feminist tradition' s
relevanee to a Christian feminist theology: what similarities exist and where do
they divert?
The centennial anniversary of the publication of The Woman's Bible was
observed in 1995. Elizabeth Cady Stanton was the main editor of this work and
together with the black feminist Anna Julia Cooper's book, A Voice from the
South (1892), it marked a turning point in Christian feminist theology. EarIy Arab
feminists, such as the Lebanese Nazira Zayn ad-Din, incorporated feminist ideas
into an Islamic frame of reference. In 1928 she published a book called Removing
the Veil and Ve iling, which aroused the anger of Islamic scholars. It wil be
interesting to see whether Muslims wil only repe at the development of the
Christian tradition or whether Islam is so inherently different from Christianity that
a comparison between the two religions is impossible. This question can also be
posed regarding matters such as whether Islam wil be just as secularized as is
Christianity, in the sense of aseparation between church and state (din wa dunya).
I suggest that the development of feminist ideas within an Islamic framework
necessarily wil end up in asking such a question, but in the inauguration of a
feminist reinterpretation of Islamic sources other matters are emphasized.
Reformation or Reconstruction
An important issue in the Christian and Judaic feminist tradition is whether the
aim is refarmation or reconstruction. On the one hand, feminists can regard the
holy text as limited by its historie al context and thus fragment it, classifying the
fragments according to what is regarded as either universal and essential or
culturally relative. On the other hand, feminists can regard the holy text as
androcentric and manmade in the interest of men. The last position was that of
Cady Stanton and the implication of this point of view is far-reaching.
Another issue which is closely related to the question of reform or
reconstruction is whether interpretation of the holy text should be within a
patriarchal framework or outside it. A reform would imply a degree of acceptance
of existing ideas whereas a reconstruction would imply a refutation of the same
ideas. Within the tradition of feminist theological hermeneuties, Carolyn Osiek
distinguishes between five hermeneutie approaehes to the biblical text by
contemporary feminists: loyalist, revisionist, sublimationist, rejectionist, and
libe rationist.
According to Osiek, the loyalists accept the bible as divine revelation and the
word of God but at the same time they claim the divine intention of man and
woman living together in happiness and respect.2 Turid KarIsen Seim, a
Norwegian researcher on The new testament, speaks of fundamentalist woman' s
exegesis,3 thus indicating a literal reading of the text, and this particular approach
2 Osiek 1985:99.
3 Discussion with Turid Karlsen Seim February 16. 1995.
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fits into Osiek's loyalistcategory. The revisionists, according to Osiek, believe that
the patriarchal framework for the Judaeo-Christian tradition is historically and
culturally but not theologically determined.4 The revisionist approach to reading
the bible involves a search for positive role models for women and an
interpretation of the text from a feminist point of view. The sublimationists tend
to read the bible allegorically, presupposing equality of maleness and femaleness
or even a preference for femininity.5 She characterizes Cady Stanton among the
rejectionists, stating that as regards the bible as well as Christianity and Judaism,
Cady Stanton considered them so permeated by patriarchal ideas that they had to
be rejected. The fifth category, liberationist feminism, yearns for a transformation
of the social order. The focus is on women's liberation in this worId through a
female struggle against all oppression.6 These five categories can be incorporated
into the model of refarmation and reconstruction where loyalists, revisionists and
sublimationists can be classified as reformers whereas rejectionists and
liberationists are reconstructers.
In the new Muslim feminist tradition several of these categories defined by
Osiek are visible. Nawwal al-Saadawi can be characterized as rejectionist, whereas
from the writings of Amina Wadud-Muhsin and Riffat Hassan we can classify
them both as loyalist and revisionist. Fatima Mernissi and Leila Ahmad are the
closest to the liberationist scholarship. However, these categories are not totally
distinguishable. Islam plays such a fundamental role in Muslim societies that for
a social reformer to exc1ude Islam necessarily means faIlure. Many feminists, who
previously struggled against female oppression in Western feminist terms have
therefor now adapted to a more favourable attitude towards Islam. This is true for
feminists such as Fatima Mernissi. It seems that in her study Beyond the Veil
(1977) she considered that changes in the conditions of women could be done
without the frames of Islam, whereas in her book Women and Islam (1987) she
has shifted attitude and believes that such a change has to be done from within
Islam through a reinterpretation of Islamic sources. However, Mernissi does not
give her point of view on the authority of the Koran in either of these two works.
The work of Leila Ahmad also points in the same direction, as she is vague in her
attitude towards Islam. In her 1992 book Gender and Women in Islam, she
expresses the view that Islam's coming brought with it a deterioration in the status
of women in some places, whereas in other places it had a liberating effect. She
does not, however, explicitly reject Islam,but rather the common interpretations of
the Islamic sources. It seems that by focusing on Islam, the principles of female
liberation have acquired a certaiii validity in Muslim society, as
IslamIcally-minded women would sympathize with pars of their arguments.
As for Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan, both tend to analyze the Koran within a
framework accepted by many Islamic scholars. Although many of their arguments
4 Osiek 1985:100.
5 Osiek 1985: 102.
6 Osiek 1985: 103.
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would be contested by these scholars, their works are part of an internal Islamic
debate.
The Question of Authority
The question of authority is a vitalone in both the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic
debates. There are two levels of authority concerning the holy scriptures, the
authority of the text and the authority of the interpretation of the text. Elisabeth
Schüssler Fiorenza has noted that the feminist biblical discourses have been caught
up in an apologetic debate which seeks to show that the Bible, or at least parts of
it, is either liberating and therefore has authority for women...or that it is totally
patriarchal and must be rejected.i7 This issue, which she labels 'the apologetic
debate' is very much part of the new Muslim feminist debate although less explicit
than in the Judaeo-Christian debate which has gone on for more than a hundred
years. As shown above, in most of her work Mernissi does not explicitly reject the
Koran as the word of God, but neither does she explicitly accept it.
The concept of the holy text as the word of God has today different
implications in Christianity and Islam. A common notion among researchers of
Islam has been that the Koran is to Islam what Jesus is to Christianity. The
development of the historical-critical method in the biblical debate has revealed
that the question of whether the Bible contains words coming directly from God
or whether it is only human narration about holy persons and happenings is not
as fundamental as the question of whether the Koran is the word of God or not.
It is possible to regard Jesus as 'the son of God' in spite of a degrading of the
holy text, whereas Islam's theology is contingent on the belief that Koran is the
word of God (kalãm allãh) which exists in heaven 'in a preserved tablet (fï
lawhin mahfuz (K. 85:22)).
The question of authority related to the interpretation of the Islamic sources is
emphasised in the debate. In Christianity, Schüssler Fiorenza has noted that the
project of The Woman's Bible started 'with the realization that throughout the
centuries the Bible has be en invoked both as a weapon against and as a defence
for subjugated women in their struggles for access to citizenship, public speaking,
theological education, or ordained ministry.,8 This ambiguity of the holy text rests
on differences of interpretation. As every interpreter has his or her own distinctive
biography, this wil influence the reading of the text. The interpreter' s biography
involves a person's specific character-traits, upbringing and experiences as well as
class status and gender.9
7 Schüssler Fiorenza 1994:5.
8 Schüssler Fiorenza 1994.
9 Hastrup 1992; Hastrup studies fieldwork methodology and the role of the ethnographer. The
ethnographer also performs an act of interpretation and her study can therefore be transferred
to the sphere of interpretation of Holy Texts.
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There is, however, another issue involved in Schüssler Fiorenza's expression.
As theological deductions from the sacred texts have been a matter for elite males
and thus favourable for men at the expense of female interests, religion has been
the means for women to endure oppression. Schüssler Fiorenza has asserted that
women's biblical heritage is 'at one and the same time a source for women's
religious power and for women's suffering.'10
An important question to pose is, who has the authority to interpret the Islamic
sources? The traditional understanding in Islam has been that the interpreters of
Islamic theology should be males only. Due partly to the gender-segregation in
Muslim society with a traditional division of labour, where men are in charge of
the civil life whereas women are supposed to keep to the domestie sphere, and
partly to the low educational standard Muslim women used to have, the ideas of
female Koranic interpreters have been refuted. There are records of female
intellectuals and teachers in Muslim history,l1 but it is difficult to judge whether
these women just transmitted male knowledge or created knowledge of their own.
Female Perspectives
A probable hypothesis would be that when female perspectives come into focus
the interpretations of the Islamic sources change. However, this is not always true.
The first know n woman to comment on the Koran was A'isha ' Abd ar-Rahman
(Bint ash-Shati') born in 1913 in Egypt. She was a professor of Arabic literature
in Cairo and a professor of KoranIc studies in Morocco. According to Andrew
Rippin, a researcher on Islam, A'isha ' Abd ar-Rahman saw the Koranic aim to be
spiritual and religious guidance, and not to give historical facts.12 Although she
emphasises the importanee of regarding the Koran according to time and place of
revelation, her approach is not feminist. It is interesting to note that Schüssler
Fiorenza stresses that a woman who reads the Bible does not necessarily read it
from a female perspective. She claims that 'to the contrary, women's writing and
spe aking often function to mediate and reinforce kyriarchal behaviour.' 13 She
further argues:
One must also consider that women, even more than men, have internalized
cultural-religious feminine values and that they consequently tend to reproduce
uncritically the patriarchal politics of submission and otherness in their speaking
and writing.14
As for ' A'isha ' Abd ar-Rahman, Schüssler Fiorenza's observation seems
plausible. Rippin has labelled her as 'neo-traditionalist and states that her
10 Schüssler FIorenza 1994.
11 Berkey 1991:143-157.
12 Rippin 1993:94.
13 Schüssler Fiorenza 1994:14.
14 Schüssler Fiorenza 1994: 15.
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approach to the Koran is 'conservativeiJ5 Although she is critical, her criticism
is more directed to the rigidity of earlier interpretations in general, rather than to
traditional assumptions of femininity or womanhood.
It took a little more than thirty years from the publication of The Women's
Bible in 1895, to the first femInist interpretation of the Islamic sources. However,
from this first step up to the nineteen seventies and eighties, Muslim feminists
tended to regard the feminist case in purely Western terms and Islam was not
brought into the debate. With the advent of the Islamic resurgence from the end
of the sixties onwards the Islamic issue came to the forefront even in the feminist
debate. In a short time many Muslim women have published books and aricles
dealing with a reinterpretation of the Islamic sources. It is also interesting to note
that in the nineties two Islamic scholars, Muhammad al-Ghazzãli and Abd
al-Halim Abü Shaqqa, have taken up the subject of Muslim women. They take
their starting point in the present situation of oppression in the Muslim worId,
claiming this to be a result of ignorance of 'the true Islam'. Their method is a
reinterpretation of the ahãdnh (Prophet Muhammad' s sayings, actions and
decisions (sing. hadith) in two stages. Firstly, they take care to verify the
authenticity of the hadnh, as they claim that many ahãdith previously regarded as
authentic (sahih) in reality are either good (hasan), weak (daï'f), or forged.16 The
sec ond step is to interpret the ahãdith in the light of the Koran. if the common
interpretation is not compatible with the Koranic text, the hadith if authentic, has
to be reinterpreted in order to agree with the Koranic view. Abu Shaqqa in
particular, c1aims that many widespread ahãdnh talking about women in a negative
way are forged. These scholars' efforts seem to be independent of the recent
Muslim feminism. Rather, their works can be regarded as part of a discourse with
'the West'. The massive attack by Western scholars on the position of women in
Islam has opened up the issue for reinterpretations by well-known Islam scholars.
The issue of gender relations is sensitive in a Muslim context and it requires
courage as well as a good reputation to open up such an issue. The reactions of
other Islamic scholars have been harsh, but less harsh than the re action towards
the Muslim feminists.17
In 1982 Women's Studies International Forum Magazine dedicated an issue to
the subject Women and Islam. Apar from contributions by researchers on Islam,
Muslim feminists were also invited to come forward. Aziza al-Hibri wrote A story
of Islamic herstory: Or how did we eve r get into this mess?, which was influenced
by the contemporary biblical feminist debate. Nawwal al-Saadawi and Fatima
15 Rippin 1993:94.
16
In science of hadïth these three categories sahïh, hasan and da'ifrelate to the authenticity of
the chain of narrators (isnad) and to the text (matn) of the hadnh.
17 Amina Wadud-Muhsin went to South-Africa and during her stay there she gave a lecture in one
of the mosques. The reaction of the ulamã was hard. In one of the periodicals, The Majlis:
Voice of Islam, she was attacked and one of the statements was: ' Anyone who claims to be a
Muslim and then supports any satanic scheme of reinterpreting the Koran or the shar'ïa leaves
the fold of Islam. He is a murtadd (apostate).The Majlis: Voice of Islam 1994:5 (voL. 11 No .7).
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Mernissi also contributed articles to the magazine, but their contributions are
marked by a secular approach and they are more concerned with Muslim practice
than with overarching theological questions. In 1985 Riffat Hassan brings up
'theological inquiries' into the Islamic sources. She emphasizes the equality of the
sexes which can be read out of the story of creation in the Koran and she
compares this view with the hadïth literature where one can find a totally opposite
view on gender relations. Fatima Mernissi published Women and Islam in 1987,
drawing attention to the ahãdi-h on women in order to investigate their
authenticity. She chooses to concentrate on the reliability of the narrators of these
ahãdi-h. She argues that Abü Hurayra, a famous narrator of ahãdi-h was a
misogynist, thus colouring the ahãdi-h he transmitted from the Prophet with his
own views.18
She also attacks the use of hijãb (the head-scarf), claiming that there is no
Koranic evidence that the wearing of a veil is an Islamic obligation. 19 Refusal of
the Islamic use of a veil is common among Muslim feminists. Leila Ahmad, in her
book Women and Gender in Islam, argues that veilng for women was a
requisition for the wives of the Prophet only.20 It is interesting to note that the
idea of veiling as a symbol of oppression has been rejected by Samira Fayyãd, a
leading Islamist who has been active in the struggle for female influences in the
Islamist movement in Jordan. She wrote in an article:
There are many roots of this insignificance in women' s position. The first of
which is the divergence of women's liberation movements away from the essenee
of the problem. Those involved in the movement should have joined the
mainstream of a general liberation movement working for the liberation of man
and woman in times when both were suffering. Upholding her banner of women's
liberation emphasized her peculiarities as female and overIooked her integral
nature as a rational and sensible human being. Rather she should have concerned
herself with the national problems side by side along with men bearing full
responsibility, ignoring marginal matters such as changing dress-styles and other
trivialities.21
The issue of the veil exposes fully the tension in the Muslim feminist debate
between the reformers and the reconstructers. As the debate is in its inaugural
phase the differences are to an extent smoothed, whereas the tension wil probably
be more and more visible in the progress of the debate.
The most common issues in the contemporary feminist reinterpretation of Islamic
sources are:
(1) Reevaluation of Islamic sources
(2) Criticism of the use of Islamic sources
18 Mernissi 1991:62-81.
19 Mernissi 1991: 85- 10 L.
20 Ahmad 1992:55.
21 Fayyãd 1992:3.
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(3) Criticism of interpretations of Islamic sources
( 4) Equality of men and women in the Koran
I wil exemplify these issues by referring to two Muslim feminists, Amina
Wadud-Muhsin and Riffat Hassan. As stated earlier, both these two can be
classified in the loyalist and revisionist approach as identified by Carolyn Osiek.
I have chosen to deal only with the reform feminists as there is a probability that
common Muslims and Islamists wil take their views into account and thereby
open a discussion with them. This has to a certain extent been done as Amina
Wadud-Muhsin received the King Faysal Prize for her academic work Qur'an and
Women in 1994. The reputation of Fatima Mernissi and Nawwal al-Saadawi, in
Muslim society is that of 'Western feminists' and very few Muslims outside the
ranks of Muslim femInists would find their writings relevant.
Re-evaluation of Islamic Sources
Amina Wadud-Muhsin has in her work been concerned with the study of the
Koran only. She has not taken ahädi-h into consideration. Hassan, on the other
hand, devotes a great part of her study to ahädïth although she states that she wil
concentrate on the Koran as it is ' the primary source of normative Islam' .22 She
explains ahädi-h to be 'the lens through which the words of the Koran have been
seen and interpreted. ,23 She takes her starting point in a discussion of 'the
Islamic tradition' which she con siders to be the Islamic texts (Koran and ahädi-h)
as well as the whole body of regulations and laws built on these texts. She refers
both to the refutations of ahädi-h by what she calls 'moderate' Muslims, such as
the Pakistani intellectual, Ghulam Ahmad Parwez, and the Indian scholar Moulvi
Cheragh Ali and to the quotations of famous orientalist scholars, such as Alfred
Guilaume and H. A. R. Gibb where they invalidate the hadïth literature. By this
she manages to raise doubts to the validity of ahädïth. Although she believes that
one has to be sceptical towards the hadi-h literature, she sees that to a certain
extent the ahädïth are necessary and she agrees with the saying of Fazlur Rahman:
'if the hadi-h literature as a whole is east away, the basis for the historicity of the
Koran is removed with one stroke. ,24
Criticism of the Use of IslamIc Sources
Both Amina Wadud-Muhsin's and Riffat Hassan's approach to the study of the
Koran is in the first place hermeneutical. Wadud-Muhsin explains her
hermeneutical model as being concerned with firstly, the context in which the
22 Hassan 1990:93.
23 HasanI990:94.
24 Hassan 1990:94.
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Koranic passages were written, secondly, the grammatical composition of these
passages and thirdly, the worId-view of the Koran.25 As for the latter she states
that most of the former Koran commentators would have an atomIstic
methodology, as they would interpret one verse at the time without regarding the
text as one part of a whole.26
Hassan claims that 'religion is being used as an instrument of oppression rather
than as a means of liberation.'27 She further argues that 'the negative attitudes
pertaining to women which prevail in Muslim societies, in general, are rooted in
theology.'28 She believes that Muslims in general 'consider it a self-evident truth
that women are not equal to me,29 a belief which in Hassan's view lies in three
theological assumptions:
1. that God' sprimary creation is man, not woman, since woman is believed to
have been created from man's rib, hence is derivative and ontologically secondary;
2. that woman, not man, was the primary agent of what is customarily
described as 'Man's Fall' or Man's expulsion from the garden of Eden, hence 'all
daughters of Eve' are to be regarded with hatred, suspicion and contempt; and
3. that woman was created not only from man, but also for man, which makes
her existence merely instrumental and not of fundamental importance.30
Hassan gives three main explanations of these theological assumptions. Firstly, the
patriarehal environment in Muslim society has made Islamic scholars during
history interpret IslamIc sources in terms of male hegemony. Secondly, many
ahãdith with negative attitudes towards women are in circulation in Muslim society
although their authenticity has been questioned and their popularity , even among
Islamic scholars, points to the view of women as subordinated to men, as being
deeply embedded in Muslim society.3! In presenting her arguments, Hassan also
indicates that many ahãdïth about women are forged as she believes that there are
incompatibilities between passages in the Koran and many of these ahãdïth. She
even criticizes the position of the hadah collections by al-Bukhãri and Muslim in
Islamic jurisprudence, believing that Muslims accept the two collections as being
on a like footing with the Koran.
To IslamIc scholars, Islamists and even common Muslims criticism of the
ahãdah might be regarded as criticism against Islam itself. This makes the project
of a feminist reading of the Islamic sources a very delicate matter as there exist
utterances related to the Prophet which convey negative views of women such as,
25 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:3.
26 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:2.
27 Hassan 1990:96.
28 Hassan 1990:96.
29 Hassan 1990:100.
30 Hassan 1990:100-101.
3! Hassan 1990:103.
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for instanee that the majority of the inhabitants of Hell are women.32 Some
feminists would refute these sayings, claiming them as forgeries, whereas others,
such as Amina Wadud-Muhsin have chosen to leave out the matter of ahãdïth and
concentrate solelyon the Koranic text and its previous interpreters. However, this
method is problematie as the ahãdïth are regarded as the explanation of the Koran
and thus have strong authority in Islamic Theology. Others again, such as the
Islamist Samira Fayyãd, together with male Islamists, such as Muhammad
al-Ghazzãli and ' Abd al-Halim Abu Shaqqa, would explain these ahãdïth
hermeneutically, emphasising the specific situation of every hadïth. Thus this
specific hadïth mentioned above would be explained as an admonition made by
the Prophet to women in general and should be understood as a general reminder
(tadkira).33
The differences in interpretations and understandings of ahãdïth point at the
multivalenee of the text. Not only wil ahãdïth be interpreted differently in
different contexts, but it also depends on the interpreter how the text wil be
perceived. The subject of the researcher is also decisive for the understanding of
the text. A researcher on gender relations in Islam wil search for statements about
women only and might fail to notice that there are expressions about men and
human beings in the Islamic sources which convey negative views of both men as
a category and mankind as a whole. However, these statements have not been
understood as generalizations by Muslims themselves, but rather as admonitions
and reminders that human beings should follow the path of God. On the other
hand, as even Islamist scholars have noticed, many ahãdïth have actually been
interpreted in terms of male preference or have been presented as authentIc (sahi1)
although they are either only good (hasan) or weak (da'if ).34
Criticism of Interpretations of the Islamic Sources
The traditional interpretation of Islamic sources is high on the agenda of the
modern feminist debate. Wadud-Muhsin discusses the objectivity of the
interpreters of the Koran, claiming that not one of them can be wholly objective
as their ' subjective choices' would colour the result of their research. Her main
criticism is not of the commentators, but rather of the common conception that
there is no distinetion between text and interpretation; thus there is a tendency to
elevate interpretations to a holy level. She characterizes three approaehes to the
interpretations of women in the Koran: 'traditional', 'reactive', and 'holistie' .35
She explains the 'traditional' exegetical works (tafãsïr sing. tafsïr) as those which
interpret the entire Koran with certain objectives in mInd, such as grammar,
esoterism, rhetoric, history, or legislation. She claims this approach to be atomIstic
32 Muslim 1971:1431 (voL. IV).
33 Abu Shaqqa 1990:273.
34 cJ. Abu Shaqqa 1990; al-Ghazzãli 1989; al-Ghazzãli 1991; al-Qardãwi 1990.
35 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:2.
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with no underIying hermeneutical principles in order to interpret each part of the
Koran in the light of the Koran as a whole. In addition, all of these interpretations,
both from classical and modern times, have been written by men, and Wadud-
Muhsin thus believes that women' s experiences have been either excluded from
the text or ' interpreted through male vision, perspective, desire, or needs of
women. ,36
The 'reactive' approach to the interpretation of the Koran has, according to
Wadud-Muhsin, mainly been concerned with criticism of the Koran and Islam.
Modern scholars have justified this criticism because of the poor status of women
in Muslim society. However, Wadud-Muhsin states that these scholars, likewise,
do not distinguish between the text and the interpreter. 37
The aim of Wadud-Muhsin's study is to demonstrate the best to ol for the
liberation of Muslim women, namely to turn to the Koran, 'the primar source of
IslamIc ideology and theology' .38 This represents the third approach, the 'holistie'
interpretation of the Koran. According to her, this method includes modern social,
moral, economic, and political aspects and even the issue of women.39 She refers
to Fazlur Rahman's principle of interpreting Koranic passages, saying:
He (Fazlur Rahman) suggests that all Koranic passages, revealed as they were in a specific
time in history and within certain general and particular circumstances, were given
expression relative to those circumstances. However, the message is not limited to that time
or those circumstances historically. Areader must understand the implications of the
Koranic expressions during the time in which they were expressed in order to determine
their proper meaning. That meaning gives the intention of the rulings or principles in the
particular verse.40
The project of reinterpretation or of turning back to the primary sources without
regarding previous scholarship as infallble, started with the intellectual salafiyya
movement in the nineteenth century. Although women's issues were not
particularly emphasized, some reforms in the view of women were visible. One
example is Muhammad Abduh's interpretation of the verse of polygamy in the
Koran. Turning away from the common understanding that marring more than
one woman is well accepted, if not obligatory, he suggested that the last part of
the verse should take effect, namely: 'But if you fear that you might not be able
to treat them (the wives) with equal fairness, then (marry only) one....This wil
make it more likely that you wil not deviate from the right course (K. 4:3).'
In Western society the feminist thought achieved a breakthrough in the sixties and
seventies and brought with it a kind of relativism, as perspectives changed. It
became obvious that 'the objectivity' of the researcher was only an ilusion.
36 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:2.
37 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:2.
38 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:3.
39 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:3.
40 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:4.
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Various sciences opened up for new interpretations as it became obvious that
previous research results have been dominated by male perspectives. The
reinterpretation of the Islamic sources by women is a new project and the next
decades wil show us whether this project has any future. Let us now turn to the
reinterpretation in order to examine the elements involved.
Equality of Men and Women in the Koran
Initially in the Muslim feminist theological debate the idea of equality between the
sexes in the Koran is emphasized. This study is mainly concerned with the
ideological level and wil thus take up the question how gender relations have
been perceived anthropologically and cosmologically. I wil concentrate on two
main issues: How is the creation of human being in the Koran interpreted by the
feminists? And how do they perceive the role of women on earth?
Creation of Human Being
Wadud-Muhsin asks the questions:
'Do the Koranic accounts of the proeess of the creation of humankind distinguish
woman from man in such a way as to confine her potential to a single biologically
determined role? Does it imply created inferiority?'
She argues that although the Koran distinguishes between man and woman she
fin ds no differences in value between them. It is, however, important to notice that
Islamic scholars in various times have accentuated the very same point, but they
have tended to link this equality to the relationship between man and the Creator
only. Thus, equality of man and woman for both madhhabists41 and the more
modern Islamists signifies religious equality, Le. equality in Islamic obligations,
such as praying and fasting; whereas sociologically man and woman are depicted
to have different roles. This division of roles related to gender contrasts with the
Western paradigm where social equality rests in the first place on economic
equality: whether women have either private economical means or property or take
active par in the production of society.
Wadud-Muhsin has attacked the common understanding of gender relations in
Islam. She bases her arguments concerning equality between men and women in
the Koran on human being's incomprehension of the supernatural.42 To make
these matters understandable for mankind, according to her, they need to be
rendered in human language,. Thus, in the Koran we can find references to other
worIdly happenings which we as human beings must interpret allegorically.43
41 c.f. Roald 1994:17. Idefine madhhabist as those Muslims who adhere to the madhhabs (the
four law-schools).
42 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:15-16.
43 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:16.
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Wadud-Muhsin turns to the story of creation in the Koran. She believes that
attitudes towards women in Muslim society are built on the interpretation of this
story. She takes her starting point in the Koranic verse:
And from (min) His signs (ayãt) is that He created you (humankind) from (min) a single
soul (nafs), and created from (min) it its mate (zawj), and from (min) these two He spread
countless men and women (K. 4:1)
From this verse she extracts key terms, such as min, nafs and zawj. As for min she
claims that it can be used for the preposition from in the meaning of extracting
things from other things. It can also, according to Wadud-Muhsin, be used to
imply , of the same nature as' and she states that in the Koranic verse above the
meaning changes according to which translation of the preposition one chooses.
She refers to al-Zamakhshãri (d. 1144 CE.), a famous commentator on the Koran,
saying that he interprets this verse as meaning that 'humankind was created in/of
the same type as a single nafs, and that the zawj of that nafs was taken from that
nafs.' She says that he has found backing for his argumentations in biblical
versions.44 It is important to be aware of that most of the commentators of the
Koran from the first centuries of Islamic history onwards incorporated many
Jewish interpretations or Talmudic accounts of various biblical stories (isrã'ï liyãt)
which have their counterparts in the Koran. In the modern Islamist debate,
however, many of these stories have been weeded from these tafãsïr. One example
is the famous tafsïr by Imãd ad-Di n Ibn Kathir (d.1372 CE.), which in the
nineteen-seventies was examined by Shaykh Muhammad ' Ali as-Sãbuni. The res ult
was presented as mukhtasar tafsïr Ibn Kathïr (Shortened Commentary by Ibn
Kathir) and it is regarded as containing only authentic materiaL.
With this in mind we have to turn back to Wadud-Muhsin's discussion on the
preposition min and how the Koranic verse changes its meaning according to
which understanding of min is used. She states implicitly that al-Zamakhshãri
arrived at his conclusion wrongly as he depended on biblical materiaL. However,
I would argue that al-Zamakhshãri' s conclusion is not based on these biblical
materials which are classified as isrã'i1yãt; rather it is a res ult of the
understanding of a hadïth found in the hadnh collections of both al-Bukhari and
Muslim related by Abu Hurayra and thus accepted as authentic by orthodox Islam:
Treat women kindly. The woman has been created from a rib, and the most crooked part
of the rib is in the upper region. It you try to make it straight, you wil break it, and if you
leave it as it is, it wil remain curved. So treat women kindly.45
Wadud-Muhsin actually mentions this hadïth in a footnote, saying that according
to Riffat Hassan the hadïth, although authentic, belongs to the category of hadïth
44 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:18.
45 AI-Bukhari 1984:346 (volA); Muslim 1971:752 (voL.2).
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ãhãd which means that this hadith was reported by one person only.46 Hassan has
rejected, not only the authority of chain of narrators (isnãd), as nobody other than
Abü Hurayra has related this hadi1h, but also the text (matn) of the hadith.47 Both
Hassan and Wadud-Muhsin reject the hadah as normative.
Hassan also emphasizes that 'God's original creation was undifferentiated
humanity and not either man and women' .48 She proves this by pointing to the
meaning of ' Adam" in Hebrew which is ' of the soil'. She further says that the
Hebrew term' Adam' refers to 'the human' (speeies) rather than to a male human
being and in the Koran the term is used, in twenty-one cases out of twenty-five,
to refer to humanity . She also states that the Koran uses both feminine and
masculine terms and imagery to describe the creation of humanity from a single
source.49 In addition, the creation of Eve (Arabic: Hawwã') from Adam's rib is
never mentioned in the Koran, and even in the hadith referred to above, Adam is
not named. Hassan interprets the function of this hadith to be 'further
'dehumanization' for women since the female species could - in the ahãdith in
question - have been created from a disembodied rib which may not even have
been human. ,50 It is interesting to note that a rnnority of Islamic scholars, such
as Muhammad al-Ghazzãli, are of the view that hadah ãhãd should not be
normative either in legislation or in doctrine. There is thus a controversy between
orthodox Islamic scholars which substantiates Wadud-Muhsin's criticism of
al-Zamakhshari' s analysis of the Koranic verse above.
The next key term to be dealt with is nafs. Wadud-Muhsin observes that
grammatically, nafs is feminine, whereas it conceptually is neither masculine nor
feminine as according to her, the Koran never states that the creation of
humankind started with the nafs of Adam. Thus she considers that the Koran does
not express the creation of humankind in terms of gender.51
Both Hassan and Wadud-Muhsin have de alt with the key term zawj.
Wadud-Muhsin stresses that zawj is masculine, grammatically speaking, whereas
conceptually it is neither masculIne nor feminine. Hassan goes further, saying that
whereas the Koranic usage of azwãj refers to the married couple; man and woman,
another form for 'couple', namely zawjayn (dual form of zawj), describes the
proeess of ongoing creation, referring to the Koranic verses:
1.' And it is He who has created the two kinds (zawjayn), male and female out of
a drop of sperm as it is poured forth' (K.53:45-46).
2. 'Does human being, then, think, that he is left without a purpose? Was he not
once a drop of sperm emitted? Then he did become a leech whereupon He created
46 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:18-20.
47 Hassan 1990:102.
48 Hassan 1990: 102
49 Hassan 1990: 102.
50 Hassan 1990:127 (footnote).
51 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:20.
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and formed (him) in due proportion. And he made out of him two sexes
(zawjayn); male and female' (K. 75:36-39).
She concludes from this that man and woman are 'two sexually-differentiated
human beings - created by God from a unitary source (nafsin wãhidatin).' Man
and woman are therefore, according to Hassan, 'related to each other ontologically,
not merely sociologically.' 52
As for the common notion of women as temptresses prevailng in the
Judaeo-Christian worId as well as among Muslims, Wadud-Muhsin rejects the
notion that this should be part of Islamic theology. She states that the Koran uses
the dual form, with one exception, to tell how Satan tempted Adam and his mate
(zawj) and how both disobeyed God.53 The one exception shows how Adam was
tempted by Satan, and then the two of them (Adam and his mate) ate of the
forbidden tree.54
According to Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan the creation of humankind is thus
gender-neutral and nothing in the Koran or in reliable ahãdïth points at to male
gender as morally or intellectually superior to the female. Male and female as
types are thus equally before God, with the same religious obligations and the
same religious rights. This view does not differ from the view of most
contemporary Islamists, who would explain men and women to have equal value
but with different social tasks and obligations. There has been a modification of
the view of women. This can be viewed in terms of Islamism as a reaction against
both modernism and modernity, where modernism depicts modern thought whereas
modernity characterizes the technification of life.55 These modifications can be
observed in the works of the Islamic scholars Abü Shaqqa and al-Ghazzãli.
However, among madhhabists, particularly in the circles of ahl al-hadïth (those
who adhere to the ahãdï th), and among the salafi;6, males are considered as
possessing a higher value than females due to statements in various ahãdïth,
among them the hadnh referred to above.
It is of interest to turn to Christian feminist theologians and their interpretation
of the act of creation in the Bible. Phyllis A. Bird is one of those who have dealt
with this subject. She compares the two versions in Genesis, the Priestly account
and the Yahwistic account. She states that the two stories contain 'no statement
of dominance or subordination in the relationship of the sexes.57 She further
argues that in the accounts:
52 Hassan 1990:98.
53 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:25.
54 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:25.
55 c.f. Lawrence.
56 The Salafi Movement is a movement which has strengthened its position in the Arab world
from the seventies onwards. It is marked by a strict adherence to the ahãdilh and a total
rejection of the madhhabi system. For further information see Roald 1994.
57 Bird 1991:20.
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The social metaphors to which the key verbs point are male, derived from male experience
and models, the dominant socIal models of patriarchal society. For P, as for J, the
representative and determining image of the species was certainly male .... Though the
Priestly writer speaks of the species, he thinks of the male, just as the author of Psalm 8.
But maleness is not an essential or defining characteristic.58
It is important to note that although there is a similarity between Bird and
Wadud-Muhsin in the perspective of gender-neutrality in creation of man in the
two religions, Bird's historical-critical method leads her to draw conclusions, such
as that the bible was written by humans, an assumption which is not possible in
an Islamic exegesis.
Roles of women
When it comes to divisions of roles in Islam, Muslim feminists would par also
from the common view of moderate Islamists. Wadud-Muhsin chooses to discuss
the role of women from two perspectives:
l. There is no inherent value placed on man or woman. In fact, there is no
arbitrary, preordained and eternal system of hierarchy.
2. The Koran does not strictly delineate the roles of woman and the roles of
man to such an extent as to propose only a single possibilty for each gender (that
is, women must fulfil this ro1e, and on ly this one, while men must fulfil that role
and only men can ful fi it).59
She claims that the Koran 'acknowledges that we operate in social systems with
certain functional distinctions.,60 Further, Wadud-Muhsin sees that these
'functional distinetions included in the Koran have been used to support the idea
of inherent superiority of men over women.'61 She asks two main questions: 'Are
there certain exceptions and exclusions for males or females? Does the Koran
value certain functions above others?,62
Wadud-Muhsin observes that in the Koran the woman's primary distinetion is
on the basis of her childbearing ability. Thus, Muslims have regarded this abilty
to be her primary function. However, she rejects this Muslim notion, claiming that
there is 'no term in the Koran which indicates that childbearing is 'primary' to
a woman' and that 'no indication is given that mothering is her exclusive role.'63
She also rejects the notion that men are special because only men have been
58 Bird 1991:18.
59 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:63.
60 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:64.
61 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:64.
62 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:64.
63 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:64.
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selected to be prophets. She points out that although there are no Koranic
examples of female prophecies, women such as Maryam and the mother of Moses
receivedrevelations (wähy).64 She argues that all those chosen as prophets were
exceptional human beings and the prophecy is thus not a specific characterisation
for males.65
Wadud-Muhsin has analysed two Koranic terms, daraja (step, degree of leve!)
andfaddala (to prefer) which 'have been used to indicate value in the functional
distinetions between individuals and groups on earth. ,66 She argues that the
Koran ' does not divide the labour and establish a monolithic order for every social
system which completely disregards the natural variations in society. On the
contrar, it acknowledges the need for variations when it states that the human
race is divided into nations and tribes that you might know one another" (K.
49: 13).'67 She thus concludes that the Koran allows and encourages each
individual social context to determine its functional distinetions between members,
but applies a single system of equitable recompense which can be adopted in every
social context. 68
She analyses the concept daraja in this perspective, saying that daraja is most
often linked to doing , good' deeds.69 God also gives daraja to individuals; either
on the basis of knowledge (K:58: 11) or on basis of social or economic distinetions
(K. 43:32). Wadud-Muhsin quotes the Koranic statement: 'Unto men a fortune
from that which they have earned, and unto women a fortune from that which they
have earned' (K.4:32). From this discussion Wadud-Muhsin turns to the verse in
the Koran where men are said to be adaraja above women. She says that
although this verse is specifically about divorce, Muslims have taken it to mean
that adaraja exists between all men and women, in every context.70 She believes
that the adv ant age men have over women is that of 'being individually able to
pronounce divorce against their wives without arbitration or assistance,' whereas
women can obtain a divorce only after the intervention of an authority.7l This
interpretation, although plausible, seems to be limited. Wadud-Muhsin does not
question the common notion that a Muslim man can divorce his wife without any
intervention. The Koran does not give a specific procedure for how to divorce and
a more profound investigation of this matter should be of interest in a study of the
Koran and women.
Wadud-Muhsin turns to the term faddala (faddala means 'to prefer' and fadl
means 'preference'). She refers to three 'preferences' in the Koran: Firstly,
64 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:65.
65 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:65.
66 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:65.
67 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:67.
68 Wadud-MuhsIn 1992:67.
69 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:66.
70 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:68.
7l Wadud-Muhsin 1992:68.
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humankind is preferred to the rest of creation (K.17:70); secondly, occasionally,
one group of people have been preferred to another (K. 2:47, K. 2:122, K. 7:40);
and thirdly, some of the prophets are preferred to others(K 2:253, K.6:86,
K.17:55). She believes that preferenee is not absolute, as although some prophets
are preferred to others, there is no distinetion between them. She concludes that
in Koranic usage, 'preferenee is relative,.72 She notes that both daraja and fadl
are given as tests, but unlike daraja, faddala cannot be earned. Fadl is given by
God to whom he wants.73 As for fadl the central verse in the Koran is:
Men are (qawwãmun 'alã) women, (bi-on the basis) of what Allah has ffaddala -preferred)
some of them over others, and (bi-on the basis) of what they spend of their property (for
the support of women) (K. 4:34f4
In her analysis, Wadud-Muhsin sees this in a material context, saying that there
is only one place in the Koran where men have preferenee over women and that
is in inheritance where men inherit twice as much as women. She links this
preference to the obligation to spend of their property, which follows directly in
the verse. She concludes that 'there is a reciprocity between privileges and
responsibilities. ,75 She says that 'men have responsibility of paying out of their
wealth for the support of women, and they are consequently granted a double
share of inheritance.,76 Wadud-Muhsin rejects the notion that men were created
by God superior to women (in strength and reason), a common interpretation of
this verse. She believes that faddala is not conditional as the text does not say that
they (men) are preferred to them (women). Rather the text states that same of them
are over some.77 She asserts:
The use of ba'd (some) relates to what obviously has been observed in the human context.
All men do not excel over all women in all manners. Some men excel over some women
in some manners. Likewise, some women excel over some men in some manners. So,
whatever Allah has preferred, it is stil not absolute.78
W adud- Muhsin further discusses earIier interpretations of the expresslOn
qawwãmun ' alã. She notes that Pickthall, an English convert to Islam who
translated the Koran in the early twentieth century, perceives this expression as 'in
charge of', and al-Zamakhshãri translates it as 'men are in charge of the affairs of
women.' As for Mawdudi, the Pakistani Islamist, he perceives the Koranic passage
as that 'men are the managers of the affairs of women because Allah has made the
72 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:69.
73 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:69.
74 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:70.
75 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:70-71.
76 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:71.
77 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:71.
78 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:71.
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one superior to the other. ,79 Lastly, she turns to Sayyid Qutb who regards this
verse in a family context. Wadud-Muhsin also observes that Qutb believes that as
men provide for their families, this gives the males the privilege to be qawwãmun
, alã the females. However, he states that 'the man and the woman are both from
Allah's creation and Allah ... never intends to oppress anyone from His
creation.180
Building upon his argumentations, Wadud-Muhsin concludes that within the
family each member has certain responsibilities. Ideologically speaking, according
to Wadud-Muhsin, women's primary responsibility is childbearing (human
existence depends upon it), whereas men's responsibility is the support of the
family (the continuation of the human race depends upon it). However, in contrast
to this ideal Wadud-Muhsin says:
This ideal scenario establishes an equitable and mutually dependent relationship. However,
it do es not allow for many of today's realities. What happens in societies experiencing a
population 'overIoad, such as China and India? What happens in capitalistic societies like
America, where a single income is no longer sufficient to maintain areasonably comfortable
lifestyle? .... What happens to the balance of responsibility when the man cannot provide
materially, as was of ten the case during slavery and post slavery US?81
Her view is that the Koran must eternally be reviewed and reinterpreted according
to social conditions with stress on mutual responsibility between males and
females. She further calls for a broadening of the concept qiwãma (guardianship)
from the material sphere to include spiritual, moral, intellectual, and psychological
dimensions as well. 82
The Koranic passage 4: 34 has its counterpart in the Bible. Genesis 3: 16 states
'he shall rule over her' where rule is a translation of the verb mashãl. Mashãl can
also be translated as manage or control and the resemblance to the Koranic term
qawwãmun 'alã is apparent. Bird states:
For the relationship of companionship, established in the creation and exhibited in the
mutual drive of the sexes towards each other ... is broken by the added word of judgement:
'he shall rule over her' (3: 16). The companion of chapter 2 has become a master. The
historical subordination of woman to man is inaugurated - and identified as the paradigm
expression of sin and alienation in creation.83
79 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:71.
80 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:73. Qouted from Qutb 1980:650 (vol.II).
81 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:73.
82 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:74.
83 Bird 1991:21.
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Reflections
Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan discuss matters which are also treated by the moderate
Islamic scholars, such as the position of the hadith literature in Islamic
jurisprudenee (jiqh) and the role of women in Islam. Hassan's discussion of the
authority of ahãdah reveals her ambivalent attitude. Wadud-Muhsin does not
explicitly reject the authority of ahãdah, but as she does not use them in her
analysis of the Koran this implies that she does not fully support them either. The
feminists take a stand against much of the ahãdah dealing with women in a
negative way, whereas the Islamic scholars would not reject these ahãdith but
would interpret them in a more favourable way. The discrepancy in view opens
up a conflct as a re-evaluation of ahãdith is not generally accepted in Islamic
theology. The reform feminists are obviously aware of this fact and that explains
the vagueness in their formulations. They wil thereby have an advantage, as their
work might get a Muslim audience, whereas the reconstructor, such as Fatima
Mernissi, Leila Ahmad and Nawwal al-Saadawi, who are more outspoken in their
criticism, would be read favourably by certain groups only.
In the view of women at the ideological level, Muslim reform feminism does not
divert toa much from moderate Islamism. For instance, the widespread IslamIc
movement the Muslim Brotherhood' s ideas on women are that men and women
are equal in regard to divine worship, whereas they have different roles in society.
However, in practice it seems that in the worId-view of the Brothers 'social
inequality' has eclipsed 'spiritual equality'. This is also true for the actually
existing Muslim societies as women have a rather low social status estimated in
economic terms. It is, however, important to pose the question whether a
sociological model constructed in Western society is applicable to Muslim society
as the economic and socio-political conditions are different. As mentioned above,
Islamism and particularIy moderate Islamism is very much a modern phenomenon
with modern perspectives. The same is true of Muslim countries which are mainly
modem, secular states. It is therefore possible that many attitudes and values
common in Western society can be found in Muslim society, too. Thus, the
evaluation of women in Muslim society might be in accordance with global
standards even by Muslims themselves. The view of Muslim women is therefore
ambivalent: at the same time traditional and modern. Wadud-Muhsin's and
Hassan's studies are in this context important as they try to adjust a modern view
of women in Islam to a modem reality.
There is a distinetion between Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan and the Christian
feminist theologians which I have referred to above. The historical-critical methods
used by Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Phylls A. Bird are part of an established
scientific tradition within Christian theology. They do turn to the study of gender
relations, which is a controversial issue within the same tradition, but they do not
part too much from the established research tradition. In Islam the established
research tradition is totally different. With the breakdown of the authority of the
traditional madhhab (law-school system), the research concentrates mainly on
textual analysis and thus works methodologically in search of evidences to
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establish laws and regulations suitable for modern society. Wadud-Muhsin and
Hassan keep to the same research method.
Schüssler Fiorenza is basically text-oriented, i.e. she goes behind the text,
reconstructing a historical action which she states does not have to be verified as
historical fact. She is thus a reconstructor in the Christian feminist tradition.
Likewise, Bird is a reconstructor as she deconstructs the text and regards the text
in its historie al context. She believes that:
the revelatory content of the word (the biblical text) and its contemporar meaning are
apprehended on ly through this conversation (which has both ancient (canonical and
post-canonical) and contemporary partners) and may not be identified with any particular
text or locution nor with the author's imputed intention.'84
Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan on the other hand, are interpretation-:oriented, i.e. they
make semantie analysis in order to change common interpretations of the text and
are thus reformers in the Islamic tradition. However, in spite of the obvious
differences in approach of Schüssler Fiorenza and Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan, I
would suggest that their positions within their respective traditions are similar.
There is a discrepancy between Christianity and Islam, particularly in the literal
reading of the text, which appears most clearly in a comparison between the story
of creation in the Bible and in the Koran as in the Koran Eve is neither depicted
as a temptress nor created by the rib of Adam. Wadud-Muhsin explains:
In other religions, feminists have had to insert woman into the discourse (of the
interpretations of the holy texts) in order to attain legitimacy. The Muslim woman has only
to read the text - unconstrained by exclusive and restrictive interpretations - to gain an
undeniable liberation.85
In this context it is also important to note that feminist Christian reconstructor
perceive the Bible as written by human beings and in particular by men, whereas
Muslim feminist reformers most probably would perceive the Koran as the 'Word
of God'. There do exist feminist Christian fundamentalists who would also reg ard
the bible as the 'Word of God', but I consider this group to be less similar to
Islamic feminists both in aims and in methodology than are the feminist Christian
reconstructor.
Among the loyalist categorisation by Osiek, there are the feminists belonging
to the evangelical tradition of an exegesis of the Bible. This approach can be
comparable to that of the Muslim feminists discussed above. Likewise with the
starting point of Wadud-Muhsin, this tradition requires a view of the revealed text
as an absolute authority. Is it thus possible to place Wadud-Muhsin and Hassan
84 Bird 1991:24.
85 Wadud-Muhsin 1992:vi.
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in a fundamentalist 86tradition as expressed by KarIsen Seim? The answer would
be yes if fundamentalism stands for a 'return to the pure sources of Islam' and it
would be no if fundamentalism stands for a political interpretation of Islam.87 It
is, though, important to be aware of the distinetion between fundamentalism in a
Christian sense of the word and in its Islamic context. The former indicates a
literal interpretation of the text whereas the latter is explained above as meaning
, a return to the pure sources', thus going beyond the development of Islamic
theology. However, Islamic fundamentalism does not necessarily imply a literal
reading of the Koran and the ahãdith. The similarity between feminist theology in
Christianity and Islam can appear amazing as there is a common notion of the two
religious spheres as being far apart. However, by turning on the one hand to the
background of a joint Middle Eastern heritage as a starting point for a common
framework of social and spiritual ideas, and on the other hand to the common
problematie of the contemporary Global Vilage, differences seem rather mInor,
depending on developments in different times and places rather than as
fundamental and absolute.
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New Veils and New Voices: Islamist Women's
Groups in Egypt
Soroya DuvaZ
'I was educated in a French school, didn't know proper Arabic, and tried Western
life-style. This was the time of my big Jahiliya1 Fear of God and his mercy took
me back to Islam. In Islam I found security, happiness, and truth; the happiness
I didn't even feel in the streets of the admired Champs Elysée in Paris'. (Leader
of an Islamist Salafi group).2
One might think that in this era of the 'information revolution', Arab Muslim
women would also be presented in the light of objective and accessible
knowledge. However, they tend to be one of the least understood social groups,
subjected to speculation, generalization and stereotyping. Analysts inside as well
as outside the region tend to see Muslim women as the most severely oppressed
group in present -day society.
The predominance of Islam as well as a common language unifying this huge
Arab region are the main reasons for perceiving Arab and Muslim women as a
single entity. It is almost impossible to convey a full understanding of gender
construets in the Middle East without coming into collision with the general
assumptions and stereotypes hel d about Islam and Muslim women. A considerable
body of new research emerged in the 1980s about women's history in this region,
yet with a few exceptions (Tuckerl993; Ahmed 1992; Badran 1987; Rosander
1991; Keddie&Baron 1991; Hussain 1984; Mohsen 1985), the bulk of the studies
rest on social development theories, modernization theories, as well as orientalist
or 'neo orientalist accounts for analysing Muslim women in the Middle East ( cf.
Minces 1982, Nawal 1982, Saadawi 1980, Afshar 1985).
These studies neglect the specificity of Arab history, social organization and
culture. Written from the perspective of modernization theories such studies
emphasize some aspects of the lives of Arab women at the expense of others.
Arab women are either doomed to an unchanging oppression, or recent changes
are attributed to the transfer of Western ideas. Oppression is seen as beginning to
lift in the 19th century with the coming of Western thought. Western ideas about
Jahiliya, lit. ignorance, but in Islamic history referred to as the period of worshipping idols in
pre-islamic Arabia.
2
Interview conducted by au thor in 1993.
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Islam and Muslim women date as far back as the 17th century, and have their
origin in the tales of travellers or crusaders. Descriptions of these societies as well
their customs was mostly distorted and misconstrued (Said 1978, Akbar 1992).
The issue of women and Islam, however, emerged as central in Western
ilustrations when Europeans established themselves as colonial powers in Muslim
countries. In the words of Elise Boulding (1976), 'understanding of women in
history suffers from a triple bias, a male bias, a class bias, and a Western bi as ' .
The great variations in the cultures and societies of the Arab Middle East make
any single statement about Muslim women false and misleading. Arab countries
differ in their history of colonialism, industrialization, urbanization, modernization,
and secularization. Variations are also to be found in ethnic, tribal, religious, and
cultural groups. Likewise, the lives of women in different classes cannot be
considered similar.
Females in the upper and middle classes enjoy more options in life than women
of the lower classes. Nevertheless, Islam is viewed as the main origin of the
prevalenee of sexual inequality in the Middle East. It is, however, a well
established fact that sexual inequality existed in all parts of the worId long before
the beginnings of Islam and is therefore not a feature exc1usive to Muslim
societies. Analysis of patriarehal notions and institutions must, therefore, shift to
the fabric of socio-cultural conditions of women's and men's lives in their
different settings. Western social scientists' approach reflect a high degree of
ethnocentrism in assuming that liberation for Arab women has to follow the same
unilinear line as the American and European women's movements. It is expected
that these goals are universal and that they should more or less be followed in the
same order. However, some Arab women, mostly elite women, who have
internalized the goals of liberation in another context, don't have the kind of
self-image that represents the goal of women's liberation in the West (Ahmed
1992, Joseph 1993). Those women want to retain the communal extended family
aspects of traditional society, while eliminating its worst abuses, such as easy
divorce for men and forced marriages.
The large st number of western feminist researchers hold the belief that once a
society is dominated in certain spheres by men, women wil become a suppressed
and passive group. Nothing can be further from the truth as the Muslim women
you wil meet wil indicate in the passages to follow. Another important arena of
social function as well as a sphere of power are women's beliefs and religious
activities, which should not be underestimated. With the general "Islamic trend"
sweeping over the Middle East since the 1970s, they become an interesting realm
in analyzing gender struggles in the region. These activities as I shall present later,
involve groups of women between and among whom essential links are created,
links which can crosscut and override kin and status group barriers. Female
solidarity in the form of "sub-societies", in social systems where there is a
preferenee for the segregation of the sexes, can be a powerful socIal force and can
become an effective way of enhancing position vis a vis the male members of the
community.
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Female solidarity can also lessen male domination by lowering the degree of
dependenee that women have on men. I am not suggesting that women's positions
should be ranked above that of men' s, but attempt to demonstrate that both male
and female spheres should be considered carefully, and that such an approach
might bring us a long way beyond the stereotype of the meek and subordinate
Muslim female. To demonstrate this more effectively, I have taken Egypt as a case
study, not only because it is an Arab and predominantly Muslim country, but also
because Egypt has played a major role in the struggles around the meanings of
gender since the 19th century . In many ways developments in Egypt heralded and
mirrored developments in the Arab worId . Secondly, there seems to be astriking
similarity between the discourse of the British colonial powers in Egypt during the
19th century, and the prevalent feminist discourses today, in which especially the
veil epitomizes islamic inferiority and the oppression of women (Ahmed 1992).
The colonial power (the British occupation started in 1882) wanted to trans form
Egyptian society to the values of the 'civilzed' European worId, and Islam,
women, and veiling played a central role to it. In Western eyes only by giving up
these 'peculiar' and 'intrinsic' practices, would Muslim societies move forward on
the path of civilization. The veil, for the colonizers but also in the vision of
contemporary Western political culture, is the most visible marker of the
'otherness' and 'inferiority' of Islamic societies. It therefore was and is an open
target for attack and the spearhead of the assault on Muslim societies.
Egypt becomes also particularIy interesting because of the various Islamist
movements that have mushroomed in thel970s, which has also paralleled the
formation of Islamist women's groups. The Islamist women's groups in Egypt are
part of a broader social movement that appeared in the 1970s in Egypt. I make use
of Herbert Blumer' s typology of social movements which considers a situation
whereby a general social movement can give birth to specific social movements.
It is possible to consider Islamist women groups as one such ' specific socIal
movement which is advocating an 'Islamic alternative' from a female perspective.
The arguments and empirical data in this artic1e are based on an exploration of
the experience of Islamist women in four different groups (Salafi, Tabligh, Zahra' ,
Muslim Brothers), and the part they play in perpetuating or altering relations of
power . Participant observation through presenee in the meetings or study circles
took place, and informal interviews were conducted with leaders as well as
members of the groups. I examine what seems to be an ambiguous political
struggle by Islamist women, who are on the one hand fighting actively against
their inequality but are on the other accepting or supporting their own
subordination. Although the location of women' s struggles is looked at in a
specific cultural setting and the location of women's struggles is emphasized
within the specific interactions of gender, c1ass, and global inequities, I think that
the results can be suggestive for understanding women's contradictory role in
relations of power elsewhere as well. Further,in an attempt to analyze the Egyptian
situation as it developed during the 1970s, the Islamic phenomenon is considered
as a processual, multidimensional one within the historie al framework of factors
that encouraged the rise of Islamism and Islamist women's groups.
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The IslamIc Trend 'EI Tayyar EI IslamI '
Islamist groups grew stronger and more widespread in the 1970s and have
continued to gain ground since . This tendency has made itself vi si ble through the
Islamic dress 'El ziyy el Islami,3 for both men and women. A variety of factors
have contributed to the mushrooming of these groups and the new type of Islamic
outlook . Much of the literature dealing with the subject has dated their emergence
to the aftermath of the 1967 defeat of Egypt by Israel though a political-military
analysis would reached far beyond the performanee of the regime itself and
revealed a deeper and more complex structural crisis that was hidden underneath.
To make sense of the defeat people sought a variety of explanations. Common
explanations were that the military had grown elitist, corrupt and bureaucratie, or
that Egypt was underdeveloped technologically. There was one explanation,
however, circulating in the society that was most significant: the Egyptians had
abandoned God and, therefore, God had abandoned them .
A further dimension explaining the phenomenon in question was the
exploitation or use of religion from above by the government, for purposes of
legitimization, as was widely suggested. With regard to the state of unrest
prevailing throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s both explanations are valid.
Yet in my opinion, the determining factors that permeated the Egyptian society
favouring an 'Islamic Alternative as the way out', and even explicitly used by the
Islamists as a slogan 'Islam is the solution' (Al Islam Huwa El Hall) are to be
found in the period following the 1973 war and all through the decade in question.
The Islamic trend was further strengthened spiritually by Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Although these were countries the Middle East, yet they have had
tremendous influence, whether formally through a group or informally through
personal attitude of central political personalities. The Islamic Revolution in Iran
1979, and the Islamisation of Pakistan under General Zia ul-Haq after seizing
power in 1977, as well as the Afghan mujjahidin's struggle against communism,
were considered ideals to be followed. The Islamisation of Sudan under El-Bashir
after seizing power in July 1991 as well as the war in Bosnia are more recent
examples.
It is important to note that in our understanding of Islam two equally important
levels of analysis present themselves. As Ali H.Dessouki points out (1982: 14),
Islamic experiences are not historically monolithic. Universality in Islamic history
is reflected and characterized by a prevalent unit y of belief whereby the holy
message is operative at the macro leve L. At the micro leve!, however, Islam is
specific. Islamic experiences appear therefore in the shape of activities conditioned
by specific cultural and social constraints.
The Egyptian case is no exception, in that both characteristics of Islam,
universalism and specificity, are reflected throughout its history. The 'Islamic
Alternative' should not, therefore be seen as a novel phenomenon per se although
its articulator and the forms of articulation have changed. The articulation of an
3 The term signify that they fulfil Islamic requirements of modesty.
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'Islamic Alternative' seems to have be favoured by factors of national economic
and social unrest throughout the centuries, yet the manifestations of these forces
have differed from one period to the next and so have the responses. The
challenges faced by Muhammed Abduh, Rashid Reda, and their disciples at the
turn of the century were different from those that brought about the Hassan
al-Bannas movement in the late twenties and thirties. Likewise, the manifestations
of the political, social and economic crisis faced by Egypt in the 1970s were also
different and, consequently, so was the articulation of the' Islamic Alternative' .
Nationalism I Islamism
The loss of faith in Nasser and his entire secularist ideology came as another
consequence of the defeat. His ' socialist' programmes were now judged to have
been failures. After N asser' s death in 1969 the government retreated from socialist
politics throughout the 1970s under Sadat's rule, and Sadat permitted the Muslim
Brothers 'El Ikhwan El Muslimun' to resume their activities, which Nasser had
banned. Sadat was now more and more brought under attack from Nasserists and
communists. One strong base of opposition to his adversaries were the , Ikwan'
whom Sadat wanted to exploit to the utmost. Publications by the Muslim Brothers
soon reached a wide audience, and particularly after the Camp David treaty with
Israel,turned not only to criticizing Nasserism and communism, but also Sadats
policies. Dissent and discontent was expressed and formulated in religious
language and terminology. Once they had gained popularity, and afraid of the
charge of being anti-Islamic, Sadat could not afford to strike out against them. In
trying to legitimate his position he also made use of the idiom of religion,
declaring himself to be a just Muslim ruler of a state the basis of the twin pilars
of faith Iman and science Ilm . Conditions meanwhile were such as to breed
discontent. The government had embarked on the open-door policy by
promulgating new laws to encourage foreign investment, which had adverse effects
on the local industries.The country was flooded with luxury and consumer goods
far beyond the reach of most Egyptians. The open-door policy brought sudden
wealth for a few, together with blatant corruption and avid consumerism. Most
Egyptians experienced its negative effects through the governments retreat from
internal development and the public sector. Matriculations at the universities
continued at a high rate while the public sector, the chief source of employment,
was cut back. Unemployment,an unproductive workforce, and the growth of
bureaucracy, strained government resources.
To ease the strain,laws restrieting emigration were relaxed, and benefitting the
professional classes as well as unskilled workers, who left for the Arab oil states,
generally for a limited period of years. Whereas remittances from abroad soon
became Egypt' s main source of hard currency, unemployment was not reduced,
and brought about rather a brain drain of the most skilled and employable.
Further,returning migrants from the rich oil states, apar from joining the ranks of
conspicuous consumerism, returned with an envious resentment of the treatment
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they have received and the disparity in resources they have observed (Duval,1989).
The Camp David accord, which tied Egypt to the United States in favour of
alignment with the West and accommodation with Israel, was another major factor
fostering discontent. The United States was pouring large aid funds into the
country, which created an uneasy political and economic alliance. This alienated
Egypt from its traditional place as a 1eader in the Arab W orId. This loss increased
the opposition of the Islamist groups, who critizised the regime's lack of
leadership and moral decay and presented alternatives. In this tense political
atmosphere, women's status and family roles were also thrust into the political
arena.
The political situation is aggravated even further by economic difficulties,
which deprived Egypt of the chanee to regain its position of leadership even as it
seeks to renew its ties to the Arab W orId. Apart from having a very high foreign
debt, Egypt' s economy suffers from dependenee on remittances and tourism, both
of which have fallen in recent years (Abd El Khalek, 1982). A major drop in
remittances occurred after the GulfWar in 1991 when most migrants returned from
Iraq, a major receiver of Egyptian labour. Tourism was affected mostly this year,
1993, due to the bombing of tourist targets by militant groups which caused a
number of tourist fatalities.
NearIy all over the Muslim worId, the decade of the 1970s seems to have been
a period in which religion has played the leading role as a means of expressing
discontent. Islam has replaced Arab nationalism as the ideology of dissent in the
Arab W orId. In face of present day challenges, nationalism is perceived as
inadequate or as having exhausted its purpose. Whatever may be the case, the fact
remains that Islam has an undeniable influence on the political proeess, and has
proven to have astrong potential for politicization. This was exemplified in the
Iranian Revolution of 1978, the incidents of the grand mosque in Mecca in
1979,and the assassination of Egypts President Sadat on 6 October 1981. On the
national leve!, we can follow the recent events on the Egyptian political scene. The
assassination of Farag Fouda4 by an Islamic gro up last year, the attempted
assassination of the Minister of Information on 21 April 1993 and the series of
clashes between police and the Islamists in Assiut,Upper Egypt, but also in
different quarters in Cairo (Imbaba,Heliopolis), and the series of attacks on tourist
targets, amply serve as examples . The confrontation between the police apparatus
and the Islamists has reached its peak on the Egyptian political arena . Violence
on part of the regime in the form of mass arests, mass shootings, imprisonment
without trial, torture, death penalties etc., have created a climate of
counter-violence by the militant Islamic groupS.5 The government, in a desperate
4 Secular anti-Islamist writer.
5 A group called Jihad, whose spiritualleader Omar Abd Errahman is currently living in exIle
in the D.S.A., has taken responsibility for som e of the killings and bombings. It is the most
miltant group operating in Egypt today and is usually blamed by the media for any unrest
created.
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attempt to stifte even the non-militant Islamic trend that has largely permeated
Egypt's different syndicates of engineering, medicine,journalism, law, academies
and science, has issued a number of decrees to restrict their autonomy and thereby
created a general air of discontent among all Islamists .
The Islamic Alternative
During the 1970s, Egypt witnessed more than one group advocating an 'Islamic
Alternative'. One group of intellectuals exposed and opposed 'Western
civilzational imperialism' and called for an Islamic left, al Yassar al-lslami. Other
groups were the Muslim Brothers allkhwan al-Muslimun, the Miltary Academy
(MA) al Faniyya-al-Askariyya, the Repentance and Holy Flight group
(RHF),al-Takfir -wal-Hijra, and the Jihad group 6(Ibrahim,1982).
Whereas they differed in their perception of the actual situation that needed to
be changed, they basically agreed on the necessity for and the direction of change.
Other groups such as Muhammed's Youth Shabab Muhammed and Soldiers of
God Junud Allah also existed. Recently, two groups by the name of el Shawqiyyin
(in reference to their leader whose name was Shawqi) appeared in Upper Egypt
and another one named the Party of God Hizballah in Alexandria (al-Ahram,1992)
By virtue of having engaged at one time or the other in confrontations with the
regime as well as through their writings, these groups have attracted public
attention. It also has to be kept in mind that there may be groups that have gone
underground and of which nothing is known.
I propose to distinguish between groups that I term action-oriented, like those
mentioned above and semi-action oriented groups, like the Salafis, Tabligh, and
Zahra. This distinetion is important to differentiate them from the less worIdly sufi
brotherhoods in Egypt that are non-action oriented, but stil have popularity. The
Salafis,7 the Tabligh,8 and the Zahra9 are groups that have gained tremendous
popularity in Egypt. They are interesting not only because of their ideological
synthesis between the action-oriented groups and the Sufis,but also because of the
emergence of the numerous women' s groups within them. The further focus in this
6 Jihad in Arabic means struggle or enormous effort to achieve a cause. It is important to note
that these groups do not call themselves RHF, MA or Jihad. These are names given to them
by the authorities and the media. Members of the Jihad for example call themselves the Islamic
group of Egypt, Al Jamaa al-Islamiyya fi Misr.
7 Salafis or Salatiyyin means the righteous followers of the "Salaf el-Saleh" the true believers in
the prophets time and after. Their loyalty is towards Saudi Arabia and their Ulama (religious
scholars) as are the form of Islam they are conveying.8 Lit. to inform (in arabic). It is their duty to tell about Islam.
9 A group originally initiated by a Syrian women in Syria. In Syria it might have a different
name in Egypt it calls itself Zahra. They have an Islamic women's organisation in Cairo that
they also call Zahra in reference to the daughter of the prophet Muhammad Fatima el Zahra.
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artic1e wil be on the women in these three groups, as well as the action-oriented
Muslim Brothers Ikhwan al-Muslimun.
The Muslim Brothers-Past and Present
The Muslim Brothers were founded by Hassan El-Banna in 1928. They were
fiercely anti-British and anti-Western. The movement sought to lead the people
back to a purified Islam, which would penetrate every aspect of personal and
national life, and free the nation from Western domInation. The Muslim Brothers
were opposed to the government and the political parties, which they saw as
importations of Western ideologies and as tools of British domination. The parties
were monopolized by the upper classes,who were participants in and beneficiaries
of foreign economic domination. Anger at Western domination and determination
to attain independence from it were central to the movement. Al-Banna
emphasized the important role of women in the Islamic reformation, and a branch
organization, the Society of Muslim Sisters El Akhawat El Muslimat was
established. Another Islamist women's organization at the time worth mentioning,
is the Muslim Women's Association, which was founded by the Islamist Zeinab
EI-Ghazali in 1936. EI-Ghazali, although independent, supported the cause of the
Muslim Brothers, and the definition of the role of women in an IslamIc society
coincides with that expressed by the Muslim Brothers:'Islam does not forbid
women to actively participate in public life. It does not prevent her from working,
entering into polities, and expressing her opinion, or from being anything as lon g
as that does not interfere with her first duty as a mother, the one who first trains
her children in the lslamic call.'(EI-Ghazali,1980 ) EI-Ghazali's increased
cooperation with the Muslim Brothers was interrupted by the intense persecution
of the Brothers, as well as by the murder of Hassan El-Banna in 1949. She herself
was imprisoned and tortured for six years (1965-72) at the hands of the Nasser
regime. The Muslim Women's Association continued to function until her
imprisonment in 1965, when it was dissolved. It has not been reconstituted sine e,
though EI-Ghazali continues to leeture and work for the Islamic cause. A few
months ago, a newspaper by the name of The Arabie Family Al- U sra-AI-Arabia
opened in which Ghazali was active. It was issued by the Muslim Brothers, but
was quickly banned by the government after four issues.
The Muslim Brothers epitomize the most important development in the 1980s.
They have progressed beyond preaching towards institutionalization, and are
committed to the establishment of an Islamic socio-political order based on Islamc
law Sharia (Ibrahim,1982). This pro gress ion has made itself felt in two ways. The
first was their sophisticated participation in the parIiamentary elections of 1984
and 1987 and hereby their acceptance of political pluralism. Secondly, they
gradually but steadily established an IslamIc infrastrueture which includes schools,
hospitals, clinics, investment houses and other commercial enterprises. In contrast
to the services provided by the government, these enterprises are
cleaner,sometimes cheaper, and less bureaucratized. Being of ten as clean and
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certainly much cheaper than what has come to be known as the Infitah or
Open-Door enterprises, they increasingly gained in popularity. This rapidly
mushrooming infrastrueture has undoubtedly given the government some breathing
space, but has also increased the popularity of the Muslim Brothers even more.
Joining the Jihad group in the 1970s was one alternative to express frustration
and dissatisfaction, whereas in the mid 1980s joining the Muslim Brotherhood was
a more attractive, less demanding, more comfortable and respectable alternative.
Their effciency in stretching out their hands in times of crisis to the masses
reached its peak after the devastating earthquake of October 1992. The ability of
the Muslim Brothers to mobilize their network instantly to provide food and
shelter for the poor and homeless whose houses had collapsed, exposed the
governments inefficiency and its meager and belated efforts. (Time, 1992). The
political triumph achieved by the Muslim Brothers sufficiently alarmed the
government,- especially as elections were coming up- that it struck out against the
Brothers by issuing a number of decrees to limit the autonomy of the unions and
syndicates that had become increasingly Islamised. This, in my opinion, increased
anew the appeal of the violence-oriented groups, and can be witnessed in the
increasing violence used by these groups in Egypt.
Ideology of Semi-action Groups
Whereas the Sufis have a strong belief in saints and their abilty to influence or
affect personal destinies through their prayers to God, karamat, and usually visit
their shrines and ask for their help and blessings through their special connection
with God, the semi-action-oriented groups reject these beliefs with repugnance:
'It is totally forbidden and sinful haram to worship saints and ask them for
things,or even have the remotest believe that they can intervene in our destiny.
This is a form of heresy shirk. Islam is built on the Oneness of God Tawhid. Only
God can make our destiny, only God can alter it, and it is only Rim we should ask
help or forgiveness. There is no intermediary between any person and God. The
people who do this are ignorant and don't know their religion properIy.' (Interview
with member of Tabligh group) .
The Sufis believe in a vertical and personal relationship between the individual
and God which is strengthened through worship and prayer. Ultimate happiness
and peace are the fruits of such a bond ,but are also rewarded in the Rereafter.
Therefore, for the Sufi, worIdly matters including the conditions of state or society
are of minor importanee as long as inner peace is reached. Unlike other parts of
Africa or in the Maghreb where Sufis were politically active, the Sufi groups in
Egypt are totally depoliticized and are in no way a threat to the regime. On the
other hand, for the' Salafis,' the 'Zahra', and the 'Tabligh,' societal change is one
of the main aims strived for, but can only be reached by the inner transformation
of oneself. All Muslims should unite to bring about a society governed by the
ethics of Islam to ensure justiee and equality for all.
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, If everyone follows the deeds of the Prophet Muhammed, no human bein g
would harm the other, and there would be no evil'(Tabligh member). Although the
Salafis and the Tabligh are not in open confrontation with the regime as they
avoid any political involvement in form of speeehes or writings, yet they criticize
the reluctance of the government to implement the Islamic Law Sharia in all
aspects of life, the increased corruption and moral decay that is apparent in Egypt,
and the immoral behaviour among men and women in a mixed environment. 'Just
look at the crowded buses where men and women stie k to each other, and any
man putting his fithy hands wherever he pleases on any woman. Do you call this
liberation or development for women ? (Tabligh member)
These groups, though totally incapable of destabilizing the regime in any way,
were encouraged by the government in order to play down the strengthening voice
of the Ikhwan el-Muslimun who were more action-oriented and in open opposition
to the government.
However, recent arrests of members of these groups and allegations of social
disorder might be a sign of their increased politicisation. Meanwhile, media
coverage and TV programmes on prime time were suddenly opened to a number
of Salafi leaders who propagated their ideas via TV, video tapes, books,
magazines, tapes, and religious study groups at homes and mosques.
These groups share with the Sufis the notion of self-discipline and purification
of oneself from previous sins. The focus of change lies in the inner being, which
would then reflect on the outside, and eventually on the whole society. One of the
members summed this idea up by quoting a verse from the Koran: 'God would not
change a community unless they change what is in themselves ' (Lajughajer Allah
rna bi qawmen hata jughayyiru rna bi anfusihim'). Change is considered an inner
proeess growing gradually to the outside:'Everyone should start by himself, and
ask himself how the prophet Muhammed was, and how his followers ' Sahaba'
were, and try to be like them. Only then, when they followed the teachings of the
prophet can they tell other people what to do and order them to do the good and
1eave the evil amr bil marouf wa al nahiy an el mounkar ( Member of Salafi).
Muslim Sisters
Women's groups affiliated to the Muslim Brothers were more engaged in direct
politics than women of the other semi-action oriented groups. A number of them
were members of the People's Party El-Shaab (previously socialist, but now
increasingly Islamist). Most of these women have a higher degree of education and
are in some form or another related to the academia, which makes the form of
teaching and discussions more intellectual and sophisticated, rather than the
oversimplified logic presented in the other groups.
Loe al newspapers are regularly and carefully read by these women. The
mastering of at least one foreign language (French, English,German), gives them
access to the international debates and discourses in the different media. They are
thus able to form a more holistic picture of how Egypt fits into the global worId
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system. 'During the whole of last week, there was nothing in the government
newspapers except how Mubarak was cordially received in USA on his trip, and
how the United States desperately looked forward to his visit. In reality Mubarak's
visit received very little coverage in the Western mass media in general, and what
they did say about Mubarak and his policies was not that positive although he is
perceived as the 'hero' or 'champion' of what they call 'moderate' Islam and
'democratie' Egypt. In fact, Clinton didn't spend more than fifteen minutes with
Mubarak. That's how cordially he was received. (Comment from member of
Ikhwan)
Women in the Ikhwan group, see it as the duty of devoted Muslim to change
the society around them into a more just and egalitarian form that match Islamic
perceptions. They express their ideas in meetings, gatherings, public leetures, and
writings.
'It is our duty as Muslim women to have a say in the politics of our country
and the politics that shape our lives as women. Politics is not only the realm of
men, as many men want to propagate. On the contrary, it has been made our
primary concern throughout Islamic history 1500 years ago, when the women gave
the Prophet their vote (Baiya) personally. We were equally addressed, and were
equal partners in matters of the state. This is, however, not the notion most
Muslim men carry. Somewhere, the perception of women bein g only bodies fit for
the kitchen or the bed lingers in the back of their heads. (Leader in Ikhwan).
SocIal Profil e
These women's groups gathered mainly to serve educational purposes (reading,
explaining the Koran and the Sayings Hadith of the Prophet. At the beginning of
my attendances at group meetings, the personal atmosphere surrounding me was
one of suspicion and reluctance. My affilation to a foreign institution in Sweden
and my partly European origin seemed to be drawbacks. The potential use of this
research was put into question, and questions were posed whether the idea of
doing it was mine, as signe d to me, or proposed by members of my department or
university. Taking the constraining political situation into account, this attitude was
hardly surprising. Perhaps also the somewhat justifiable conspiratorial theory
deeply rooted in Muslims through the history of the crusades and the latters
hostility towards anything even remotely related to Islam, and the continuation of
this hostility in a different form in the contemporar political culture of the West,
has contributed to a powerful rejection of Western culture or ideals.
'We don't want the West, and we don't care about the West or what they think
of us. They have a hatred in their hearts against us that is blinding them and
blocking their hearts and minds from any understanding of how we want to live.
So is the case of all unbelievers who have sickness in their hearts. By the wil of
God,we wil have victory over them'(Member of Tabligh).
In any case, trying to penetrate a worId that was courteous yet continuously on
guard was a difficulty I had to cope with at the start. Being a Muslim myself
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helped in becoming more familiar with the women, suspicions slowly eroded, and
a trusting relationship was established. In this context my foreign affiliation and
origin proved to be helpful. In fact, they were able to draw on any identity they
liked, depending on the situation.
The meetings were generally held twice a week and to ok place in mosques as
well as in homes and study circles organised for children in different age groups.
Usually the leader, and two or three other women would be responsible for the
lecture. Sometimes, Islamist women from outside the group, like former actresses,
would be invited in to talk. Egyptian actresses have been Islamicising in vogue.
Some of them abandoned their acting career whilst stil at the height of success.
These women are looked at with a sense of euphoria and are taken as symbols of
how fame,beauty,wealth and power, are not comparable to the beauty, wealth and
power of Islam. 'Shams (a former actress) had fame, beauty and everything she
could ever wish for, but she discarded everything and chose Islam. In it found real
happiness. This is the real example we should follow! '(Member of Salafi)
Although the meetings included women from all strata of the society, there was
a heavy presenee of the middle class. All age groups were represented, with a
predominance in age group between twenty to thirty. Single as well as married
women flocked to the meetings. Another interesting characteristic was the
appearance of many different forms of veiIs, as well as women who were
bareheaded. Women in the Tabligh and Salafi groups usually tend to wear a face-
cover Niqab, whereas the Zahra women usually have a form of headscarf, and the
Ikhwan prefer a large headscarf covering the breasts or reaching even to the waist
called Khimar. This distinction, however, could not be made among the groups as
all variations existed and there was no clear-cut line. The majority of the women
attending were not aware or did not find it important to know to which Islamic
tendency the group belonged.
The regular attendanee in a group was based on their adherence to the general
Islamic trend El-Tayyar-El-Islami. The psychological and socIal dimension are
given as among the most important elements promoting adherence. Inner calm and
resolution, often described as a fe eling of inner peace brought about by formal or
public alignment with Islam, are prominent in the women's accounts (Radwan,
1992) . This conclusion conforms also to the findings of this study. Women often
stated that 'they had become calmer with their husbands', 'were able to deal better
with family problems' and 'weren't easily bothered by minor things like before.'
They also felt a sense of community and of communality of values that comforted
them. There was a big emphasis on sisterhood and love for one another in the
name of God (El Hub Fil Lah). This was to be the main form of group interest or
solidarity regardless of any material or personal interest. A member of Tabligh
expressed it in this way:' El Hub Fil Lah is the purest and most sincere form of
love, because I don't love you for being rich or beautiful, but because you share
with me the love of God.'
Their talk revolved mostly around Islam, apart from inquiring about each others
health and children. They were urged to read more and to be active and did not
indulge in light conversation, which according to them is a waste of time. A
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common theme in the leetures was presented as follows: 'We as Muslim women
should get prepared and equip ourselves with knowledge to preach Islam. Muslim
women should not sit for hours in front of the TV. Our main concern should be
, Datwa' : to preach Islam and invite other people to Islam, not to watch 'The Bold
and the Beautiful' (1eader of Zahra).
Another common theme is the emphasis on Islam as a religion as well as a
state Din wa Dawla regulating all aspects of li fe and opposed to the secular
, immoral' West where there is aseparation between state and church. The Western
life st yle is often put into stark contrast with Islam. TV serials like Dallas and
'The Bold and the Beautiful' shown on Egyptian TV give further inspiration:
'Now the West worship a new kind of God. Their God is called 'do anything you
like'. There are no rules or limits. Men and women go around almost naked in the
streets, they kiss and touch each other in public, and in the name of liberty they
sleep around as they like. Women are exposing that which should be private as a
cheap commodity to anyone. Can this be called women's liberation, civilization
or development? The West is disintegrating, and their people are lost amidst high
crime rates, drugs and sexual pervers it y . Islam prevents all this.' (Member Ikhwan)
The Ne! VeIl
Veilng is now common among university students and young professionals.The
Islamic trend became more prevalent among men and women in both categories.
Whereas the term muhajjabat in Arabie means the 'veIled ones' ,the veIl does not
necessarily have to cover the face. However, for both sexes the Islamic
requirements of modest y in dress, in the sense that it should not be sexually
enticing, should be met. Robes should be loose fitting, long-sleeved and ankle
length, and should not reve al the contours of the body. Conforming to this code,
men and women have developed styles of dress that are actually quite new. It is
neither the traditional dress of Egypt, nor Western, nor Arabian, although all three
elements might combine. For women depending on how modest y is defined, a
variety of headgear and face coverings with different colours and thickness of
material is observed. Men may wear baggy trousers and loose shirts.
Islamic dress is also a way of affirming ethical and social customs. Mixing
among the sexes in universities and in workplaces, as is the social reality in Egypt
today, becomes less offensive. As one observer of the Islamic phenomenon put it,
in adopting Islamic dress women ' are carving out legitimate public space for
themselves', and public space is by this means being redefined to accommodate
women (EI-Guindi,1982). The adoption of the dress does not declare women's
place to be at home, but on the contrary legitimizes their presenee outside it.
Consequently, the prevalenee of the Islamic mode among women cannot be seen
as a retreat from female autonomy and subjectivity. The availabilty of education,
the entry of women into universities and professional occupations, cannot be
considered regressive, no matter how conservative the appearance of the uniform
may look like, in helping them to achieve these goals comfortably. Islamist women
49
are also invading the mosques, previously a male domain. Some men may resist
the sharing of their power,but at the same time they are defenseless as the proeess
is taking place within the legitimate dominant culture. The charge of being anti-
Islamic by not supporting the women in the Islamic trend is an accusation most
men don't want to be confronted with. Women are not only making use of this
political space, but are constantly equipping themselves with examples from
Muslim women in Islamic history which are used to legitimize their position.
, Aisha, the wife of the Prophet transmitted three quarters of the 'hadith' (sayings
of the Prophet), she was on the battlefield side by side with the Prophet, and even
led a war against Ali after the Prophet's death. When Umar Ibn El Khattab wanted
to deprive Aisha from performing the pilgrimage, she resisted fiercely. We as
Muslim women should follow her path.(leader of Zahra)
Another member of the Ikwan said:
'During the time of the Prophet women attended the prayers from dawn to sunset. No man
has the right to deprive a woman from her Islamic mission. Submissiveness is only to God
and not to any human being (La Taata Li Makhlouk Fi Maseyyet El Khaleq). A Muslim
woman should fight for her rights, even if this means in some cases divorce.
Using this pretext, women's freedom of mobility has increased. They are able to
move freely, attend lessons and weddings with the other sisters, without the
necessity of the consents of their husbands,fathers, or brothers. SimilarIy a member
of a Salafi group expressed her anger at a man who didn't want her to attend to
her lesson with a group of children in the main part of the mosque-usually the
men's domain. 'It was degrading and humilating the way this man looked at me,
as if I were nothing- a piece of garbage. Re waved at me with his hands as if he
was scaring off a little dog and ordered me to confine myself to the women's
quarters which is very small and terribly hot now in summer. I thought to myself,
I am wearing the Islamic dress, and am totally respectable in every way, so I just
gave him my back and ignored him totally . I heard him mumbling in anger and
then he went away. I think he learned alesson he wil never be able to forget.'
The leader of the Salafi group mentioned a sit-in the men' s part of the mosque,
when a man shouted at them from behind the curtain to lower their voices.'We
should demonstrate for our rights and next time make the lesson in the men' s
quarters in order to have more space. They are not going to die if they switch to
our place twice a week.'
The Islamic dress also brings a variety of practical advantages for women. On
the simplest level, it is economical. Women adopting the Islamic dress are saved
the expense of acquiring fashionable clothes and having more than two or three
outfits. The dress also protects them from male harassment .
'Being totally covered saves me from the approaehes of men and hun gry looks.
I feel more free, purer, and more respectable' (member of Tabligh).
That El-Ziyy El-lslami does not resemble traditional dress is perhaps a significant
fact. In modern times traditional dress has come to be confined to the lower
classes and the peasantry.
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Traditional dress, therefore, identifies the wearer as being from these classes,
whereas El-Ziyy-EI-Islami might be seen as a democratie dress that to a large
ex tent erases class origins. In previous fieldwork conducted in rural Egypt, a
peasant woman pronounced these class distinetions clearIy: 'Only educated women
can wear the Hijjab, but if a peasant woman wears it, people wil make fun of her.
The wearing of Islamic dress and Islamism as a dominant discourse of social bein g
is marked by a vocabulary of dress and social being defined from below by the
emerging middle-classes rather than by the formerIy culturally dominant upper
classes.
Renegotiation of Gender Relations
The Hijjab voices the protest that many women dare not voice directly to their
husbands, and perhaps that many can not articulate completely even to
themselves. 'The leeturing, reading, and the many activities with the sisters make
me very busy, and most of the time the house is in a mess, but my husband
doesn't get angry because he knows my Islamic obligations'. (leader in ikhwan)
'Men should help women in housework.Any man is not better than the Prophet
who used to bake the bread and sew his own garment when cut.' (member of
Salafi)
Although women's protest might be indirect and displaced into the symbolic
realm, however, the previous statements by women can be read as signs that
significant negotiations of power are taking place.Through veiling and Islamism
women' s protests can be voiced and perhaps ameliorated in at least three
dimensions of inequality: in relations of gender, class, and global position. In the
realm of gender, for instance, these women are perceiving a different womanhood,
they are hearing the ethIcal, just, egalitarian voIce of Islam and are demanding its
implementation in their family polities. By singling out elements from Islamic
history, or as one woman said ' educate women in what their real rights are in
Islam' ,Islamist women are indeed starting to challenge the androcentric dominant
culture of established Islam that is hostile to women and the language of the
politically dominant. Central issues, such as marriage and divorce and the custody
of children, are looked at from an Islamicised women's perspective. Islamist
women claim, for example,that any conditions can be stipulated by the wife in the
marriage who wishes to protect her rights. This may include the freedom of choIce
in working or not, restriction of polygamy, and custody over future children. The
fear of easy divorce by men of women, as is the case now in established Islam,
or of no possibility of divorce when the wife asks for it, as dissolution of the
marriage contract lies in the hands of men, is considered a distortion of Islam,
brought about by some male Islamic scholars ulama as well as by men who didn't
understand Islam properIy and abused these rights. A practical solution for these
women and within accessible political reach, is to give the wife full autonomy to
dissolute the marriage contract herself without waiting for the husband' s consent.
This was found spelle d out in the teachings of Muhammed Abduh, an Islamic
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scholar in the 19th century , as well as by one of the first feminists
Zeinab-EI-Ghazali, but also in the earIy Islam of the 7th century, and was
therefore considered totally legitimate.
In the area of c1ass relations, the veil is a very potent signaL. The veil alles
women with modest middle-class women and differentiates them from 10wer-c1ass
women. There is also a strongly felt anger over the loss of traditional values that
has accompanied the overwhelming thrust of modernization and development, and
which is epitomized in veiling and Islamism. In reaffirming the values they hold
as important and in an attempt to make it real again, identifying themselves with
Islam, shows their connection to a vibrant and powerful culture, a culture they
wish to hold on to, as opposed to the invading culture of the West. For Islamist
women this nationalistie and anti-Western aspect has been perhaps the most
salient. What they are actually protesting is the vision of womanhood presented
by the West, the image of the future imposed by modernization, and the inflation
caused by economic dependency on other powers.
'Modernizing' Women
Middle Eastern societies began undergoing a fundamental social transformation by
the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. Foreign colonial powers
dominated the area whether formally or informally, and by the economic
encroachment of the West, the region was incorporated into the worId economic
system. 'Modern' states emerged, and were the paramount political transformation.
This period witnessed enormous vitality in the literary, intellectual,social, and
political life of women. For the first time women emerged as a significant subject
for national debate. Issues of polygamy , the treatment of women in Muslim
custom, easy male access to divorce and segregation were ventilated openly for
the first time. These issues were first raised by Egyptian male intellectuals, and
were intertwined with nationalism as well as social and cultural reforms that they
believed were important for national ' advaneement' .
Qasim Amin, an Egyptian French-educated upper-c1ass lawyer, was one of the
first towards the end of the nineteenth century to write a book where he called for
the unveiling and liberation of Egyptian women. Amin's book, Women's
Liberation (Tahrir El Mar'a 1899) marks the entry of the debate around the veil,
in which the veil epitomized Islamic inferiority. This debate was incorporated into
mainstream Arabic discourse that has recurred in a variety of forms in a number
of Muslim and Arab countries since then. Amin's call for unveiling was followed
by many in Egypt of whom upper-class background and some degree or other
Western affiliation was a typical characteristic.
The discussion of women and reform was mostly linked to the ' advaneement'
of European society and the need for Muslims to catch up. The new discourse that
emerged connected nationalism with women and cultural change rather than
displacing the classical formulations on gender. Nevertheless, the first three
decades of the century marked a feminism that was visible intellectually,
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organizationally, and politically. Women started to contribute intellectually by
writing in a variety of women's journals that they founded and organizations for
the intellectual improvement of women appeared. Politically, they were members
of women's political organizations paralleIing and actively supporting men's
parties. The first feminist discourses and feminist analysis observed in this period,
all originated from women from upper-class backgrounds .
Although these women marked a change in women's opportunities, yet like
Amin they were mostly Westward-looking, affilated themselves to the West, and
adopted an outlook that valorized Western ways as more advanced and more
'civilized' than native ways. Well-known names of feminists of this period are
Malak Hifni Nassef, Huda Sha'rawi, Saiza Nabarawi, Doria Shafik, and Mai
Ziyada who pushed for fundamental reforms in the laws governing women. They
demanded education and suffrage rights for all women. This was achieved after
Egypt expelled the British and proclaimed itself aRepublic with a new
constitution in 1956. The monarchy was terminated by a mIlitary coup launched
by the Free Officers in 1952. King Farouk was exiled and Nasser was brought to
power.
Huda Sha'rawi, the pre-eminent feminist leader of the twenties and thirties in
Egypt, founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923, the first Pan-Arab
feminist movement in Egypt. The L 920s movement by Egyptian feminists like
Huda Sharawi and Saiza Nabarawi to discard the veil remained primarily an
upper-class phenomenon. It was linked with upper-class women's entranee into
political life through participation in the struggles of Egyptian nationalist groups
and political efforts to rid the country of the foreign presence. A member of the
upper classes, and from a very earIy age, she had be en guided by her thoughts and
readings by Eugenie Le Brun, a French woman. Le Brun had conveyed to
Shatrawi the common European belief that 'the veil stood in the way of their
(Egyptian women's advancement (Badran, 1987). Thus in the early twentieth
century, and mainly through the EFU, the westernizing voIce of feminism emerged
as the uncontested and dominant voice of feminism in the Arab context. It
affiiated itself with the westernizing, secularizing tendencies of society,
predominantly the tendeneies of the upper, and upper-middle classes, and
promoted a feminism that assumed the desirability of pro gress toward
Western-type societies.
However, as mentioned earIier, another totally different tone of feminism
existed at the time. It was the strain of feminism promoted by Zeinab EI-Ghazali
who founded the Islamic Women's Association. Zeinab EI-Ghazali campaigned for
women and the nation in Islamist terms, whereas the other feminists of the middle
decades campaigned for women' s rights and human rights in the language of
secularism and democracy. Whereas these feminists consistently stressed the
superiority of the West in their feminist goals and actions, EI-Ghazali was
committed to indigenous culture and to pursuing feminism in indigenous terms.
EI-Ghazali had a determination to find feminism within Islam which is juxtaposed
to the adulation of the West and the undermining of the native that formed the
discourse of the other feminists. In advocating reformist ideas similar to
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Muhammed Abdu' s reformist ideas of Islam in the 19th century, she articulated
a belief of a reformist Islam which also favoured women.
Until the last decades of the century, the dominant voice of feminism in Egypt
as well as in the Middle East was marked by a Western-type feminism, whereas
this sec ond voice of feminism remained marginaL. It was seen only as an
alternative and was not even recognized as a voice of feminism. Ironically, as this
century draws to its end, it is the feminism advocated by Zeinab EI-Ghazali which
seems to capture the hearts and minds of the Islamist women. It seems to have the
greater resonanee for the shaping of mainstream Egyptian culture, whereas the
indisputably dominant voice of secularist, westernizing Arab feminism has become
the marginal and alternative voice. In seeking to decode the reasons for the
'Islamic Trend', numerous sociological endeavours are focused on the dichotomies
of nation-state/ civil society, traditionlmodernity, a kind of , Glaubenskrieg'
between South and North, core/periphery, capitalist/pre-capitalist, rural/urban etc.
Whatever the fabrics involved in feeding this proeess, it is obvious that the
language of Western-type feminism has exhausted its purposes.
Conclusion
The idea that improving the status of Arab or Muslim or other non-Western
women require them to abandon their own native customs is stil prevalent in most
of the Western feminist discourses. Analysts treat the debate as one between
feminists, that is, Amin and his alles, or as 'anti-feminists', meaning Amin's
crÍtics. Taking these postures, they automatically accept the supposition made by
Amin and the Western discourse: that the veil is a symbol of oppression.
Consequently, those who called for its abandonment were feminists, whereas those
rejecting that call, were anti-feminists. Assumptions are made by feminists that the
adoption of Islamic dress, because it reflects 'conservative' and ethical social
habits, also automatically connotes support of male dominance and female
subservience. The possible 'feminist' positions taken by women adopting Islamic
dress, positions supportive of female autonomy and equality, are articulated in
terms totally different from the language of Western and Western-affiliated
feminism. Investigators of the phenomenon must try to decipher this language in
order to make an understanding possible. In times of social change and political
opportunity there is an even possibilty of inequalities either bein g reproduced or
totally altered.
The logic of reproduction and real change are the same, and each time that a
political opening arises, either result is a possibility. Just as the acquiescent aspects
of women's behaviour can be singled out for co-option, so could the protesting
elements be encouraged and developed. The Islamist women I came to know are
involved in important choices in a struggle to define both their own identity and
women' s place in a changing society. They are attempting to discover an
appropriate identity which fits their tradition as it redefines their future, which has
also been the longer struggle of the Arab WorId. Negotiating their future is the
54
task these women confront with their move into the invasion of 'public spaee',
whatever form this may take.
Fox Genovese (1991), writing of US society, observes that 'sexism instead of
receding with the triumph of modernity, has probably become more general and
more difficult to locate in a single institution'. She also confirms that late capitalist
society 'has contributed a bitter twist to the centuries of female oppression' .
SimilarIy, Michel Foucault articulated the view that modern forms of power are
much more difficult to locate as they lack a center, or an 'eye'. (Foucault, 1972).
In this context, Michel Certeau (1984) argues that subordinate groups turn to the
use of small tactics as the only viable form of protest to bargain over modern
forms of power. At the end,however,they might form a significant resistance, a
strategy that is likely to be adopted by these women in their future struggle.
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Contested Identities: Women and Religion in
Algeria and Jordan
Wilhelmina Jansen
Woman and Muslim. Conflicting or Complementary Identities?
The Islamc resurgence in the Middle East has led for many women to shifts in
perceptions of self as women and as Muslims. Their established identities are
contested by new religious leaders who through the media and social control,
impose a 'new' identity for Muslims with specific notions of gender and gender
relations as important elements. As a res ult, women question whether their gender
identity, how they feel, behave and represent themselves as women, is still in line
with the propagated Muslim identity -how they should feel, behave and represent
themselves as women.
Based on data gathered during anthropological fieldwork in Jordan and Algeria,
this paper looks at how women try to reconcile new notions of femininity with a
new identity as Muslims. On the theoretical level it discusses how people's
multiple identities continually contest each other and how this must be taken into
account in a theory of identity formation. It is also argued that insight in this
process is essential to understanding women's paricipation in fundamentalist
movements.
Introduction
'Y ou are accountable for none but yourself' Koran, S.4:83
Aisha, a Jordanian woman of 23, is trying out new ways to present herself. It is
spring 1989, a few weeks before the start of Ramadan. The coming of the fasting
month has touched a deeply hidden religious spot in her. Up till then she
considered herself a young careless woman, outgoing and attractive, a Muslim, but
not thinking about Islam too much. She worked as a seeretar to the Jordanian
television station in Amman when she met her college-educated hus band. The
marriage was not as traditional as that of some of her sisters and friends: hers was
not arranged by senior family members, the couple was not related, they did not
move in with the husband's family but established themselves independently, and
she did not stay home but found a new job as a seeretar at the university in a
nearby town. Aisha continued to dress and wear make-up as she was used to doing
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as a girI and helped her husband make professional videos, including one which
propagated birth control. When her second daughter was born she quit her job to
take better care of her children. Now, after some months of being a full-time
mother and housewife she decides that it is time 'to become serious' as she calls
it.
But becoming serious is not without problems. She has many questions to ask
friends, relatives and me to determine how to become a good Muslim and to start
being accountable for herself. Most questions concern the modest y of her attire:
'Do you think the flowers on this scarf are toa colourful?' 'Shouldn't I wear the
scarfs I have rather than bring my husband to new expenses?' 'Is this dress toa
bright?' 'Can I wear high heels with ajelIaba?' She also starts to question her
previous behaviour: 'Can I stil take the bus to town with my mother-in-law?' or
'Maybe I was wrong to have let put in an I.u.d. before giving my husband a son.'
In the course of redefining her own proper behaviour, she also reconsidered the
proper upbringing of her daughters: 'Is it bad to let my daughter ride a bike?' (As
a non-Muslim I could not always give proper Islamic advice, only to the last
question I convincingly argued that there was nothing wrong with a three year old
pedaling her three-wheeled bike on the porch.)l
Many women like Aisha follow and support the religious revival in Muslim
countries, and in doing so ask advice from relatives, peers and new religious
leaders, and thus contribute to the proliferation of religious books, pamphlets,
cassettes, television and radio programmes and study groups where questions of
religion and morality are discussed. A growing number of women turns away from
their previous way of living and behaving and more or less adhere to
'fundamentalist' ideas.2 At first sight there seems to be a complete change in
identity: the symbols by which the self is presented are replaced by the opposite.
The tight miniskirt is replaced by long wide froeks, the thin nylons become dark
stockings, the radiant smile a withdrawn face. Colour becomes gray or black.
Extroversion and outgoingness become introversion and seclusion. Secularism is
The ethnographical data for this paper was gathered in a small town in Northem Jordan in 1989
and in a large provincial town in West Algeria in 1981-82 and 1984 (See resp. Jansen 1993b
and Jansen 1987).
2 Critics of the concept of fundamentalism have pointed out its christiancentric, ethnocentric,
homogenizing, demonizing and a-historical character (Esposito 1992:8; Karam 1993:4, Jansen
1993a:32-33, n. 16). The alternative, 'Islamism', however, sounds less ethnocentric but suffers
equally from the problem of suggesting homogeneity and a-historicity, can neither do justice
to the differences and flux within Islamic movements, and suggests an objectivity which might
not be there. The term fundamentalism on the other hand, enables fruitful comparisons between
simIlar movements in different religions and points to many analogies in the centrality of gender
in symbolism and ideology and in the effects on gender relations (Riesebrodt 1990, Hawley
1994). Moreover, there is nothing wrong in taking a critical stance as long as this is made
explicit. These are valuable reasons why many continue to use the term 'fundamentalism' (as
in Munson 1993:151-152, Jansen 1993a; Hawley 1993; Marty & Appleby 1993). The main
reason why I use the term Islamism alternating with, but more prominent as fundamentalism,
is my anthropological tendency to use emic concepts wherever possible and relevant.
57
replaced by religiosity. But is it indeed such a radical change of identity as it
looks from the outside for the women involved? How do women themselves
perceive this change? To what extent does this new self, or the presentation
thereof, conflct with the old self? Why do they construet such new identities?
In this paper I wil look at the shifting notions of self of Aisha and other
women and how their multiple identities continually contest each other. Gender
is an important element in Islamist or nationalist identity polities. Gender is also
an important identity element by itself, in how women de fine themselves as
women. How women combine (or struggle with) their different identities is
essential in understanding women's participation in Islamist movements. The main
aim of this aricle is to show how women use Islam as a stock of symbols, signs
and signaIs, not only to change their religious identity, but even more so their
personal identity in relation to their most significant others.
Notions of Identity
The concept of identity is at present in flux. Josselson (1987: 12-13), a psychologist
interested in identity formation amongst women, wrote: 'In psychodynamic terms,
identity is neither a structure nor a context but a property of the ego that organizes
experiences. It is an amalgam, according to Erikson, of constitutional givens,
idiosyncratic libidinal needs, psychological defenses against inner conflet,
significant identifications with important others, interests and social roles. In a
sense, we might think of identity formation as the assembling of a jigsaw puzzle
in which each person has somewhat different pieces to fit together. ' She is quite
confident that most people wil man age to put the jigsaw puzzle together and have
a sense both of internal coherence and meaningful relatedness to the real worId.
She describes in her books several examples of how women 'have found
themselves' .
Others have disputed this notion of identity as a sense of self and of wholeness
that can be ' found', as if it were a construet that is ' the re'. They rather present a
picture of identity as something that is continually in construetion, a puzzle that
is never finished and always mixed up with other puzzles. For instanee Judith
Butler (1990:25) said: 'There is no gender identity behind the expressions of
gender; ... identity is performatively constituted by the very "expressions" that are
said to be its results'. Identity cannot be found but only created in an ongoing
proeess within specific power constellations. Butler therefore demands that
students of identity investigate 'the political stakes in designating as an origin and
cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices,
discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin' (ibid:ix) In other words, for
women gender as an identity category is not caused by women's sex, but the result
of the complex interaction between women and the persons, institutions, symbols
and power structures around her.
Contradietions in identity arise because people belong to different groups in
relation to which they develop a social identity at the same time (Tajfel 1978,
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1982, Skevington & Baker 1989). These groups, and the person's position in them,
make conflcting demands on the individuaL. Especially women are confronted
with conflcting identities imposed on them. First, because they more often belong
to the less powerful groups and so have less influence on the mo dels of
femaleness being imposed on them, and on the representations of themselves as
subjects. Secondly, because certain combinations, such as bein g a caring parent
and a professional, remain inherently problematie (Roland 1979) and seem to be
more a problem for women than for men.
Moreover, the impact of each group -- be it the family, the religious
community, ethnic group, peer group, or work environment -- shifts over time in
conjunction with the lifecourse of the individuaL. Family relations and connections
with the home become stronger when a woman marries and has children, while
relations with friends tend to lessen. The self is continually and rapidly shifting
as Ewing has shown in her seminal article 'The Ilusion of Wholeness. Culture,
Self and the Experience of Inconsistency' (1990). She argued that people give
plural, inconsistent self-representations which are context dependent. At different
times and in interaction with different people, a different aspect of the self comes
to the fore, and a different element of one's identity is presented. Nevertheless,
people experience them as one, often fail to see how they are changing, and prefer
to think that the contradietions are or should be resolved. This idea finds its
paralleI in the Foucaultian concept of the dispersed subject, which states that
people's identity is constituted through subject positions set up in discourses which
are specific to place and time in history. This proeess largely occurs unconsciously
and does not prevent people from feeling a sense of wholeness. Moreover, it is not
restricted to non-Western cultures, which are supposedly more contextual and
relational, but a universal semiotic proeess (ibid, p. 251).
On a cultural level the ilusion of wholeness is constructed by symbolic means.
Clothes, rituals, or behavioral rules, which may include rules on such diverse areas
like food-taboos, greeting forms, body posture, or use of machines or public space,
give a sense of continuity and constancy to identities. They serve to identify those
who belong and to differentiate them from those who do not belong. For the
participants themselves, it heightens the awareness of who they are, and creates
a sense of belonging and differenee from others (Cohen 1995:53). This is all the
more urgent under conditions of intense political, economic or religious conflcts
in the wider society. Shifts in identity on the individual leve! then intertwine with
shifts in collective identities. The wider context influences the form and the
content of the symbolie expression of the different elements of the self and the
speed with which these change. The overt and visible choices of symbols by
individuals may give an indication of the reconciliation of the demands of the
various levels on the individual, but only partly and temporarily so. Observers tend
to read a more constant and fixed identity out of the use of these symbols than is
intended by the users. When women start to use an Islamist veil and thus
emphasize one type of identity (religious), do they perceive themselves as having
acquired an Islamist identity which contests their previous religious identity? And
how do they reconcile this with their other identities as seeretary, mother,
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daughter, video-åssistant or designer of high tech factories. How do they recreate
the ilusion of wholeness under these new conditions?
Shifting Boundaries between Self and Group
The question is to what extent the symbol of veilng really stands for a change in
identity, and specifically in which identity. Asad urges us to unpack 'the
comprehensive concept which he or she translates as 'religion' into heterogeneous
elements' (1993:54). Part of this is, in my view, to see the new veiling not as a
strictly religious symbol, but to show how it is intimately linked to social life and
power relations therein. if it is strictly seen as a religious phenomenon it may be
explained as only a communication of a profound change in private religious
beliefs rather than also of other changes in social life and one' sidentity . As the
questions of Aisha show, she was more in volve d with the symbols of her religion
than with doubts about her beliefs. For her, her beliefs did not change; what was
more significant was the way she would from now on express them, and take them
seriously. After having settled down as a homemaker and mother of two children,
she wants to be respected as such. Although she did not pray regularIy and
because of her pregnancies was not very serious about keeping the fast, she does
not consider her plans to pray and fast more regularIy now, as a change in belief.
On the contrary, it is more a confirmation of the beliefs that were always there.
When she uses Koranic citations now more in discussions with her hus band, she
refreshes her memory of things learned long ago, rather than applying a totally
new discourse. Women like Aisha have always considered themselves Muslims.
Only they used to be young and careless and not yet serious. Their new religious
practices form more a confirmation of what they already were and what they
believed but never showed, than a totally new religious identity.
The large variety in the degree and form of female veilng reflects the
variation in the alternative modes of self-image. Of the growing group of modern
veiled women that wear 'Islamic dress', only a small minority experience a
profound shift in religious identity. The distinetion between the days of ignorance,
before they became religious, and the days of hidaya or the current situation, is
very important for these radical fundamentalists. They are far strieter in their
practices, for instanee in their relations with non-related men or non-Muslims. The
types of veiling they adopt reflect their attitude: they use gloves, completely cover
their face with a niqab, and preferably wear dark colours. Religion is a major
preoccupation in their lives, and they are somewhat impatient and scornful with
the fad followers who choose daring colours and styles or who make only
halfhearted attempts to discover the merits of a more religious life
A larger group of women is far less sure what is the proper way. By asking
others' advice about how to express what is already there, Aisha seeks to align
herself to the moral consensus of the religious group and thus make the boundary
between herself and the religious environment more permeable and her identity
more defined through them. Let me compare Aisha's case with that of Nawal, a
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young Algerian woman who also took to the veil, because it shows some striking
similarities. Despite the socio-economic and political differences between Jordan
and Algeria, resulting in a much larger adherenee to fundamentalist movements
in Algeria, on the personalIevel the experiences of the women seem to have much
in common. When I met Nawal in 1981 she was an unmarried Algerian career
woman who had studied law and now occupied a top position at a large state firm
in one of the larger towns in Western Algeria. She lived in a vila provided by the
firm, dressed in smart suits, and was regularly driven by one of the chauffeurs to
the headquarters in Algiers for ameeting. Nawal considered herself a good
Muslim, kept the fast, but did not pray regularIy. Ten years later she was married,
had three children and quit her job (in that order). She prayed five times a day,
did not leave the house without her husband' spermission, and veiled herself.
When we discussed her plans to take on the veil in 1984, she said it made her
happy to be able to clarify her identity in that way. Just like Aisha she did not
consider it a change in beliefs but rather an intensification and explication of them.
She had always considered herself an outsider in the community because of her
exceptional way of living, but now she felt 'back home' again. Aisha and Nawal
now both define their self more through the religious community, but one of the
causes and of the consequences was that their identity became more differentiated
from that of another group: the family .
Cultures differ in the way the boundary between self and others is drawn, and
thus in the measure of autonomy accorded to individual identity, as well as in who
are the significant others. In Jordan the most significant others were always
famIly, and individual identity was and stil is strongly defined by famIly relations.
This was ilustrated by the reaction of a Jordanian student whom I gave a low
grade for an exam paper. He said: 'I can't get an F because I belong to the (tribe
of) M's.' At that time I did not yet grasp the meaning ofthis remark, only that he
considered it a strong argument in his effort to make me raise his mark. Jordan is
stil very much a tribal society in which tribes are hierarchically ordered and vying
for power through control of its individual members. Family ties and the power
of the family name can be decisive in getting a partner, a job, entranee to the
university and even in getting good grades. In the students view, his grades
should match his family's status, rather than his personal abilty. Moreover, he
used his tribe's high rank and power as a threat to his teaeher, which, if the
teaeher had been Jordanian and more sensitive and obedient to local power
hierarchies instead of a foreigner who did not know who the M' s were, might
have had some effect.
Another example of the hold of family over the individual, and of the
predominance of family identity over individual identity, can be found in the
famly associations (jama 'iyya). The main goal of such associations is to enable
regular contact between family members, for instanee by providing facilities for
family gatherings, usually in the form of a guest house which is used for
weddings, circumcision feasts, or the parties of the unmarried males. The family
associations also function as insurance- and saving-funds. Some have special
arrangements to save for the education of the children, others provide loans to
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members and/or provide mutual support at death. The strong social control this
leads to is exemplified by the case in which a young man found the guesthouse
of his family closed on the day of his wedding. He had reserved the hall for his
wedding party, but his cousin had locked the door and taken the key to protest that
the groom had not shown sufficient familial respect. He had planned a wedding
while his elan was still in mourning for an aunt who had died two months before,
and moreover he had preferred to marry a 'stranger' rather than one of his cousins.
W omen' s boundaries of self are considered to be more permeable than men' s
in many cultures. This is expressed by the term 'relatedness'. Josselson (1987: 175)
says that the proeess of anchoring is critical to the proeess of identity formation
of women because the self is experienced so much in relation to others. She
distinguishes four areas in which anchoring takes place: primary family, husbandl
children, career, friends. In this anchoring women may differ from men. Women
are for instanee less tied to a career and more tied to their children, as a result of
which loss of a job wil less likely lead to an identity crisis. Women's identity is
therefore more marked by relatedness; as Josselson says identity is not a matter
of being but fundamentally a being with.3
A similar phenomenon can be noticed in Jordan where women's identity
depends even more on the family than men's identity. The naming system is very
much indicative of this. Small children are often called by the term they wil later
have to address the speaker with, and thus made aware of the proper family
relation. A girI might thus be called 'ammi (lit. 'my uncle') by her father's
brother, and khâlti (lit. 'my aunt' by her mother's sister.4 People in general are
often identified by their family relation, as father or mother of someone, or
daughter of so and so. But this is far more of ten the case for women than for men.
A woman is seldom called by her first name, but rather as ' bint-X', daughter of
X, before mariage, 'â'ilat-Y', family of Y, after marriage, and 'umm-Z', mother
of Z, after the birth of her son.5 These words anchor women to others and express
their relatedness to relevant others to the point of ignoring their individual identity.
The name symbolizes that a woman's choices are the choices of others. Before
marriage X wil decide how she dresses, where she goes and whom, when and
where she maries. When the father is replaced by the husband, Y wil decide
when and where she goes or whom she shall see, and when both father and
husband have died, Z wil take over and decide how and where his mother wil
live. Female obedience is especially required in the field of sexuality and modesty.
All controlover their sexuality and any references to it have to be put in the
R. Josselson, lecture Seminar Identity and Development, September, 27, 1990 Amsterdam.
4 I would like to thank Farha Ghannam for her comment on this and other topics.
5 Only exceptionally is this order reversed. One legendary woman managed to have her son
called after her instead of her being called after her son. Stories are told about her, that she took
decisions like a man, talked at the well with the men, and composed poems like men. These
stories show the potential breaks in the norms but at the same time serve to reinforce the
general pattern.
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control of men. Men are urged to impose this control by sayings like: ' Hamm al-
bnât lemma mât (Protect the girls until death.). Since hamm also means anxiety
or concern, the underIying notion is that a father wil be troubled by the presenee
of his daughter until she dies. The names by which a woman is called express a
deep-felt conviction that a woman's identity is subsumed under that of the family
group. The total subordination of her own identity to that of her family is a
symbol of the strength of the group, her modest behaviour a symbol of the
family's status and honour.
The transfer of authority from the father to the husband, however, is the first
weak point in the ideology that denies an autonomous self to women. Whose
authority is decisive, that of the father or the husband? Moreover, in practice,
women as living actors are not always able or wiling to conform completely with
the orders of the males of the family. An example can be found in the case of 26-
year old Jordanian Amina who wanted a divorce. Dissatisfied with her second
husband, who locked her up in the house she ran home. Her brother brought her
back and tried to reconcile the couple, but as soon as she could she ran home
again. Then her husband accused her of adultery (in an effort to avoid the
obligation to pay a rna hr muta'akhkhira), to which her father and brother reacted
vehemently. It meant a blemish on their honour and they tried to convince the
husband that if his wife was adulterous it was his fault and he was to blame and
not her parents. The father negotiated a divorce with as main argument not that
his daughter was unhappy or the marriage not working, but that the husband was
unable to command her obedience. Meanwhile her eldest brother blamed her father
and her husband for not listening earlier to his warnings that the young man would
have difficulties in controllng such an experienced woman with children. The
subject of the discussion, Amina, withdrew and did not talk with them, but in the
meantime had her own way, while the men contested each other' s authority and
inability to effect it. 6
The norms of obedience are often far removed from reality. FormerIy women
had to leave home to fetch water from the well and wild herbs from the field, or
help herd the goats or bring in the wheat harvest. Now an increasing number of
women finds work in schools, offices, and institutions. Both Zohra, my 48-year
old neighbour, and Mûna, her 20 year old daughter, were and are often out of
sight and away from the authority of the responsible male. Zohra recounted how
hard she had to work since she was eleven years old, after her mother had died
and she had to take over her mother' s share of the land labour as well as the
housework for a father, six brothers and a mentally il sister. She did everything,
6 The question of women's identity of daughter versus wife also returns in discussions on
membership of family associations. In most associations women leave the one they belong to
by birth for the one of their hus band, at least for the financial aspects which now are arranged
through the husband. But she and her husband wil continue to be invited to the social
gatherings twice a year of her elan of birth, because, as they say: 'hiyya bintnâ', she is our
daughter. Establishing a woman's identity in these terms is essential for the elaims on her
obedience.
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mowed, reaped, bound up the sheaves of wheat and winnowed, she ground the
grain by hand, kneaded the dough and baked the bread in a self-made furnace.
Life was difficult then and the father's permission for her activities out of doors
was taken for granted rather than asked. Her daughter, who was born on the land
during the harvest, studied to become alicensed nurse and recently found
employment in a hospital in the next town. Mûna is formally engaged to a bus
driver whom she met on the bus to schooL. He encourages her to work to save for
her trousseau and their newapartment to be built on top of his father' s house. Her
independence is not very compatible with the ideal of complete obedience and she
suffers from the results of this inconsistency. While on the one hand she holds a
responsible job where she of ten has to work at night and regularIy comes into
contact with unrelated men, on the other hand she is scolded by her fiancé for
walking unchaperoned from his parents to her parents house (about 300 metre).
She has to copy him in presenting their marriage as an arranged one, in line with
the ideal, instead of giving the romantie version that they fell in love on the bus.
In short, the norms of female obedience are stil vivid, and there are many efforts
to enforce them, but women resist being moulded even more than before.
The ideal of women's identity as being dissolved in the identity of the family
group includes her religious identity . Her religious behaviour and belief is
supposedly made subject to male parental approval. Antoun, who described the
religious lessons by which Jordanian Muslims were made familiar with Islamic
ethics, paraphrases one preacher who said in 1960: 'A woman may not undertake
a voluntary supererogatory fast without first seeking the permission of her
husband. The purpose of this rule is not to discourage fasting but to stress the
necessity of the obedience of the wife.' (Antoun 1993: 616). He voices an ideal
that to a large extent is still upheld today. The incorporation of women's religious
identity under that of her family is expressed by the saying , a woman follows her
husband' , which means that upon marriage a woman takes her husband's religion.
The imperative for women to obey the hus band is larger than the imperative to be
a believer. This idea is the basis for the Islamic rule that Muslim men can marry
a non-Muslim woman, as this leads to an increase in Muslims, but a Muslim
woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man, as she would loose her religion.? That
the woman is not treated as an independent agent is further corroborated by the
statement than when this happens, it would be her father who is to blame for her
apostasy as he arranged her marriage.
Men's controlover women's religious identity even extends into the hereafter.
Jordanian women to Id their conviction that upon the death of a woman her
husband can veto her entranee to heaven by not forgiving her for being angry with
him, even if it was his fault.8 Some women however believe that this gendered
? This last type of marriage is not legally possible in Jordan.
8 It is their personal interpretation of a widespread belief that believers upon their death must be
pardoned for their faults by their co-religionists. The community of believers can thus decide
if a person is to be saved.
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fate is not absolute, and that age or parental authority can give them a similar
right. During a discussion on a decorative wall hanging with the maxim: 'Heaven
is under the feet of the mothers', one woman explained that women can earn
heaven by bringing up their children well and that they can also decide on whether
their sons go to heaven. A son who is not forgiven by his mother wil never go
to heaven. The religious identity of social minors, a status which women keep
during most of their life, is decided by their family. This control of the family
over a women's religious identity ilustrates that the kin group tries to be more
influential than the religious group, and to make kin identity more important than
religious identity.
During the last twenty years, however, the lines between individuals and their
family have been redrawn and made c1earer, and previous loyaltes have been
questioned. The power of familes over the religious identity of their members is
waning. Female actors always tried to balanee the different identities according to
the circumstances. New is the use of Islam by women. First, they claim a more
autonomous religious identity, the reasons for which I wil show further on.
Secondly, by claiming religious responsibilty, they defy male parental control in
more than the religious domain, and protest against hierarchies within the family.
Drawing upon Islam a generation gap is (re )created. Women are creating a niche
to make their own decisions by playing out the different loyalties.
To obtain a change in their position, women historically have used several of
the identity strategies identified by Skevington and Baker (1989) and Tajfei
(1978). The first is assimilation which involves the adoption of the positive
features of the high-status group by the low-status group who wish to join them.
The second is social creativity whereby the subordinate group seeks to create a
new and positive image for itself through new symbols, language, history etc. or
through the reinterpretation of negative features. The last is social campetition
when the subordinate group challenges the basis of the status hierarchy and seeks
to change the relative power and status of groups by active or passive resistance.
There are theoretical limits to this political project. Such as the c1aim of a
collective identity based on gender for such a diverse group which is internally
divided by lines of class, colour, or nationality. Or the danger of an essentialist
notion of gender identity, which feminists would want to avoid, but which
Islamists use to their advantage. The different perspectives of the participants, their
historical and hierarchical relations, as well as the cultural symbols and rituals
used, must be taken into account. This is easier to do if we start with certain
individuals in specific contexts. Despite these warnings, all three strategies can be
recognized in the identity politics of women Islamists.
Islamism as an Identity Strategy for Women
The Morocean sociologist Fatima Mernissi calls Islamic fundamentalism a
'statement about identity' (1987:5). For both young men and women it is a protest
against established economic, political, religious and moral hierarchies. When
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identity organizes experiences, as Josselson (1987: 12) states, it must be asked
which experiences have to be dealt with. In the literature on the Islamic revival
the in fluene e of the economic and political crisis has been frequently discussed
(Wagtendonk & Aarts 1986; Antoun & Hegland 1987, Marty & Appleby 1993;
Zebiri 1993). A dominant picture in the literature on 'fundamentalism', especially
by its critics, is that 'the people' (read 'men') are in crisis, due to economic,
political and moral chaos, that they adhere to 'fundamentalist' ideas in order to
change the worId. In their zeal to establish a new moral order they use 'the modest
woman' as a symbol and force real women of flesh and blood to retreat to the
home. In this picture, compulsory veilng is analysed as a mechanism of social
control of women, and ' symbolizes the lack of choice in the selection of identity:
identity in the form of hijab is imposed ' (Moghadam 1993:143). But this
bombardment of women with their normative identity is only one side of the
matter. Not only is the male offensive not as effective as often supposed,9 it also
leaves out the role of women.
A subdominant picture is provided by studies start out from a woman' s
perspective (e.g. MacLeod 1991; Zuhur 1992) and try to answer the question why
women adhere to fundamentalist notions. Women not only respond to Islamist
movements and adapt their identity accordingly, they actively take part in these
movements, and use Islam, just like men, to shape their identity. Outside observers
may not like that in doing so these women take over the idiom of their oppressors
and limit their freedom of dress and movement, simplify reality and exalt their
domestie activities. But portraying them as vulnerable victims of an objectionable
ideology is a missed chanee for understanding the rise of Islamism and the
meaning of Islam for women's identity. It is also an unsatisfactory answer to my
wondering why Aisha and Nawal suddenly decided to become serious, given the
fact that none of their family nor their immediate surroundings tried to push them
in that direction. Aisha's own parents let their daughters decide for themselves
what to wear. Nor did her in-laws neither insist on Islamist dress or behaviour; her
mother-in-law, who did not veil, had often extolled my decent dress when we were
visiting, thereby implicitly commenting on the much shorter skirts of her daughter-
in-law. But decent dress for her did not necessarily mean Islamic dress. She
scolded her own eldest married daughter once that she could better prove herself
as a good Muslim by helping her parents rather than by covering her head with
a veil. Nawal's mother never abandoned her traditional Algerian haik, but never
expected her daughters to veil, whether they were married or not. She even
complained when one of her daughters was forced to veil by her in-laws. Neither
Aisha nor Nawal felt that an identity was forced on them, but rather that they were
9 The effects for instance on women's participation in the labour market is limited. Even in Iran
women's average participation became not significantly lower after the revolution, although
female judges and top officials lost their jobs, and many educated women fled the country
(Moghadam 1988; Tabari 1986; Ramazani 1993).
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expressing their own selves, and subsequently impressing these identities on their
husbands.
To explain the appeal of Islamist movements among university and educated
women, it is important to show that not only the boys are in crisis, but that the
girIs are even more so. Women who actively become Islamiyya seemed until a
few years ago stil comfortable in school or at work, and not afraid to use public
space. Their life at that time seemed far removed from that of their mothers, who
were hardly literate and who likely had moved from the countryside into town.
Their fathers were still associated with low status jobs like agricultural or
industrial worker and their mothers kept full seclusion and veiling whenever they
could afford it in this urban environment (cf. also Ahmed 1992:222; Zuhur
1992:63). The young unmarried daughters saw themselves as different from their
mothers. They had moved up a few social steps and learned the latest Wordperfect
program on the computer rather than how to spin wool. They sat on chairs rather
than sheepskins, walked outside with friends rather than remain secluded, and
worked in a bank or office rather than in the kitchen. But this differenee put a
heavy strain on these young girIs. The gap with the milieu of the mother was
acutely felt, moreover their dealing with the modern worId was filed with
frustrations.
Just like the boys,the girIs could not cope with the economIc situation.
Economic changes led an increasing number of women like Aisha and Nawal to
follow an education, seek paid employment and aim for the symbols of
independence: an income, Western clothes, freedom of movement, mobilty --
maybe even a car-- and decision-making power in economic matters. But they
were frustrated on two fronts: due to the economic malaise it soon became
difficult to obtain the coveted material goods. Higher education brought no longer
the high gains promised, although the modern amenities and luxuries kept staring
down at them from bilboards, and was flashed at them by the conspicuously
consuming elite, and by soaps and commercials on television.
Moreover, even when gained, the new freedoms proved to conflct very much
with the traditional identity of daughter and wife. The family relentlessly
demanded familal loyalty and obedience. As in the case of Mûna' s financé, they
kept imposing norms which could not be combined with the exigencies of paid
work. A young university professor complained that at work she is responsible for
a whole department, its students and curriculum, that she studied in America and
drive everywhere in her car, but that at home her father expects her to take the
man he choses and to leave all her property behind when she marries and her
brothers expect to be served whenever they see fit and ask her to account for
every step she takes and every person she talks to. In her daily contacts she has
to fight for respect, because she is a women and people doubt her sexual mores.
The wider society does not accept the take-over of the public space by
schoolgoing girIs and working women.
Especially N awal felt this non-acceptance acutely. Living ina provincial town
she had felt quite unhappy because she was not married yet, and people gossiped
about her independent living. It was particularIy difficult to maintain ameasure
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of authority over her male subordinates. Women who adopted features of the
higher-status males such as education, public space, careers, political office,
smoking and driving, challenged the basis of the gender hierarehy. They became
competitors with men for power resources. Men who saw their authority and
dominanee dwindling, could find in Islamist ideology the terms and the arguments
to strike back. Drawing on the traditional equation of spatial boundaries with
sexual boundaries, women's coming out of the home was seen as a loss of sexual
control. And the reaction was in that same line: strict sexual mores had to be
reestablished by strieter rules for the use of public space for women and by
regulating the public visibility of women's bodies.1O At first sight, women
increasingly seem to yield to this pressure, but many of them do so in a subversive
way. Young women who feel frustrated with the future and with the past, solve
it by creating an alternative image of woman and themselves which is neither the
image of a Western women nor the image of their mother. The first symbolizes
a separateness and loneliness they do not asp ire to and the sec ond implies a
relatedness and obedience they want to escape.
In women' suse of Islam, the three above mentioned strategies can be
discerned. By veiling, women partly assÏmilate to this dominant normative model.
They re take established ways to gain respect: veiling, modest behaviour,
segregation of the sexes. They also seem assimilated in the use of the respected
source-books, the Koran and the Hadîth, and the use of fragments of one's
personal and collective history to create an identity. They study the sources and
write history, for instanee the life stories of Muhammed's wives, to serve as role
models for present day women.
More important however is social creativity, the second strategy in identity
polities. For although old symbols and histories are used, they are put in a
different form to create a different identity . The veil of the new Islamists is very
different from that of their mothers. The change in form betrays a significant
change in meaning and in the women underneath. The new veil no longer refers
to the respectful women sec1uded in the home, as previously, but rather to the
young career women, working in offices and travel agencies. The hijâb (a long
sober overdress with a large headscarf) of the latter is more practical, international,
sober, and uniform. By updating and upgrading an old symbol, young women have
sought to create a new and positive image for themselves, features previously
considered negative have been reinterpreted, loyalty to a larger, even international,
Islamic community has been expressed.
The creation of a new identity to show to outsiders is an arduous and lon g
proeess. Women seldom turn Islamist overnight. Aisha decided to wear lon g
10 In the manifesto of one of Algeria's IslamIc parties, AI-Nahda ('revival), part of the goal "to
spread virtuous morals and to defend them" is thought to be met by working for the abolition
of mixing of the sexes in education, administration, health servIces and other work-places and
establishments (Zebiri 1993:215). Twenty years ago, in Algeria, an unveIled woman taking the
bus, risked to be taken for a prostitute; today she risks being beaten on the legs, or worse, being
kiled.
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c10thing and go veiled a few weeks before Ramadan, the Holy Month which
usually releases more religious sentiments. But she postponed taking action. She
would say: 'Tomorrow I wil do it,' while she put on her finest city c1othes, did
her face in full colours and went shopping in town. Her sister-in-law encouraged
her by giving a beautiful black shawl embroidered with hundreds of bright little
flowers. She wore that for a while and c1earIy loved it. She kept saying: 'Isn't it
pretty?' . I nodded, and bit back the remark at the tip of my tongue that veilng is
not meant to make a woman prettier but rather less appealing. Instead I teased her
by saying that now she might not be able to wear that pretty winter suit she had
just bought. She said she would put on boots with that so that her legs were
covered. Her traditionally embroidered dress, a present from her mother for her
trousseau but never worn, was recovered from the bottom of a trunk and let out.
In the first week of Ramadan she went with her husband to an Islamist store to
order an overgown, grumbled about the drab colours, and realIzed her previous
choices had been toa fancy and bright. With a sigh, she hid the pretty shawl in a
drawer and also the embroidered dress returned to the trunk.
Many young women in Jordan and other countries go through a similar proeess.
A comparison of the pictures in the Yearbooks of Yarmouk University ilustrate
the gradual increase in veiling. In 1980 of the female graduates 17% were veiled,
in 1986 this figure had risen to 39% and three years later, in 1986, it reached
47%.11 Many students are pragmatie about it. One student told me: 'My father
hesitated to let me study, but my taking on the veil brought him around,' and
another: 'At least now we do not get bothered so much by the male students.'
Finding the right symbols, and through them, working on a new religious
identity happens in continuous interaction of the individual with her surroundings.
On the way the most obvious conflcts with other loyalties and sides of one's
identity must be solved. The new veil, unlike most of the traditional veils of
Jordanian and Algerian women, is 'workable' as it allows economic activity.
Unlike the Algerian haik, which had to be pressed against the body by the two
upper arms and needed to be held with one hand before the face, the new veil
leaves both hands ready to work, the eyes open to see and the mouth visible and
audible. Moreover, the new veil expresses transnational anti-Western sentiments
in its international uniformity. The image of the young veiled woman behind the
computer is part of national pride.
11
Veiling is related to the discipline of study. Especially students in Biology, Physics,
Mathematics, and Chemistry wear veils (69% of female graduates) and women studying Arabic
(67%), disciplines acceptable for girls under Islamic norms. Girls make up a large share of the
student population in these disciplines. For example, in 1983/84 at Yarmouk University 31 %
and at the University of Jordan 58% of the students in the physIcal sciences were women.
Veiled women can next be found in the English Deparment, probably for the opposite reason.
In this case veiling prevents people from drawing false conclusions as to the girl's true loyalty
when choosing this popular and prestigious discipline. Women in the Faculty of EconomIcs and
Administrative Sciences go largely unveiled, as do the few women in Sports, Journalism and
Engineering.
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Paradoxically, the greater conformity with and dep endene e on the wider
religious community, and the search for moral consensus, is used by people to take
individual choices and be personally responsible. This obligation in the religious
domain to be accountable for oneself and to be individually responsible for
realising Islamic values, has effects on the social domain where individual
responsibility and accountability are also c1aimed by women with the help of
religious arguments. Here the third strategy of identity politics comes to the fore:
social competition whereby the subordinate group challenges the basis of the status
hierarchy and seeks to change the power balance.
Threatening the Cohesion of the Family: Widening the
Generation and Gender Gap
In their creative strategy, young Islamist women may on the one hand seem to
return to old symbols and bow to the generation of their parents, but on the other
hand, by adopting a dress which is more international, sober, practical and
uniform, and by adhering to ritual rigidity and a strict avoidance between the
sexes, they react to and challenge old hierarchies.
Many women who turn more visibly to Islam take this decision themselves: the
family does not impose this identity, although they cannot easily disapprove. Aisha
is convinced that it is her own decIsion. When I asked what her husband thought
about it, she answered: 'He said: you have to decIde for yourself.' In reality, when
she announced her decision to her husband, he said: 'That is better.' and then,
turning to me as if defending her: 'Everybody thinks that is better. In our religion
one has to dress shara 'i.' 12 It was the first time however that I heard him say
something positive about it, as he usually found her very attractive in her Western
clothes and never gave any hint that he wanted her to change, nor did he have any
tendency himself to adhere to new rules. When I asked for areason, Aisha
recounted how a week earIier she had walked to her mother-in-law in a short skirt
and the neighbours had climbed to the roof to look at her. During her visit she had
felt upset, because the skirt was too tight on her as she had not yet regained her
figure after her last pregnancy, and it kept creeping up. Moreover, it cost toa much
money to buy nylons all the time. She would gain more respect and dress more
cheaply in Islamic dress. Aisha felt she had to excuse her choice. Not that she
expected disapproval, but neither had her hus band, his family or her circle of
friends suggested anything in that direction. On the contrary, she had little direct
contact with other Islamsts, nor would she call herself an Islamist.
12 The reader may wonder about my own views on this. I tried to remain neutral rather than
approve or disapprove. However, in discussions my pronunciation was several times corrected
from shara'i to shara 'i, the first word means 'from the street with the connotation of
'whorish', the latter' according to the Shari 'a, the Islamic law'. The letter 'ain in the second
word is difficult to master for a foreign speaker, but not unfamiliar or unspeakable to me. Was
this maybe a Freudian slip of the tongue?
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Some respected members of the older generation tried to discourage her and
reacted with irritation at the young woman's zeal. When Aisha, dressed in her
recently acquired Islamic outfit, visited her husband's great-aunt, the old lady
reacted both to her veiling and my presence, by telling the following joke, warning
us beforehand that it was 'not religious'. She said (I paraphrase her): 'It deals with
the three important prophets. God said to the first, Moses: Go and select your
people. And Moses looked over the people and selected from them the most
beautiful women. Later came Jesus, and God said to him: Go and select your
people. And Jesus went and selected the most beautiful women. When it was the
third prophet' s turn and God told him to select his people, there were only ugly
women left, with wry faces and crooked arms. So Mohammed said: 'Cover your
faces and follow me.'
Aisha did not smile, neither did I, as I was somewhat embarrassed about this
Orientalist joke. Yet it made clear the old lady's objection to and distaste of
veilng. Depending on their socio-economic background and their personal
convictions, not all mothers react the same to their daughters' new veiling. In
Egypt, some mothers had struggled themselves to come out of seclusion and
considered the removal of the veil liberating; 'they are unhappy to see their
daughters ' undoing' their gains' (Rugh 1993: 163). In Algeria, w here the proeess
of giving up the veil by the mothers' generation was stopped during the Algerian
revolution as the veil became a symbol of resistance against the French, it was
more common to find veiled women who preferred their daughters to go unveiled,
as in the case of Nawal's mother. Although they themselves kept the conservative
haik, they wished for their daughters the liberty they fought for but never got.
Nawal's mother was disappointed about the changes and would often sigh: 'We
fought the war of independence for nothing.' The situation found by Rugh in
Egypt, that mothers sometimes donned modern Islamc dress at the urging of their
daughters, is seldom found in Algeria because a larger percentage of women stil
wear the traditional veil.
Despite these critiques, however, people cannot easily disapprove the striving
for a better moral life. They might think it overdone, or not timely for a young
woman who does not yet have to think about her afterIife, or not necessary for
being a good Muslim, but parents, husband and other relatives cannot deny a
young woman responsibilty for her own deeds because she herself wil be held
accountable. Islamists hold each person responsible for her or his own salvation,
and not only the family patriarch. They know Sura 4:84 'Therefore fight for the
cause of God. Y ou are accountable for none but yourself. Rouse the faithful:
perchanee God wil overthrow the might of the unbelievers. God is mightier and
more truculent than they.' (Koran, interpr. Dawood). Also women are required to
make their own religious decisions, even if this implies that they contradict and
disobey their father or husband. When negotiating their religious autonomy and
a new power position, women often use the express ion: 'No one should obey a
created being in the disobedience of the Creator' (la ta' at li-makluq fi rna' siyat al-
Kaliq) from the hadith. Many women have discovered in Islam a strategy for
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increasing their decision-making power. When relatives refuse her this right, she
wil tell them her rights with the holy scriptures in hand.
This new-found autonomy is repeated in other domains. Aisha took to the veil
during a turbulent time in her marriage. She had supported her husband in his
proposal to buy a piece of land, yet without her knowing he had used her money
but had not put the land in her name too. For weeks she was angry, refusing to
cook for him and sleep with him. Wearing the new symbol made her confident in
her beliefs and religious knowledge, so she started to quote Koranic verses to
show that he was a bad Muslim because he had stolen her bridewealth and
property. He could not but repent his wrongdoing. Peace returned to the household
when he promised to have the property deeds written in the name of their two
daughters. She announced she would go back to work again in order to refil her
bank -account, and he better not dare say that it was improper for a mother to work
because she was wearing Islamic dress and thus proved her modesty. It is
significant that in using her religious knowledge to influence her relation with her
husband she felt less insecure and did not ask others for advice. Nawal in Algeria
also used religious knowledge in her arguments with her hus band. He had started
drinking and maltreating her at the time and by slowly interesting him in a more
religious life she worked to improve his behaviour.
Not only the line between women and their husbands but also between girls and
their fathers is redrawn. By turning Islamist they challenge the kinship hierarchy
as well as the gender hierarehy. To use terms like 'sisters and brothers' for
religious peers appears an assimIlation to kinship values. But their implication of
equality between women and men as believers defies the patriarehal ordering of
women and men as daughters and fathers. Y oung women can find in IslamIst
ideologies legitimate excuses to defy the father's choice of mariage-partner when
the proposed gro om does not show sufficient religious zeal. The fundamentalist
group wil support them in arguing that religious loyalty is more important than
loyalty to the family. Women use a religious idiom and religious symbols to
defend their own choice to work, to use public space, to marry, but also to
criticize their fathers and husbands for not giving women their due rights, for
refusing them an education or their own property, for using a1cohol and drugs, or
for spending their money on the street rather than for their family. 13 A widening
gap is acutely felt by many families.
When the daughter or wife decides to follow her own rules for dress and
behaviour instead of obeying her male kin, cont1cts may arise, not only because
they might disapprove, but also because it is one of the few areas where women
openly make their own choices and can defend them. Moghadam quotes an
account by Coffman who was fascinated by the way young girIs reconciled their
fundamentalist li fest yle with their dream of succeeding in thermodynamics and
become civil engineers. They told him that 'nothing irritated them more than the
efforts of many Algerian men to veil their women by force and abuse them into
13 For this protest character of the new veiling see also MacLeod 1991.
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submission. 'I think it's scandalous how men dominate women in Algeria!'
seethed Aîcha as she mechanically pushed an errant lock of hair back under her
hijab. 'Listen, if I'm able to take on the hijab against the wishes of my father,
another woman is also able to decide not to wear it, despite the wishes of her
father. No woman should let herself be intimidated by a slap, a whack of the belt,
or blackmail. A woman must stand up for her rights.' (Moghadam 1993:150).
The conflcts become more serious when they also try to impose their new
moral behaviour on other famIly members. Islamist women set an example, both
for themselves and for other women, but their exemplary and proselytizing
behaviour is not always appreciated. Family members may get fed up with being
called 'culturally un-authentic', 'western', 'degenerate' or 'blasphemous' (Karam
1993:10; Zebiri 1993:219) when they have been doing nothing more than they
always did. Fathers and brothers do not like to see their authority contested by
what 'the imam has said'. This has led to an irreparable rift in many families.
Thus, a renewed adherenee to Islam, may change both a woman's relation to her
family of birth and to her family of marriage. Family and religious peer group are
contesting each other's influence on women's identity. This contest and the slow
movement from the family to the religious community as primary identity group
leaves room for the development of her own individual identity. Her autonomy
versus the family increases. This diminishes the hold of men over female relatives.
Andrea Rugh noted the same reshaping of personal relations in Egypt, where
youngsters defy the father in the name of Islam, and girIs can for instanee refuse
the father' s choice of marriage partner with the argument that the boy is not a
good Muslim. Rugh states: 'Religious movements are uniquely equipped in this
respect to rede fine personal loyalties toward the higher entity of community
without destroying the stability that comes from strong family institutions.'
Although I agree with this transfer of loyalties, I doubt whether the stability of
strong family institutions is left intact. Islamism is becoming a divisive element
in many families.
It is the paradox oflslamic ideology, which places so much emphasis on family
cohesion and hierarchy, that it is used by women to undermine the authority of the
father or husband. While reproducing the kinship tie in Islamic idiom, they defy
the kinship and gen der hierarchy.
ConclusIon
Women's multiple identities are changing in a continuous interaction with wider
social proeesses. The very visibility of the symbol of the veil suggests most
changes in religious identity. I have tried to show in this paper, however, that
women's religious identity has not been radically changed. To the contrary;
changes in their religious identity are not so much perceived as individual changes
in belief system as in the ways these beliefs are expressed and turned into practice.
Despite a new dress code, strict spacial and behavioural rules, informants would
deny a profound change in identity in this respect. What was put more into
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question was their familial identity. Resurgent religious groups demand loyalty to
the umma, the religious community, over loyalty to the family and even over
loyalty to male authority. Women were already contesting their relatedness and
extreme subjugation to the family due to their increased autonomy in space,
education or work. Dissatisfied with the past pattern according to which a
woman's identity was subjugated to that of her family, and in which she only
existed as daughter, wife or mother, but also frustrated with the Western model
of women as career women, they applied social creativity as a strategy to mould
old symbols, idiom and history into an identity that contained multitudes, and that
was continually discussed and remade so that it could be experienced as one.
Let us take a last look at Aisha and Nawal. Both accommodated to the norms
of the people they felt close to, but on their own t(1rms. They did not take their
mothers veil or followed their mothers' secluded way of life, but took on a new
veiling as both a symbol of religious autonomous responsibility as well as of their
presenee in the public domain. Both used it to protest against their husband.
Veiling mIght also have been a form of protection against gossip about their
relation with me, a non-Muslim and Western woman. Again it would make their
'real identity' c1ear to significant others. This decision to 'become serious'
involved them in a complex decision-making proeess. They had to answer
questions they never had to answer before and they had to rely on their own
judgement as never before. They both used it also to request respect for their
motherhood, Aisha for produeing only girls, Nawal for liberating her from paid
work when the combination of a full-time job with three small children became
toa strenuous. She convinced her husband to sell his car and take his duties as
provider more seriously so that she could stop working.
Despite the very different national contexts in which Aisha and Nawal live,
they show some similarities in the arguments they use to explain their choice and
in the contextual elements that make such a choice understandable. Of course not
all women have the same reasons for turning Islamist, nor share the same socio-
economIc background. The modern media, however, have helped to spre ad the
discourse and the symbols that young women can draw from to orient themselves
in this new endeavour. International exchange of information should not be
underestimated in enabling women to formulate what they want in an Islamic
idiom. It is on this level that women's Islamism from such widely divergent
countries as Algeria and Jordan can be compared.
What does this mean for theory on fundamentalism? First, women have reasons
for adhering to fundamentalist ideas and practices that are both similar to men's
but also their own special reasons for adhering to fundamentalist ideas and
practices than men. If we look at the literature on Islamist movements, and how
this takes women and gender into consideration, we see that most of it dep arts
from males as constituting the main body of Islamists. It has been argued here,
however, that the growth of these movements cannot be understood properIy
without taking account also of women as a driving force behind them. If gender
is mentioned, it is usually as an important issue in IslamIst discourse, or in the
context of the detrimental effects of IslamIst movements on women. Neglected,
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however, is how women with the help of Islamist idiom construet their own
gender identity which inc1udes the right to study and to participate in the political
and economic domains. Authors who describe the attractiveness of Islamism for
women do so hesitantly, as they do not want to be considered apologists for an
anti-rational, exc1usive, potentially violent belief system. The problem lies in
fundamentalism being both negative and positive for women, and in the
importanee of taking both sides into account.
Secondly, it was argued that when Islamist movements are interpreted as
fundamental changes in religious identity the symbols are overrated. A visible
change in the symbol of the veil does not necessarily imply a fundamental change
in belief system. Besides overrating the change in religious identity, this has as
side effect that other identity changes, such as patrilineal or gender identity, are
overlooked. Changing family and gender relations are both cause and effect of
fundamentalism, and not only in negative ways.
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Public Baths as Private Places
Marjo Buitelaar
In the film Halfaouine a Tunisian boy struggles to save the best of both worIds as
he is bidding farewell to his childhood and taking his first steps towards
adulthood. For boys in sex-segregated societies like the Maghreb-countries,
growing up implies an irreversible transition from the worId of women to the
worId of men. In Halfaouine, this transition results in a crisis when the boy
accompanies his mother to the hammâm and is ' caught' peeping at one of the
nearIy naked women.
What I am interested in here is not so much the incident' s symbolie marking
of the protagonist's life-crisis, but the question why a boy's transgression should
create such a state of frenzy among bathing women. There is not one single
answer to this question. The public bath is a complex social situation which relates
to many dimensions in women's lives.! In this paper I wil use the example of the
public bath in Moroccan society to discuss the sexual division of space that is
characteristic of North African cultures. The major part of the article consists of
a description of the main features of the organisation of social space and its
correspondence to different notions of privacy. Next I wil look into the paradox
of the hammâm as the most private of public female domains. To a certain extent,
the significance of this characteristic for women depends on their living
arrangements, which both express and effect shifting notions of privacy. In the
latter par of this paper I wil therefore investigate how modernisation proeesses
influence women' s social relations and the differential importanee of having access
to female networks through the privacy of the hammâm.
I first explored the significance of the hammâm to women during research in 1983-1984 in the
town of Sidi Slimane, Morocco. This resulted in a (Dutch) master's thesis in 1986 in which I
discuss the importance of the public bath for women in l) creating and sustaining social
networks, 2) paricipating in the community of MuslIms by adhering to Islamic notions ofpurity
and purification, and 3) marking transitions that women make from one stage of life to another
through specific bathing rituals. In 1992 and 1993 the first public baths for Moroccan and
Turkish women in the Netherlands were opened. In the meantime, I had developed a specific
interest in the relation between the gendered experience of religion and the construction of
(Moroccan) female identity as a result of my Ph.d. research into the meanings of fasting for
women during Ramadan (cf. M. Buitelaar 1993.) These cIrcumstances led me to take a fresh
look at my 1983-1984 material and extend it with new fieldwork in the Dutch hammâms. This
paper is mainly based on the 1983-1984 materiaL.
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The Concept of Privacy in Anthropology
It is common knowledge that social organisation in Muslim countries in the
Middle East is predominantly based on a sexual division of space. In accordance
with the Islamic moral-legal code, men and women spend their daily lives in
relatively separate spheres. Women's domains consist mainly of the house and the
neighbourhood, while workplace, coffee shops, the market, the mosque and the
street are typically men's domains. Schools form an interesting mixed domain,
where more explicit male and female zones tend to arise among students as they
get older.
Western educated anthropologists have easily been tempted to sum up such
spatial arrangements by stating that women operate mostly within the private
sphere and men in the public sphere. In the 1970s feminist researches who were
in search for grand theories to explain the universal subordination of women saw
a causal relation between women's lack of power and what they perceived to be
a greater preponderanee of women in the domestie sphere and men in extra-
domestie spheres. It was believed that women were nearIy universally confined to
the 'private' sphere, which prevented their access to authority, prestige and cultural
values. These were thought to be the prerogatives of men, who competed for these
sources of power in the 'public' sphere.2 This view was soon corrected by studies
that showed that women could exert considerable informal power within the
'private' sphere and were also often able to influence decisions taken in the
'public' sphere through their husbands and sons.3
Since then, awareness has grown of the difficulty in assuming that the private -
public dichotomy is a universalone or that the criteria that determine what socIal
situation people from varying cultures experience as 'private' or 'public' should
be the same everywhere. Historians have pointed out that the Western
interpretation of privacy as the right of a person to individual freedom and the
conception of private and public spaces as mutually exc1usive spheres are the
result of slow historical developments.4 More recent ethnographic evidence
suggests that in many cases private and public zones cannot be assessed by
physical dimensions alone, but may be defined by sound and sight zones as weii.5
Public and private domains may be measured not only by space but by a wider
context inc1uding time, participants and activities. In order to do justiee to the
different notions of privacy experienced by Moroccan women, I follow Sciama in
2 Cf. M. RosaIdo (1974) 'Women, culture and society: a theoretical overview.' in: M. RosaIdo
& L. Lamphere (eds.) 1974.
3 Cf. C. Nelson, 'Public and Private Politics: Women in the Middle Eastem World.' 1974, in
American Ethnologist 1(3): 551-563; S. Rogers, 'Female forms of power and the myth of male
dominance: a model of female/male interaction in peasant society.' in American Ethnologoist
1975, 727-56.
4 Cf. N. Elias (1969) and B. Moore (1984).
5 S. Ardener, 'Ground rules and social maps for women: an introduction.' In: S. Ardener (ed.)
(pp.11-34) in S. Ardener (ed.) 1981:20.
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defining privacy as the right or need of individuals or social groups to separate
themselves from others at various times, or for certain well-defined activities.6
Morocean Notions of Privacy
A low level of spatial differentiation in traditional urban Morocean houses and the
remarkably mobile character of the furnishings confirm the contextual
understanding of privacy suggested here above. Rooms tend to be of the same
shape and size. Although the quality and decorations of furniture may differ from
room to room, all rooms are basically furnished with the same sdâris or small
divans that are arranged along the sides of the walls When a family disposes over
more than one room, the husband and wife may sleep in a double bed in one of
the rooms, but otherwise there are no specific bedrooms. Even if a house consists
of several rooms, most members of the family prefer to sleep together in one
room, either on the sdâris or on thin mattresses that are laid out every night. In
the morning the blankets and mattresses are put away again so that the room can
be used for other purposes, such as entertaining guests and eating meals. The
mîda, a small round table also moves around a lot. When the weather permits
family members may prefer eating the main meal at midday in the court yard, but
the table is rolled back to one of the rooms for tea or to serve a guest of high
status. A now vanishing custom is for husbands to eat apar. In most families,
however, when there are no guests all family members eat together. Meals are
served from a common plate.
These sleeping and eating arrangements ilustrate the high value that
Moroccans attach to sharing. Except maybe for the parents, hardly ever does an
individual member of the family have a room or even a plate 'of one's own'.
Indeed, the Western notion of privacy as the right of the individual to time or
space for him- or herself is relatively weak and is socially depreciated.7
Moroceans seldom withdraw themselves from company and such behaviour is met
with suspicion. People who seek to be alone may either be thought to be il, in
which case they should be c10sely attended to, or they may be suspected to be up
to some mischief, in which case the presenee of others may prevent them from
carrying out their plans.
A notion of privacy that is much more highly valued by Moroccans is famly
privacy, the right to hide family life from those who do not belong to the qurâb
6 L. Sciama, 'The Problem of Privacy in Mediterranean Anthropology' In: S.Ardener, 1981:89.
7 Much to the annoyance of high school students, who have difficulty finding a quiet place to do
their homework. Many of them take their books to the parks or sit down under a street lantern.
This behaviour is more readily accepted from boys than from girls, who face the additional
difficulty of being expected to participate in household chores.
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or 'c1ose ones,.8 The importanee of family privacy can be recognised in the
spatial organisation of traditional Morocean houses, which are turned inwards.
Strangers easily get lost in the narrow, winding alleys that lead to the houses, so
they stay away if they have no business there. The outside walls of the houses are
high and if they have any windows at all, these tend to be very small, bared, and
above eye-level so as to prevent passers by from peeping in. There is only one
entranee to the house. The need to protect family li fe from the larger society can
be ilustrated by the fact that in cities in the Rif mountains in northern Morocco
the front door is called l-ltâm ad-dâr, the veil of the house.9 Behind the low
doorway is a small corridor that leads to the court yard. The court yard of ten lies
a few steps below street level and the corridor may have bends. Again, this
obstruets the view of what goes on inside. The court yard is called wust ad-dâr, the
centre of the house. The rooms around it can only be entered from the court yard
and catch light from windows in the walls facing it.
The place where guests are invited to sit down is an indication of the
c10seness between the visitor and the host family . While it is an honour for a
special guest to be invited into the most luxuriously decorated room of the house,
creating a temporary guest room is also a way of hiding the privacy of family life
from view. On the rare occasion of men inviting male guests who are not close
family the visitors are inevitably received in a 'guest room'. Women, on the
contrary, only seldom receive their female guests in a special room. If the weather
permits, c10se friends are invited to sit on the roof or in the court yard. Otherwise
female guests may be received in whatever ro om the hostess happened to be
sitting at the moment of their arrival.
These gender differences ilustrate that men are more concerned with family
privacy than women. A man hardly ever invites his friends to his house. His
domestie life is not their business. Especially female members of the family should
remain hidden from the outside world. Etiquette even forbids a relative stranger
to the family to ask a man about his wife' s health. A male acquaintance to the
family wil respect the family privacy by vaguely inquiring after ad-dâr, the house,
meaning the members of the household.
Among women, famIly affairs are discussed more frequently and more
detailed. Still, a female visitor does not readily mention the name of the husband
of her hostess but is more likely to refer to him as mûl ad-dâr, the owner of the
house. This is not only indicative of the power relations between the genders, but
also points to the significance to women of gender privacy, the need and right of
groups of the same gender to separate from persons from the other gender. By not
mentioning his name, she distances herself from the husband of her friend.
8
luse this emIc term since it allows more room for more personal links between non-kin that
may have developed over time as a result of common residence, fosterage, ongoing relationships
after dissolved mariages, etc. Compare D. Eickelman (1981) 156-162.
9 M. Cammaert (1985:81).
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As in many Muslim countries, the notion of gender privacy is a domInant
ordering principle in the social organisation and the corresponding spatial
arrangements. In the company of other women, 'the brakes can be taken off
certain impulses' as Moore (1994) describes the atmosphere of private groups to
which individuals may temporarily retreat for protection and relief from the
demands and obligations of larger society.
The house is associated with women's privacy to such an extent that it has
developed feminine qualities itself. Walls are often painted in bright pink, blue or
green colours that correspond with those of women's c1othing. The divan covers
usually have a flower design and, when money permits, contain brocade, likewise
features that are exc1usively reserved for women's c1othing. Calling the front door
'the veil of the house' also ilustrates an association of the house with the female
body, which may also be protected by a veil against prying eyes. Combs-Schiling
even goes as far as saying that the traditional Morocean house is modeled on the
female body. 10
This is not to say that ' anything goes' for the women who meet within the
intimate female privacy of a house. Depending on context, such relaxation can
itself be highly stylised and imposes Its own standards of behaviour.11 This is
especially the case in interaction with to non-related women, in whose presenee
family privacy must also be protected to a certain extent. Of these two competing
forms of privacy, gender privacy prevails, so that among themselves, women feel
free to dress, sit, laugh, and talk in away that they cannot do in the presenee of
men.
In the eyes of women, gender privacy can be more dominant than family
privacy. Even in his own house, a man can be an unwe1come intruder when his
wife is receiving guests. While his definition of the situation is that of a private
place where family privacy prevails, in the view of his wife, and much more so
in that of her friends, gender privacy is disturbed and the setting is transformed
from a private place into a public one. In such cases, women cut off their
conversation, check their posture and clothing, and expect the man to withdraw as
quicklyas possible.
In situations where this is not possible, as in the case of a woman who had
no choice but to invite me into the same one-room dwellng where her il husband
lay on a divan, the two genders are likely to ignore each other. In this particular
10
" Even after gaining access to the initial opening, one is not yet within the main part of the
household, but rather one must first follow a dark, circuitous hallway that finally breaks forth
in the central court yard - a place of great pleasure. The image is dear. Entry into the female
is difficult, but if one gains access, then pleasures abound." E. Combs-Schillng (1989: 215).
11 Cf. Moore, Privacy, 46, who maintains that escape into such a group is never a complete escape
from social demands. While offering temporal escape from external pressures, intimate groups
also serve to transmit and sustain different aspects of a society's culture. Therefore such groups
develop their own standards of behaviour. That is one of the reasons for continuing individual
ambivalence toward such groups, a tendency to retreat into an intimate protective group and
then to escape from it.
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case, my hostess had to leave the room to fetch water to make coffee. In much the
same way as Europeans in an elevator may choose to ignore the other occupants,
her husband and I kept silent and evaded each other' s glanees. His presenee was
even more openly disregarded by his daughter who came in and greeted me,
saying: 'What bad manners does my mother have to leave you sitting here all by
yourself! '
Even when there are no visitors women may feel il at ease when adult male
members of the family are present. They feel checked in their activities and are
on their guard not to discuss certain matters, particularIy topics concerning
sexuality. Teenage girIs love to dance or sin g along with the radio, but when their
father or an older brother enters the house they stop at once and may be ordered
by their mother to turn off the radio altogether. There is of course considerable
variation between families. In liberal families gender privacy is not seldom
overruled by family privacy and family members of both genders feel rather
comfortable in the presenee of each other. The attitude of more traditional women
concerning mixed-gender domestie situations can perhaps best be ilustrated by
quoting aMoroccan proverb according to which ' A man about the house is like
a boil on the back', that is, a nuisance that prevents one from leaning back and
relaxing.
In turn, men can also feel uncomfortable in complex domestie situations
where their actions are limited by rules of avoidance. A fact that is of ten
overIooked by westerners is that the sec1usion of women not only limits the
freedom of women but also circumscribes men's behaviour. In the family with
whom I lived six months in Sidi Slimane, during the evening that my host was not
out to a café to meet his friends he sat in the unheated garage to listen to his
transistor radio by the light of a candle. Inside the house the female members of
the family were comfortably watching the television in a heated and iluminated
room. When a programme was being broadcasted that my hostess thought would
interest her husband, she sent out her small daughter to fetch her father. Instead
of joining us on the divan, he would sit down on a stool in the far corner of the
room and leave again as soon as the programme was over.12
Asymmetries in Boundary Control
The discussion of Morocean notions of privacy ilustrates the point that a
conception of sex segregation which relegates the activities of women to the
'private' sphere and those of men to the 'public' sphere is toa simple. The
12 Cf. P. Bourdieu, 'The Kabyle house or the world reversed' . 1979: 141, who describes for
Kabyle society in Algeria how men are 'shut out' of the house in daytime and H. Geertz, In
the essay 'The Meanings of Family Ties' in :C. Geertz, H. Geertz, L. Rosen, we are presented
(1979:331) with descriptions of how men in Sefrou, Morocco, mo ve with circumspection in
their own neighbourhoods and homes.
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dominant definition of a situation as private or public as well as the extent to
which people are in a position to protect their privacy are dimensions of gender
relations. For every social situation the question should be asked vis-à-vis whom
amongst the participants experience of a particular setting as private or public is
felt. In each case, this implies a proeess of negotiation between the different
participants about their various interpretations of the situation.
The sexual division of Morocean space is not symmetrical. Men have more
space at their disposal than women, and it is easier for men to cross the
boundaries of male and female domains than vice versa. The house is considered
a female domain, and most men wil respect the privacy of the female members
of the family by spending much time out of doors. But sooner or later they have
to come home to eat and sleep. Also, the house is the seat of the family privacy
in which male members of the family participate and which is highly valued by
them. Furthermore, as reference to the male head of the household as mûl ad-dâr,
owner of the house, demonstrates, women are well aware of the fact that house
rules are ultimately determined by their hus band or the male relative with whom
they live.13
From this point of view it becomes clear that there is more to the proverb 'A
man about the house is like a boil on the back' than was alluded to above. A boil
on the back is something beyond your controL You don't have a say in Its coming
on, and since it is on your back, you can't touch it. In the same vein, a man about
the house may be a nuisance that prevents you from leaning back and relaxing, but
there is not much you can do about it.
Men never need to ask for permission to enter theIr house. Women, by
contrast, always need the authorisation of their husband or male caretaker to go
out. To be sure, this does not mean that a woman has to ask for permission every
single time she leaves the house. In practice, most women have negotiated a kind
of 'passe-partout' or standing permission to visit specific places such as school,
the mosque or the public bath, or to 1eave the house on particular occasions such
as to visit a relative or a sick friend. They must, however, always be able to
account for their extra-domestic activities, and permission to go out may be
withdrawn at any time.
Also, the rules that determine who adjusts to whom when boundaries between
male and female spheres are crossed point to asymmetry. The major step a man
may take when he enters his home is to call out camlû at-tarîq , c1ear the way' .14
Subsequently the women inside adapt to the violation of their privacy by checking
their clothing and conversation. Conversely, when women intrude into male
domains like the street or the market, they take measures such as veiling, not
13 The Mudawanna or Moroccan code of personal status follows Malikite law according to which
it is a man's duty to prov ide maintenance for his wife, including a place to live. In return for
her maintenance, the wife owes the husband her faithfulness and obedience. Cf. L. Buskens,
Islamitisch Recht en Familiebetrekkingen in Marokko. Aspecten van wet en werkelijkheid in de
steden Rabat en Salé en het omliggende platteland, Amsterdam: Bulaaq (forthcoming).
14
F. Mernissi cited in Messina, Celebrations of the body, p.117.
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lingering, or crossing the road to avoid walking past a café. Men make less
adjustments to the presenee of women in their domains than vice versa. Older and
strict muslim men tend to avert their eyes, while young men not seldomly put the
trespasser in her place with impertinent glances or remarks.
A form of cultural dominance of men can be observed in these negotiations
about the private or public character of places. Women have less controlover the
boundaries of their private domains than men, and whenever different notions of
privacy overIap, women accommodate most prominently. These spatial
arrangements correspond to Moroccan notions of male and female corporeality.
Men's legitimate penetration of women's private domains reminds one of men's
penetration of women's private parts in sexual intercourse. In this way, cultural
definitions of femininity and masculinity are embedded in the univers als of human
sexuality.IS In the dominant worId view, men are conceived of as bounded
entities that are able to exert considerable self-control. This explains why men do
not have to take measures when their domains are invaded; it is no threat to their
integrity:
Women are considered to have 'open' bodies. Their boundaries are fluid and
permeable. Correspondingly, they are thought to have less controlover their
bodies. Various practices can be observed in which female bodies are symbolically
closed. To prevent premaritalloss of virginity there are rituals in which girIs step
through a 100m to 'close' their bodies. Also, women must always wear a belt
around their waist and keep their hair tied together. Loose c10thes or loose hair are
associated with loose moraIs.
Similar relations between the sexual division of space and practices to 'c1ose'
the female body as a social measure to control the Nafs or passions of women has
been documented for other Muslim societies in the Middle East. Delaney
(1994:38) for example, discusses how according to Turkish vilagers women must
be socially covered under the mantle of a man and enc10sed within his home, just
as a field must be enclosed and 'covered' by ownership to reap its fruits. This is
symbolised by wearing a headscarf. Women who do not wear a headscarf are
considered open to the sexual advances of men. Boddy (1992:53) argues how the
cultural definition of femininity in Northern Sudan is c10sely related to the notion
of 'enc1osure'. This is expressed in women's confined lives within the enclosure
of residential compounds and the practice of infibulation, an extreme form of
female cIrcumcision that entails almost complete c10sing of the vulva. While
IS Compare Combs-Schiling, Sacred Performances (1989:215) who writes about the mingling of
such undeniable givens and cultural assumptions: "The fusion of the two (...) makes it difficult
for the fem ale to distance herself from the cultural definitions because they are written on and
through her own body. To discard the definitions would be in some real way to damage her
essential self (...) The embedding of cultural particulars in universal thoughts is one of the most
powerful and durable means of reproduction that culture has avaIlable to it." On this last
subject, also see P. Connerton, Bow Societies Remember,1989.
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women explain the significance of this practice in terms of protection of their
fertility, men tend to emphasise the need to curb women's strong sexual desires.16
These examples appear to agree with the view that sexual divisions in the use
of space generally correspond to different conceptions of the moral values of
women and men. (cf L. Sciama The problem ofprivacy 19:91) Like Boddy's, my
material suggests that because men and women experience space differently they
also have differentiated views on male and female moral virtues. My female
informants do not acquiesce completely to this dominant view on the 'weakness'
of women. In their view the sexual division in the use of space shape different
forms of self-control in men and women. Because of the confined space within
which they spend most of their lives, women claim to possess sabr, patience or
endurance. Unlike men who seek distraction out of doors, women do not run away
from their problems but develop the patience to come to terms with them. The
salutary effect of sabr consists of all that strengthens the religious impulse and
weakens the passionate one.(CfRuska in Encyclopedia of Islam 1987:27) The kind
of self-control that men develop more prominently is called aql, reason, the
adroitness to negotiate successful transactions and act towards strangers according
to the Morocean code of conduct.(Cf Eiekelman 1989: 181) Contrary to sabr aql
is considered to develop as one acquires more autonomy and freedom of
movement in the social worId.
The Inviolate Privacy of the Public Bath
In the hammâm, different notions of privacy and female boundary control concur
in a specific combination. Contrary to the house, where women's privacy may be
intruded into by male members of the family , the public bath remains a female
domain ideally at all times. In terms of gender privacy the public bath is the most
private of female domains. The furious response of the bathing women in
Halfaouine to the boy whose looks had betrayed him as a man must be understood
in the light of various implications of his tresspassing had on female privacy.
With his 'seeing' eyes/7 the boy violated the only domain over which
women have absolute control, the only sphere of privacy that they can legitimately
keep to themselves. In a way, the public bath is the ultimate 'circuit breaker'( Cf.
Moore : 12) for women, a private domain where a social overIoad, in this case
famIly obligations, can be switched offtemporarily. When a woman is out to meet
friends, she is expected to come home if her husband sends for her or when she
receives word that high status guests have arrived unexpectedly who must be
attended to. But in the hammâm, a woman cannot be reached from the outside
worId. Whatever claim people want to put on her must be postponed until her
16 Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits, p.53.
17 The mistress of the public bath allows women to bring along their sons until they begin
teyshûjû or teyCarfû 'to see' or 'to know', meaning that they begi n to view the naked female
bodies with a sexual interest.
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return home. The inaccessibility to outsiders of women in the public bath has even
become proverbial; the attention of an absent-minded person with a far-away look
is caught by teasingly commenting mshât al-hammâm, , she is off to the public
bath'. Not surprisingly, women are ready to defend vehemently the only place
where they are temporarily immune to certain demanding obligations.
Losing temper is itself an expression of the relaxation of self-control that is
allowed within the female privacy of the public bath. Most hammâms are open
exc1usively to women or to men. Other public baths have separate wings for men
and women. Some public baths operate with alternating opening hours or days for
men and women. The latter are less popular among women. One woman told me
that she is hesitant about visiting a hammâm where the men's hours have just
finished. She always makes sure that a considerable period of time has elapsed
between the departure of the last men and her entrance. She would hate to be the
first woman to enter the hammâm after it has been vacated by men. She would not
feel completely at ease to enter a place almost naked that was occupied by men
only shortly before.
My informant's sensitivity to the former presenee of men in a public bath
ilustrates women's sense of bodily vulnerability. For many, the hammâm is the
only place where, except for their underpants, they undress completely and expose
their body and untied hair to others. As Messina describes in her account of the
bathing protocol in the public baths in Fes, bathing in the public bath entails much
physical contact, bodily intimacy and sensual attention. (Messina 1993: 194). This
kind of 'openness', of not being constantly on one's guard to protect one's bodily
boundaries can exist on ly because women feel secure that their female privacy wil
not be violated. Therefore, I suspect that the commotion among the bathing
women about the boy's glances also reflects anxiety about having their privacy
intruded when most vulnerable.
Also, the presenee of a boy who is on the brink of entering the men's worId
involves the risk of intimate information about women leaking out to male
domains. In terms of family privacy, the hammâm is the most public of the
socially recognised places for women. An additional reason for the turmoil among
the bathing women in Halfaouine could well be fear that reputations may be
harmed should gossip spre ad outside the family circle.
Privacy and the Public Bath at the Age of Modernity18
In terms of family privacy the public character of the hammâm enhances women's
vulnerability. Nevertheless this public dimension of the public bath is an important
reason for its popularity among women. It is one of the rare places where they
is
For the purpose of this paper luse Bernal's definition of the term modernity: the process of
incorporation into the nation-state and the capitalist world economy. Cf. V. Bernal 'Gender,
Culture, and Capitalism: Women and the Remaking of Islamic "Tradition" in a Sudanese
Vilage' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1994, vol 36 no. 1, pp. 36-67.
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meet women who do not belong to their qurâb or 'close ones', that is, the circle
of friends, relatives and neighbours with whom they interact on a daily basis. Here
a woman is likely to pick up news that would not have reached her ears within the
c10se surroundings of her' dâr wa darb', the house and the alley where she lives.
In the public bath she has the opportunity to extend her personal network beyond
the women in her immediate surroundings. The scars and tattoos on the nearIy
naked bodies of the bathing women tell details of their personal histories without
words.19 This creates an atmosphere of temporary intimacy that may encourage
a woman to pour out her heart to any woman who happens to sit next to her.
Sharing personal problems with a stranger who has no access to her own social
network has the additional advantage that she does not have to be afraid that her
confidentialities wil leak out to her 'c1ose ones' in the form of gossip that could
have repercussions on her reputation. In this way, the weekly visit to the public
bath serves as an 'escape' from the family privacy that envelopes women most of
the other days in the week.(Cf. Moore 19:46)
Due to modernisation proeesses, the importanee of the hammâm as meeting
place is not the same for all women. Nowadays, the traditional housing
architecture as was described above is only one of several types that can be found
in Morocean towns. Most high-income families have left the mdîna or old quarters
of the town and moved to the vile nouvelle, the former French quarter. The
European streetplan and architecture in the vile nouvelle look much like high-class
suburbs in European cities. Whether they were built during the French occupation
or at a more recent date, the lay-out of the modern vilas consists of aliving room,
several bedrooms, a kitchen and a bathroom. The vilas are hidden from the view
by trees and high surrounding walls. Most houses have pitched, inaccessible roofs.
Where roofs are accessible, the distance between the houses is usually too large
to allow conversation between neighbours. Except for passing cars, the broad
asphalted avenues are almost completely deserted. Children do not play in the
street but in their private gardens, and corner shops are rare. As a consequence,
the hustle and bustle that is characteristic of the traditional quarters in the mdîna
is laeking. Since even the distance between adjacent houses is relatively large and
requires passing much open space, women do not easily leave the house for a chat
with a neighbour or to run a small errand.
In general the inhabitants of the vile nouvelles are financially well-off, and
many families have a khaddâma or domestie servant. They do the shopping and
other chores outside the house, so that the mistress of the house can remain a
hâjba, a sec1uded woman. Hâjbas only leave the house on special occasions, in
which case they put on a face-veil and ajallâba, a long traditional overcoat. Even
though nearIy all houses in the vile nouvelle have a bathroom, most women make
sure not to skip a weekly visit to the public bath. For many of them, this is the
19 Tattooing is a form of traditional therapy to treat varIous ilnesses such as infertility and spirit
possession. Cf. M. Akhmisse (1985:87-8).
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one of the rare occasions in their otherwise rather isolated lives when they can
meet other women.20
The interaction between women in the mdîna is much more intense. Due to
high unemployment and housing shortage, many of the traditional houses as
described in the section on Moroccan notions of privacy are now shared by several
familes, each family occupying a different floor, or, in more dire circumstances,
a different room. The central court yard and the flat roof are shared between the
families. To respect the family privacy of the other occupants of the house, men
hardly come there, but the women are almost constantly in contact while preparing
food on their little mobile charcoal- or gas burners, when doing the laundry near
the water tap in the court yard, or simply relaxing and enjoying the view from the
roof in the afternoon. Only small alleys run between the rows of terraced houses
so that from their position on the roof women can talk to their next door and
opposite neighbours without leaving the house.
The alleys are full of playing children, while hardlya stranger passes by. Not
surprisingly, the women in the mdînas often leave the house for a chat with a
friend who lives a few houses away or to run a little errand at one of the many
local shops. When they do not go beyond the immediate surroundings of their
house, they do not bother to put on a jallâba or overcoat, but casually throw a
bedsheet or tablec10th over their shoulders or head. Most of the lower and lower
middle c1ass families that live in the mdîna do not have the means to have a
domestie servant. Shopping is therefore done by male members of the family or
by women themselves. In general then, these women are much more mobile and
less isolated than the women in the vile nouvelles. For them, a visit to the public
bath is a we1come relaxation from the daily household-chores and a good
opportunity to talk to women from other neighbourhoods.
As in many modernising third world countries, the need for cash and
commodities has drawn large numbers people from the country side to town
looking for jobs. The mdînas have not been able to absorb the influx of new
citizens, and duwâr jadîd or 'new vilages' spontaneously grow everywhere around
Moroccan towns. Like country dwellngs, the houses in squatter areas consist of
a court yard with one or two rooms of equal size. Unlike residential patterns in the
countryside, the houses are built in rows, forming small alleys that allow the same
patterns of interaction between women as was described for the mdîna. Some of
the oldest duwâr jadîd now enjoy municipal recognition and are connected to the
electricity grid and waterworks. Most squatter areas, however, go without
electricity or water. For the daily use of water, women send their children to the
public tap to fil empty bottles. Larger quantities of water are needed for doing the
laundry, and most women find it more convenient to go to the public tap for this
task themselves to do their washing there. To feel more at ease at this public
20 Cf. Messina who cites the Moroccan proverb according to which: "A woman only leaves the
house to go to the hammâm and the cemetery." (Messina 1993:187).
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place, they of ten arrange with neighbours and friends to go there together, so that
the public tap has become ameeting place for groups of washing women.
There are no public baths in the squatter areas. The former country people
who are living there are not accustomed to visiting the hammâm of ten, since this
is typically an urban phenomenon. Nevertheless, adopting the custom of visiting
the public bath is an important economIc strategy for women from the squatter
areas. For these 'newcomers' to town, the economic prospects within the market
economy are low and many families depend on extra-market channels of economic
and social help. Women from the squatter area therefore try to gain access to the
networks of established women in town and seek to enter into patron-client
relations with them.ii One of the best places to meet townswomen is, of course,
the public bath.
What I have tried to argue so far is that besides the attraction of absolute
female privacy of the hammâm, women from different residential are as and
economic backgrounds all have their own reasons for visiting the hammâm
regularIy. Although this may give a fair idea of the importanee of the public bath
in the lives of women in contemporary Morocco, it is not representative of all
Morocean women. Several categories of women no longer visit the public bath but
prefer to bathe at home or visit the public showers.
In the last fifteen years, public showers, sometimes in combination with a
hammâm, have begun to appear in larger Morocean towns. In these public
showers, people no longer sit in circ1es on the floor in one of three main rooms
behind the buckets of water that they have filed from a communal tap or
reservoir. The rooms in the public shower have separate compartments, each with
one shower. Each person sits on her own bench in front of her own faucet. This
arrangement allows much more individual privacy than the rooms in the public
bath. When they first appeared, the public showers were almost exclusively visited
by men, but in recent years, more and more women have begun visiting them. I
was taken to them by a group of high school girls. They prefer going to the public
shower because bathing there is much quicker. You don't have to wait to fil your
bucket at the tap, and rinsing the body from the shower is less bothersome than
continually having to pour small bowls of water over yourself. Another relatively
new category of women composed of secretaries, teachers and other young women
with busy jobs, likewise prefers the public shower because of its efficiency.
For quite a different reason, al-khwatât or Muslim sisters also show a
preferenee of the public showers over the hammâm. Seeking a purer form of
Islam, these women disapprove of what in their eyes is the public nudity of
bathing women. According to Islamic prescriptions, Muslims should not expose
their naked bodies to the eyes of people other than their spouse, and even then, the
21 For analyses of such informal female networks for other categories of North African women
see: V. Maher (1974) Women and Property in Morocco. Their changing relation to the proeess
of social stratification in the Middle Atlas and W. Jansen (1987) Women without Men. Gender
and Marginality in an Algerian Town.
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genitals should ideally remain concealed.(Cf. Messina 1993:136). As mentioned
earlier, most women in the hammâm keep their underpants on while bathing.
Some, however, undress completely, covering their genitals with a hand or a
washbowl when they traverse the rooms. The Muslim sisters are not the only ones
who condemn this behaviour. When I asked women what they liked and disliked
about the public bath, exposure to the genitals of other women was often
mentioned as one of the drawbacks of bathing there, although few were prepared
to avoid the public bath for this reason.
Another disadvantage mentioned by my informants was the lack of hygiene
in the public bath. Especially in the public baths in the ville nouvelle a growing
number of women can be observed who no longer sit directly on the floor. They
bring a rubber mat or small wooden stool with them to sit on, thus avoiding
contact with the dirty bathing water and the hairs that come off the women behind
or next to them. Other women, especially those who have a taken on a European
life-style give up visiting the public bath altogether.
To conclude, I would like to take up two points about shifts in the importanee
of the different notions of Moroccan privacy that I have described in this paper.
First of all, it is interesting to note that living in a house that is designed and
furnished in a European st yle which is characterIsed by a higher degree of space
differentiation than traditional houses often goes hand in hand with a growing need
for individual privacy and less emphasis on sharing, be it family privacy or gen der
privacy.22 Amongst other things, this is expressed in an increasing
'instrumentation' to create more distance between the body and its environment.
In the domestie sphere this includes sitting on chairs around a high dinner table
rather than sitting on the floor around the mîda or small round table; the use of
knives and forks and separate plates for the individual members of the family
instead of eating by hand from a communal plate; and separate rooms with (single)
beds for the children. In bathing practices this involves using devices that prevent
direct contact with other bathing women such as rubber mats or wooden stools,
or making a shift from visiting the hammâm to visiting the public showers where
every woman has her own bench and her own faucet.
Secondly, the different categories of women who have stopped visiting the
hammâm appear to have one thing in common: they tend to have more freedom
of movement than the categories of women mentioned earlier. Moreover, this
freedom of movement corresponds to several new meeting places for women.
Teenage girIs meet in school, Muslim sisters meet in the mosque and working
women meet at their jobs. The female privacy of these meeting places is not as
impenetrable as the public bath. Isuspeet, however, that the experience of
operating outside the traditional female domains implied by theIr greater freedom
22 I owe this argument partly to Messina' s description of domestic spatial arangements in the
Moroccan city of Fes, although she do es not make a clear distinction between family privacy
and gender privacy. (Cf. Messina 1993:114;194).
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of movement has developed a stronger sense of individualism in these women
which may have diminished the importanee of gender privacy for them.
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Female Dervishes in Contemporary Istanbul
between Tradition and Modernity
C. Raudvere
Even in popular media, it is more and more recognised that groups and individuals
associated with religious activities in the Muslim worId cannot always be
identified as part of 'the Islamist movement'. All Muslim activities are certainly
not , Islamist' , on the contrary many Muslims react strongly against Islam's new
visibility in society. Among religious organisations in Turkey, the various sufi
orders play an important role In what is a complex debate the participants take
up very different positions and formulate very different strategies. Some of the
sufis strongly oppose what they consider to be authoritarian attempts of
manipulation. Therefore it is important to identify religious opposition against
what is casually known as , Islamism' . As Michael Meeker writes:"The resurgence
of Islam in Turkey is better understood as a transformation, rather than arevival,
of religiousity" (Meeker 1995:31).
This artic1e is based on preliminary fieldwork among urban women in Istanbul,
with a special emphasis on strategies used by women attached to sufi groups
towards the Islamic presenee in contemporary Turkish society. i As we shall see,
young educated women have changed many formerIy indisputable facts about
secularism, religion and modernity. In the offcial republican discourse religious
observance used to be associated with rural and small town people with little or
no education. Today there is a multitude of religious strategies for women and
numerous more or less formal organisations providing different outlooks on
attitudes, ritual practices, dress etc.
Sufism is a very broad term, covering a wide range of different Muslim groups
and activities, as well as theological and philosophical assumptions, over a long
period of time.2 It can generally be defined as the mystical traditions of Islam. A
dervish is an initiated member of a sufi order, emphasise personal spiritual
i The fieldwork was conducted in the autumn of 1993 and in the summer of 1994,
altogether 4 months. Generous grants from Bergvalls stiftelse and Erik Philip
Sorensens fond made these visits to Istanbul possible.
2General surveys with further referenees: Schimmel 1975, Awn 1987, Baldick
1989.
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development and the obligation to follow the instructions of their teaeher, a sheik,
who is also the spiritualleader of most prayers and ceremonies. Sufi groups, far
from homogeneous, are found in all parts of the Muslim worId and among
immigrants in Europe and North America. Mostly these dervish orders are
organised in formal, semi-public communities, but the ritual practices of sufism
have also always been observed in private throughout history. Sufism has a long
and complicated history beginning in the very first centuries of Islam.3 The earIy
Muslim mystics were to a great extent influenced by Christian ascetics in their
mode of contemplation and devotion. The repetitive prayers developed into the
principal ceremony of all sufi groups, and found legitimation in the Koran.4 Via
Eastern Christianity influences also came from Indian spirituality, such as
meditation, breath control and the use of the rosary.5 Most Western scholarIy
works concentrate on sufism as a theological system or as literary history, and
only few address ritual practices among sufi groups.6The emphasis on doxa,
normative and philosophical systems, and not least aesthetics, have formed an
exceedingly idealised image of sufism as an attractive form of expression. Sufi
conceptions have be en transformed into Christian terminology in search of
transhistorical similarities and eternal truths. Poetry and the world of art have in
many ways formed the image of sufism as a more beautiful and acceptable form
of Islam than the general idea of Muslim orthodoxy. Through. the metaphors of
wine drinking poets and beautiful women the image of the lustful Orient has been
maintained. Sufism has been used by European artists and writers as a form of self
definition, presenting themselves as outsiders, in opposition to narrow-minded
bourgeois respectabilty, but not necessarily as Muslims.
The affuence of roses and nightingales in the orientalist studies of sufism has
created a great distance between the normative discourse and 'life as lived'.
Sufi Women in History
It is hard to trace women of flesh and blood in sufi history, though some female
saints appear in pious legends.7 Most frequently 'Rabica of Syria appears, and is
often treated as a single historie person But according to Julian Baldick's
convincing analysis it seems more likely that stories about two women, 'Rabica of
Basra and Rabi'a of Syria, have been amalgamated into one character in legendary
history. Rabi'a is commonly referred to in the religious education of young
women, not only in sufi contexts, as an ideal to follow. Her life is told in
3Baldick 1989: 13 ff.
4Chittick 1987.
5Baldick 1989: 23 ff.
6 Some studies that emphasize rituals of specific sufi groups are Trimingham 1971;
Gilsenam 1973 and Geels 1993.
7Baldick 1989: 29 ff.
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pamphIets and popular booklets and she is especially renowned for her ' absolute
devotion to the love of Allah', as I was told. The life of the saint can, it seems,
easily be related to women's lives in the mega city of today. Some scholars have
emphasised the way in which sufi philosophers of the Middle Ages use female
imagery when constructing metaphors of the Divine, above all Ibn cArabi (d. 1240).
From 'the golden age' of Persian and Turkish poetry a highly idealised imagery
of women appears in poetry and pious literature; an image of the ideal female,
rather than descriptions of women's lives.8 The 'positive role' of women in sufi
literature as stressed by Anne-Marie Schimmel is mainly an interpretation of
literary sources, not analysis of lives of historical women. ' As mothers, many
mystical inc1ined women have deeply influenced their sons who in turn became
leading masters of the Path thanks to their early education.,9 The contrast is very
sharp between Anne-Mari Schimmel's literary study and Julian Bladick's historical
approach. Her appendix 'The feminine element in sufism 'in Mystical dimensions
of Islam (1975) refers only to idealised women in poetry or legendar history.
Similarity and stability are stressed rather than differenee and change, while
Baldick does not hesitate to show how both theology and religious practice were
reciprocally influenced.
It is undeniable that side by side with the exquisite poetry praising women of
both beauty and spiritual qualifications many negative theological conceptions are
associated with women. The influence on sufism from the gnostic aversion of the
human body and the physical aspects of life led to many very negative statements
about women in general. The use in sufi theology of negative philosophical terms,
in different ways associated with femininity or women, emphasise this dichotomy
.10 Traditional sufi training, the 'path', aims at controllng human nature and
man's given conditions: body and souL. It is astriving upwards away from what
is considered material and therfore associated with the feminine. It has been
pointed out many times that the soul on its lowest level was considered feminine,
grammatically as well as philosophically.
Only brief notions in historical documents tell of female members who
participate in prayers and other activities of the dervish orders.
8 Emile Olson and Kurtulus Öztopçu write in their discussion on how to evaluate
and use the poetic sources as indications of sufi women's lives (1993: 11):'the use
of feminine imageryas a metaphor for God in the poetry of both Turkish and non-
Turkish (Arabie and Persian) mystics may also suggest, on the one hand, that in
contrast to more orthodox Muslims, Muslim mystics tended to have a more
positive if sometimes idealised view of women in profane as well as in sacred
realms. On the other hand, the mystical poets who do not refer to either males of
females specifically may also reflect the general lack of differentiation which is
characteristic of Sufi thought, leading them to use an androgynous or non-sexual
model of human beings in relation to that which is sacred.
9Schimmel 1982: 145.
lOSehimmel 1975: 112 ff; Watson 1994: 144 ff.
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Turkish Islam and Secularism
Turkey differs in several ways from many other Muslim countries and the conflcts
between various religious and more secular groups have a long history .11 , Islam
in Turkey always was, and continues to be multi-dimensional' Richard Tapper
writes in his introduction to Islam in modern Turkey (1991).12
Along with urbanisation and other changes within the social structures,
modernist educational programmes from the 1920s onwards led to the situation in
Turkey today where secularism, traditionalism, nationalism, and Islamism
intermingle in ideological struggles at all 1evels of society. The Turkish political
arena cannot be sufficiently described in right-left categories, since it involves
harsh conflcts of social, ethnic and religious character.
Governmental religious politics of the last 70 years have been dominated by a
programmatic secularism attempting to trans form Turkey into a 'modern' European
society. The reform ideology has its origins in the 19th century Ottoman Tanzimat
movement and other attempts to introduce Western reforms, but at the time
secularism to a large extent was met with reluctance.13 At the beginning of this
century the so-called Y oung Turks,took up these attempts of modernisation in their
struggle against the old Ottoman rulers. Ever since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gained
power in 1923 after the fall of the Ottoman empire, systematie secularism has
been on the agenda. His government initiated what is commonly known as 'the
republican revolution': a series of radical changes, de vrimler, 'revolutions' or
, turns'. Among the first measures taken were restrictions on the religious
communities. All Muslim activities came under state control and became to a large
extent mosque-centered, as pointed out by Richard and Nancy Tapper/4 while
other places for religious devotion were shut down.
A chain of changes involving radical transformations of Turkish society started
with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. The dervish orders were forbidden by
legal restriction in 1925, although they have remained active underground ever
since. The meeting places of the sufi orders, the tekkis, were c1osed, along with
them the medreses, institutes of religious education, and welfare institutions of
different kinds. All of them were dependent on the vakifs, foundations c10sely
linked to the religious establishment and forbidden at the same time. Other places
for gathering, like holy shrines of saints and gre at sheiks, türbes, popular
destinations for pilgrimages, were also closed. The use of religious titles such as
sheik, efendi, baba etc., and garments and other attributes associated with the sufi
orders were prohibited. The consequence was, as Richard Tapper writes, that
llToprak 1981, 1987, 1994; Mardin 1983, 1989, 1994; Baykan 1990; Kafadar
1992; Zürcher 1993; Markoff 1994; Sayarn 1994.
12R. Tapper 1991: 3.
13 Ahmad 1993,Moghadam 1993:79ff, Zürcher 1993
14Tapper & Tapper 1987.
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'Turkish Islam in effect became more standardised, circumscribed and
compartmentalised.15
This large modernisation project run by the new leaders, with grand political
ambitions, led to significant changes and many of them with an immediate effect
on everyday life. As signs of modernisation, the alphabet was altere d from Arabie
to Latin scrips, the Gregorian calendar was introduced, and the use of famIly
names. The symbolic value as well as the practical 'not only gave Turkey a more
European image, but also made communication with the Western worId much
easier". as note d by Eric Zürcher.16
The tempo and intensity of the reforms were met with some reluctance and led
to opposition and even violent uprisingsY After Atatürk's death in 1938, and
even more so after the elections in 1950, when Adnan Menderes formed the
government, the pressure on religious groups was reduced.18 During this period
'religious courses were brought back into education, government support of the
Hajj was restored, shrines were reopened and training for religious officials was
restarted' .19 But still, it must be remembered that education on all leve is as well
as all aspects of the offcial discourse was based on secularism and nationalism.
Religion was not any obvious topic on the political agenda until the late 70ies.
Secularism and Nationalism
Turkish secularism was markedly nationalistie from the beginning. Ziya Gökalp
(d. 1924), the ideologist of the Kemalist secularism, layiklik, formulated a patriotic
national ideology in which the search for the pure, original, Turkish heritage was
an important part. Öztürk, original and true Turkish, was one of the key terms.20
The ancient Turkic nomads of Central Asia and the Anatolian peasants were
highly idealised, despite the latter being the most devoted protectors of Muslim
traditions. In the Kemalist discourse, modernity was identified with what was
Western and European. Words like oryantal and arabesk were used, and stil are,
with strong pejorative associations, meaning both Eastern (Arabic) and an
inc1ination to be backwards and anti-modern. What are thought of as ideals from
pre-Islamic periods, democracy and equality between the sexes, were linked to the
new ideals of modernism. Linguistic purism also belongs to this era, hailng
Turkish as the mother of all tongues, with the result that popular culture was even
more influenced by Arabie media: radio stations, films etc.21
15R. Tapper 1991: 2.
16Zürcher 1993 :23lff.
17Yalman 1969.
18Zürcher 1993: 231 ff.
19R. Tapper 1991:9.
2°01son & Öztopçcu 1993: 2.
21Stokes 1992:89 ff: 1994.
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As early as the Ottoman period a nationally defined religion was prevalent, a
distinet Turkish form of Islam, in which sufi theology played an important part.
Sufism is defined by the dervishes themselves as liberal and individuaL. These two
aspects are united in agenerally cherished assumption that genuinely Turkish
traditions are maintained among the sufi orders. Among the contemporar orders,
of ten in opposition against secular politics as well as Sunni orthodoxy, other
alternatives for a pious life are at hand than those offered by the Islamic groups.
The attitudes towards sufi orders are somewhat ambiguous. Despite legal
restrictions and counteractions against them, they are highly regarded by people
in general as preserves of genuinely Turkish traditions. Legends, stories of
mirac1es, poetry, songs and instrumental music are known to be transmitted among
the dervishes, particularly the poems of Yunus Emre (d. ca. 1321).22 The
consequences are a rather complicated situation where the dervishes are both
oppressed and honoured. The Islamist universalism, therefore, stands in many
religious and political questions in glaring contrast to Turkish nationalism. In
individual lives, however, this is not always a conflct.
Secularism and Women in Turkey
The history of the women's movement in Turkey goes back to the 19th century
and involves both religious and secular groups.23 The Turkish mode of secularism
also has a very special relation to women's issues. Education of women was one
of the foremost targets of the Kemalist campaigns and served as an Icon of
modernity. Modern educated women were called 'the daughters of the
revolution',a phrase stil used off and on in conversation. Rapid changes were
promoted by the Kemalist government and the secularisation proeess was
encouraged, from the earIy 19th century and onwards. This created a divergence
between different levels of education and tensions between rural and urban
lifestyles: 'republican Turkey, a society that had been exposed to an élite-directed
radical transformation of traditional values regarding women,' as Feride Acar
writes.24 The rural-urban tension has remained a basic theme in much writing on
life in contemporary Turkey. However, the last twenty years rural life has mobed
into the big cities, as much as the image of the 'city' and the modern world is
presented through TV and other media in the countryside. Shar divisions are not
made that easy anymore.
22Schimmel 1975: 329 ff.
23Taskiran 1974; Ahmed 1982, 1984; Kandiyoti 1991a, 1991b.
24Acar 1991: 281.
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The Halveti-Cerrahi order of Istanbul
A sufi order is called a tariqa, that is a path or road, hinting at the spiritual
development offered members of the group. The principal ritual, the repetitive,
intense zikir5 prayer Cremembrance') is observed by almost all dervish orders.
The term is used several times in the Koran26, which has served as an important
defence for the sufis against orthodox criticism of sufi piety as affected and
sentimentaL.
Among the sufi orders in Turkey, the Halveti-Cerrahi has a unique position. It
is the only one officially recognised, and goes by the name of a society for
traditional Turkish music and folklore, Türk tasavvuf musikisi ve folklorunu
arasturma ve yasatma valii.27 The community is a branch of the Khalwatiyye
and has a long history as an urban sufi order in Istanbul.28 The dervishes meet
three times a week at the tekke, the lodge of the tariqa, a place of devotion and
social gathering. The tekke consists of several houses and looks rather small and
insignificant from the street. At the entranee is the mausoleum, the türbe, with the
founder' s coffin and his imitators' coffins covered with green cloth. These holy
men are shown tokens of veneration by the dervishes when entering or leaving the
tekke. Pir Nurredin al-Cerrahi (d. 1721) founded the tekke in Karagümrük, where
the dervishes stil met, in 1704. Today, this is quite a run-down part of Istanbul,
near Fatih, a district know n among other citizens to be a centre for Islamists. To
religious people it has a certain flavour of tradition and Muslim history.
Many of the orders' activities are focused on the founders, venerated at their
mausolea. Genealogies and succession form a vital part of the oral history of the
orders. Everyday events discussed among the dervishes are of ten referred to in
connection with a legend from the life of the founder or one of the important
sheiks and how God guides him through trouble and difficulties to harmony and
order.
Both male and female dervishes are disciples, mürids, of the sheik, and are
supposed to follow the ideal of training and developing themselves. Hierarchies
among the dervishes form the basic infrastrueture, with the sheik at the top. He
is responsible for the dervishes' spiritual development, being the teaeher of the
community, and the 1eader of rituals, and through interpretation of dreams he gives
individual guidance. Secrets are supposed to be revealed on the steps toward
perfection. From the point of view of the dervishes, the hierarchies symbolise
spiritual development and are shown by signs on their garments. The hierarchies
of the past and the present exist in away simultaneously: important persons of the
past are present through story-tellng and the teachings of the sheik and gives
authority to his statements and decisions.
25dhikr in Arabic.
2610: 71; 21.48, 21: 105; 40: 54.
27Kissling 1953; Jong 1978; Martin 1972; Baldick 1989: 114.
28Jong 1965; Baldick 1989.
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In the 1960s and 1970s the Halveit-Cerrahi order led a languishing life and only
a few men kept up the zikir prayers in Karagümrük. For the past 15 years there
has been a steadily increasing interest due to the charismatic sheik Muzafer Ozak
(d. 1985) and the new Islamic appearance in Turkish society. These factors have
rendered two new groups of members: Western converts, of ten familiar with
meditation and new-age rituals, and many of them women; and also young Turkish
people without family ties who enter the order. Ozak had a developed programme
for his mission. Many of his books are translated into English and he went ' on
tour' to the US and Europe to preach his message and perform public zikir
ceremonies on stage with a group of dervishes. They represent the new seriat-
orientation, c10ser to a stricter interpretation of Muslim ideals, while others are
fascinated by the musical and poetic heritage among the Halveti-Cerrahis, an
attraction that can be described in religious as well as nationalistie terms.
Rituals among the Halveti-Cerrahi Women
Evidently, there have been women of greater or less importanee throughout sufi
history , but hardly anything is known of how they practised their religion. How
regular was their attendanee at the tekkes? How frequent were their zikir-meetings
at home? How were the hierarchies constructed among women compared to men?
Many of these historical questions seem hard to answer, despite that the history
of the order plays such a great role in the narrative traditions of the group.Todays
female Halveti-Cerrahi dervishes cannot be said to conduct parallel activities;
rather, I find the image of a Chinese doll more relevant. The male dervishes act
on the fringe of a public arena, while the women's activities and rituals are even
more hidden. Not on purpose, as far as I can see, but is just considered less
important and less suited for public encounters.
From my observations I can distinguish three groups among the female Halveti-
Cerrahi dervishes. The first is the elderIy women who frequent the tekke as part
of their family traditions. Many of them were born in the country side. The
middle-aged women constitute the second and the smallest group. Like the elderIy,
their acquaintance with sufism springs from the family, and they are socially well
integrated in the order. The third group, that of young women, is very
heterogenous. It consists partly of not very well-educated women, often at home
with small children. Like the older women they often come with other family
members, and the better part of theIr socIal network is within the order. A new
kind of member who have joined the order over the past few years are the well-
educated young women, many of them professionals or university students.
Membership is to them a personal choice, and they are fully aware of what the
head-scarf and the long skirt symbolize in secular society. These of ten very well-
spoken young women represent the new visibilty of Islam, the movements and
tendencies in Turkish society today. Their aspirations and aims - how they
construet "tradition" differently for different purposes - indicate the complexity the
conflcts that the Halveti-Cerrahi order confronts today. It is no longer a question
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of secular vs religious matters; the religious discourse is certainly polyphonic. In
many families it is a source of conflct between the generations.
This is so not only in the construetion of meaning within the traditional
frameworks of history and story tellng: a new seriat-orientation is also present.
This new generation of well-educated women has a positive outlook on religion,
and plays an active part in society to a much greater extent than previous
generations. With their different lives they wil have new expectations and
demands on the order in the future.
Every Thursday zikir is performed by the dervishes. During hours previous to
the ceremony, about 75 women of all ages come slow ly dropping in at the
women's part of the tekke, and many more during Ramazan and other festivals.
Some come very earIy for social reasons and sit and chat before the prayers start.
They can reach the women's part ofthe tekke directly by way of a staircase on the
outside of the main building without moving through the men' s part at alL. The
upper floor has several rooms for social activities and meals, and doors to the
gallery above the büyük meydan, the prayer room of the male dervishes. The
Thursday meetings folIo w aset pattern: first evening prayer, then dinner with
night prayer to follow, that turns into wird (a litany composed by Pir Cerrahi), and
then finally the zikir-prayer that can last for several hours. During this intense
ceremony some of the '99 beautiful names of God' are repeated for long intervals.
As the tempo, the bodily movements and intensity of the zikir increases, the male
dervishes rise and form a spiral, while moving in circles.
In the crescent -shaped gallery the women sit very dose to each other in the
crowded room, and it is almost impossible to move. It is very hot and dark. The
women follow the zikir in the same way as the men do. But they cannot rise, or
form any cirdes. Although I pointed out several times that I had no intention to
convert, my interest in the group was interpreted as an indication of that I "had
a good heart". I was always wellcome to attend the zikir prayers. With a scarf on
my head I sat in the backrow of the women, but mostly I was urged to sit in the
forntrow with a good view over the büyük meydan. It is questionable, however,
to what extent the separation between the sexes should domInate an analysis when
it is not emphasized by the participants themselves. The spatial distance between
men and women is so conspicuous to a Westerner that it tends to become the
fundamental category for descriptions and interpretations. When asked, women
mostly answer that they perform zikir together with the men, but at different
locations of the tekke. After a while distinet groups of women were recognisable
for me. They had their set parts of the gallery and any trespass resulted in
quarrels. Space was also marked by age (elder women in one corner), attitude to
dress (from peasant st yle to sumptuous hijab) and different emotional intention in
the participation of the zikir ceremony.
Not all women taking part in the zikir are initiated members, dervisler. From
the neighbourhood women come more or less regularIy to the various meetings at
the tekke. It can be women with a general interest, but women on a pilgrimage to
Pir Cerrahi's tomb are also rather frequent visitors. The latter are often members
of some of the many Halveti sub-groups and come on organized bus tours.
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W omen's zikir-ceremonies
Once a month the women come together for a zikir-ceremony of their own. On
these occasions no man is present at the tekke, and all duties are performed by
women. It has been difficult for me to find out whether these gatherings are a
recent phenomenon or not. Different persons give very different answers. A
plausible assumption seems to be that the various kinds of meetings that Turkish
women traditionally have held in their homes are now made into a public ritual,
open toanyone who chooses to come. Domestie gatherings of a more or less
religious character have been important arenas for women's religious practices.
These movements from domestie to more public arenas is most likely an impact
of modernization proeesses in everyday life. In the suburbia of the modern
metropolis it is no more possible to hold meetings restricted to family and friends.
Other places than the traditional arenas open up for women's gatherings. The
choice where to go and what leader to follow plays a crucial part in the
construetion of an urban Muslim identity.
The women's zikir at the Halveti-Cerrahi is led by two women appointed by
the sheik. A fact of utmost importanee for the women going across Istanbul on
their own is that the meetings can be attended guarding their modest y . A room
adjoining the gallery (not circular like the büyük meydan) is used for these
meetings. Still, this room is so overcrowded that the women cannot rise and the
women, to my knowledge,invariably perform zikir sitting down, even under more
private conditions. However, the intensity is as ardent as on Thursdays. The prayer
is accompanied by heavy bodily movements and fervent emotional expressions.
The zikir starts gradually, reaches its climax and fades slowly away while the
women sing ilahiler. Pieces of sugar and candy that have been placed close to the
zikir-leaders during the ceremony are afterwards distributed among the
participants. Bottles of water and garments from the sick are also collected after
having received baraka from the zikir. Tea, snacks and sweets are shared in small
groups, while some remain with the zikir-leaders and talk to them, maybe sharing
some confidence. Others continue to sing ilahiler and yet others enter the rooms
next to the prayer-room for a chat and some social activities.
The social importanee that the order has for the members cannot be
overestimated, bearing in mind the considerable increase of the population of
Istanbul over the last 50 years and the almost uncontrolled growth of the major
cities. In contemporary Istanbul most women of the Halveti-Cerrahi order are
newcomers in a metropolis of more than L 2 milion people facing inflation,
unemployment, housing shortage, and overcrowded flats. Many families are split
because of work migration. The women experience astrong social identity with
the group in Karagümrük, where they can form new bonds and relations. As Fulya
Atacan has shown, the order offers male networks of economic contacts as well
as being a basis for many other important relations, personal and professional. To
a certain extent this is also true for women's religious activism. Affiliation to a
specific group gives access to new arenas.
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Head-scarfs and 'the new veiling'
'Why are women's heads the site of political and religious conflct?' Carol
Delaney asks in an article on the social and political meanings of bodily hair.29
And certainly tesettür, the proper covering of the body, has been a constant topic
in the Turkish debate just as in most other Muslim countries.
The Kemalist laws of the 1920s never mentioned female dress as it regulated
only the men's headgear. Stil, the female headscarf (basörtü) has been regarded
as either rural and backward or ostentatiously religious. Its reappearance on the
public arena was to some elder secularists both a threat and an insult to the
Kemalist ideals. Since the earIy 1980s, young women started to come to university
campuses with covered heads, although the law prohibited religious c10thing in
offcial areas. These Islamist women put on new designs and outfits claiming them
to be 'traditional'. None of these garments were used in pre-republican Turkey.
Rather it is an invented tradition, globally used by women as a sign of Islamic
consciousness. In Turkey Atatürk himself has for decades served as a model for
secularist outfit: shaved, with business suit and tie,sometimes with a bowler hat,
his portraits hanging on the wall of almost every offcial building and in many
private homes.3o His wife and daughters played the same role as public persons
with their short European dresses and short uncovered hair. In the first decades of
the republic the different modes of cloths were interpreted as indicating astruggle
between urban and rural, between educated sophistication and ignorance. The
Koran, the primary source of Muslim ideals, states that a true believer, man or
woman, should be dressed in a modest way. What modest y, edep, implies has
caused an intense debate.31 Different Muslim groups have different answers as
to what constitutes proper clothing.
'The veil' has for a long time served as a popular Western icon of the position
of Muslim women. But it has also been emphasized that 'head scarves' and 'veiIs'
can be interpreted as a revolt. 'Debates about the new veilng force all women to
recognize that choIce of dress is both a personal and politicai matter. It may be
one of the few forms of political protest some women have', Helen Watson writes
in a highly discerning artic1e on the interplay between normative discourses on
female dressing and local practices.32 This is certainly true as long as this insight
does not create other 'absolute images' of Muslim women in the media. It must
be remembered that many Muslim women do not accept the Islamist specification
of 'veilng' or seriat-discourse as the only relevant mode of guidanee for their
wardrobe or religious practice. In their interpretation of religion more covering of
the body is not the equivalent of a higher grade of religiosity.
29Delaney 1994: 168ff
30Meeker 1995:37f
3101son 1985; Mandel 1989; Zürcher 1993:302ff; Delaney 1994; Ilyasolglu 1994;
Watson 1994
32Watson 1994:157
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A rich variety of Muslim dress can be observed in the streets of Istanbul, from
the all-covering black c10aks (çarsaf) to what are considered to be country-st yle
scarves, basörtü. The Arabie term hijab is sometimes used by radical Islamists
referring to proper Muslim cloths for women. The different modes of the tesettür
is a fashion in its own right. Shops specialized in modest c10thing offer their
customers different variations of monochrome full-length coats and matching head
scarves in discreet patterns. Also, the all-white headscarf can be decorated in a
number of ways: invowen patterns, beads, fringes or lace. Although spoken of as
a 'uniform' by many secularists, the marks of individuality are unmistakable. The
variations can easily be 'read in the street or on campus as identification of
adherenee to particular groups and attitudes. In the academic world opinions are
evidently divided whether the tesettür is a question of personal choice or an
expression of arepressive ideology. The importanee of outward signs and
appearance is certainly not restricted to women. The way men handle their facial
hair is equally interpretable. Being shaved and wearing a tie, like Atatürk did, is
a c1ear sign of secular ideals, while the moustache is generally regarded as the
'traditional Turkish look'. A more strict and sober appearance with a well cut
beard and a long-sleeved white shirt without a tie, but buttoned up, is rather
common among men within various Islamist groups. The male dress has not
created the same conflct nor hindered young men's entry to university or
professional life. Whereas many well-educated women wearing tesettür feel
discriminated and trapped between two sides on the labourmarket knowing most
employers attitude towards the wearing of headscarves. When I asked aa young
unemployed civil engineer whether she had tried religious manufacturers, she
answered bitterIy: They only hire men.
External appearance and clothing are very much in focus, not only in the
general debate, but also among religious women themselves. Helen Watson
stresses how varied the attitudes operating towards the appearance and movement
of the body can be within a Muslim community.'Less attention has been given to
the personal and political dimensions of hijab as both a required' form of dress
and a personally chosen artic1e of clothing. ,33
Constructing Urban Muslim Identities
The women who perform zikir at the Halveti-Cerrahi tekke differ as much among
themselves as religious women in general do in contemporary IstanbuL. The image
of Turkish Muslim women' has been deconstructed over the last years by sec ond
wave feminist and religious women likewise and no single prototype can represent
the complexity of approaehes. These proeesses have also encouraged women's
religious activities and they have moved more into the public arenas from the
private realm. 'The woman question' in the Islamist discourses is not any more a
33Watson 1994: 143
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negligible par of the media and the way the Islamist deal with the issue is
challenges the secular establishment and are highly provocative to many loyal
Kemalists. The members of the sufi orders certainly do not stand unaffected by the
intense debate in the media.
Religious Turkish women relate in very different ways to the debate on Islam' s
influence on public matters. To some it is a question of degrees, while others, like
some female dervishes, consider the Islamist claims to be fundamentally
contradictory to their sufi ideology. The demands of Islamic influence on society
are part of intricate global proeesses, but in Turkey also flavoured with a
programmatic secularism and the imperial history of the country. Due to the
Turkish educational system, secularism is the one background everybody can relate
to, whichever position is taken in the debate on the relationship between the state
and religious activities.
It seems likely that Turkish women, in the past as well as the present, form
informal religious groups to a larger extent than men form informal religious
groups, with meetings at home, votive prayers and vows at shrines and cemeteries.
At Koca Mustafa Pasa Camii, where the saint Sümbü1 Efendi and his daughter
Rahine are buried, a huge tree grows. This has been for long a place of special
importanee to women. The type of piety expressed here is of the kind Islamists as
well as secularists condemn. Private prayer meetings are frequently and severely
criticized by Islamists as a breeding ground for superstitious behaviour and un-
Islamic tendencies in general.n Islamistic rhetoric women's gatherings beyond the
control of local imams and mosque oriented hierarchies is of ten associated with
uncontrolled sufi activities. From a secular point of view the sufi orders have the
means of establishing invisible networks and thereby have a certain political
influence. The presenee of the sufi orders also blurs attempts at c1earcut
categorization of the present muslim discourse.
Women of the Halveti-Cerrahi order are part of a formal organization with long
since developed rules of intern al structure and rituals. The oral history of the
community has always functioned as a way of interpreting the experiences and
choices of the dervishes. Many women also take part in informal gatherings that
seem to vary more than the restricted ritual life within the sufi order.
Being a young female dervish in contemporar Istanbul is to claim both
tradition and modernity. The normative discourses founded in the Koran and in the
hadiths offer transhistorical c1aims which are used to defend a variety of positions.
However, in a rapidly changing social context - a steadily growing metropolis with
social turbulenee and political turmoil - interpretation of the holy texts are an
absolute necessity to be able to construet an urban Muslim identity. The collapse
of Kemalist modernism is highly visible in the postmodern city with its dissolved
centre, its problems of uncontrolled settlements and pollution. In the midst of this
are women's lives. Nevertheless, bein g a religious woman is not any longer
equivalent to ignorance and powerIessness. It can certainly also mean resistance
to authoritarian Islam.
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Women and Mouridism in Senegal - The case
of the Mam Diarra Bousso dahira in Mbacké
Eva Evers Rosander
Introduction
In Senegalone finds various forms of the current 'traditional' ,'local' African
Islam, comprising mainly Sufi Islam. There is also another orientation of Islam
which is less 'traditional' and more' global' , an Islam more open to the universal
Islamist tendencies and expressions of today. I refer to Islamisation as a kind of
mediator between tradition and modernity in Senegal, being at the same time an
interface and a dividing line between local and global and between traditional and
reformist or radical. In this article, my main focus wil be on women and Sufi
Islam in Senegal. More precisely, I am interested in Mourid women, the
Mouridiyya being the second largest tariqa (religious Sufi ' order' or
'brotherhood') in Senegal, and the Mourid women's associations. I have studied
in particular one religious association, dedIcated to the celebration of the mother
of the founder of the Mouridism, the farnous Sheikh Amadou Bamba. This
association carries the name of the mother, Mam Diarra Bousso.The image of the
mother as a pious person whose influence on her son results in his turning into a
great saint is very important in the Sufism in general and perhaps even more so
in its West African form. The mother figure is important in West Africa also
outside the realm of Sufism and woman as mother has a position of authority
which is not the case for women without children.
My interest in women's organizations in West Africa derives from a conference
a few years ago with a group of Scandinavian and West African female social
scientists. We called it 'Transformation of Female Identities: Women's
Organizational Forms in West AfrIca'. The working title of my research project
is 'Women's organizations as cultural expressions of female identity'. It is carried
out in Mbacké, a town situated close to the Mourid's holy city of Touba. Mbacké
was the town where Sheikh Amadou Bamba spent part of his life before he moved
on to Touba,which sine e then became the centre of Mouridism. In my fieldwork
I have been concentrating on the women members of the Mam Diarra Bousso
association. Through participation in their meetings and visits to their homes I
have tried to get an idea of their lives and ambitions and engagement in the
association. Together we made the pilgrimage to Porokhane to celebrate the less
formal, religious association. I call this form of association 'informal' as it has no
links whatsoever with the state or with state related regional institutions. Even if
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there exists an elected president and a cashier, one or several seeretaries and
someone who keeps the accounts for the money collected from the members, there
are no membership lists or any form of registration. To cease being a member
does not require any formalities; one just stops going to the meetings.
Generally speaking, women's informal assocIations in Senegal not only provide
a collective basis for action - they also express and consolidate women's cultural
identities. In Senegalese societyeverybody strives to get integrated into the group.
Nobody wants or can stay alone, without belonging to one or more groups. To be
alone is to be 'outside', isolated, and that is something which only mad people do.
One's life has to be transparent (Wolof:leer) and well known to the social
surrounding. This is one' s social and moral obligation. Everything has to be done
in common as if to underIine one's honesty: meals, work, entertainment. The
assocIations offer the proper framework and the legitimate form for togetherness.
Aide-entre aid (self help) is important for all kinds of social activities and
ceremonies.This means collaboration with others on a reciprocal basis. To realize
oneself fully as an individual, one needs a group, a collective.
Religious and ritual associations draw upon higher authority. To better explain
what I mean I wil cite Kathryn March in her article about women's associations
and development: 'The religious associations east women's actions within a
culturally meaningful frame, cloaking women's associations with an aura of
spirituality, inspired authority and orienting the place of gender in the wider worId
order '(1982:78). This wil be my perspective in the following in my use of the
Mam Diarra Bousso association as a case for analyzing women's position in the
local community as well as for makng some tentative generalizations about their
place in the wider society.
In a similar way, some religious institutions and rituals wil be discussed from
the point of view of gender ideology and practice. To clarify these issues they wil
be divided into questions about religious authority and the relations between those
who have and those who do not have access to religious power. The nature of
leadership and member participation in the religious associations are also matters
of concern. The participation of the members is often motivated by both
self-assertiveness and self-protection as part of women's informal strategies. The
focus easily becomes directed towards the distribution of material and immaterial
resources. One important resource is information. The associations are informally
structured around female communication networks which also stretch into male
domains of power and authority. Another is the moral reputation of the women
leaders and members of the associations, reputations which can sometimes be
more or less successfully manipulated by the women. This leads us to reflect on
female and male ideas about Mourid gender ideals. Mam Diarra Bousso is one
such female religious ideal person, whose life is told again and again in the form
of legends by the Mourids as an example of the ideal wife and mother whose
behaviour was characterized by mun (patience) and soutura (loyalty, stoicism,
ability to keep family secrets).
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Some Analytical Concepts
There are three key words or concepts, namely purity, religious education and
religious blessing, which are intimately linked to men's and women's different
positions in the religious institutions and rituals. Those key concepts in the male-
dominated Islamic discourse are often brought up in Senegal by the Sufi
marabouts as well as by the Islamists. They can be said to be paroles d hanne ur
of the Senegalese Islamic revival. And they affect women's participation in the
Mouridism, as Sufism and Islamism are partly interacting and influencing each
other in contemporary Senegalese society.
Perhaps birth is the factor of most importanee for the position of women in the
Senegalese society. ' Caste' ,1 religion, ethnicity, descent from the great maraboutic
lineages - all this gives ascribed status or lack of ascribed status to women, as well
as to men, of course. However, compared to women, there seems to be more
transactional space for men's social careers; they are more mobile and
unconventional. The male status seems to be more easily achieved and transformed
in other, alternative and overIapping ways, like for example in migration.
Women's role as moral icons of the society prevents them from getting
recognition for certain more innovative forms of status changes. In relation to
baraka, descent is decisive for both men and women, as we shall see. But again,
women have the disadvantage of getting much less societal recognition for the
blessing baraka they may have inherited from their maraboutic line age through
descent, although they may be sokhnas, I.e. of maraboutic descent. In short,
women give and take/receive less baraka than men. This contributes to their
marginalisation in public life in relation to the men, whose ideas about themselves
and the women dominate and monopolize the gender ideology and its religious as
well as its secular practice.
By purity (Arab.tahara) is meant ritual purity, required of those who approach
God through prayers, reading of the Koran, and entering holy spaces like mosques.
These people are men, as women who menstruate and give birth are impure during
the bleeding periods. The blood is considered defiling. This physical fact
predestines women to a second-rated position within the Muslim gender hierarchy,
as a woman cannot control her bleeding and thus cannot avoid being periodically
, unclean'. This limits her participation in the rituals and gives her a low ranking
compared with men.
Religious education and knowledge has always been an important criterion for
being a good Muslim. Knowing Arabic well enough to be able to read the Hadith
and knowing prayers and at least parts of the Koran by heart are current examples
of what defines true believers of Islam. Jahaliyya, religious ignorance, is now
becoming a negatively loaded moral concept, signifying not only as it did
originally the lack of Islamic knowledge which characterized strangers living
outside the Arab region. Added to this, today the concept has connotations of
heresy or even denigration of Muslim values. Religious education for both girIs
1 Hierarchically ranked ascribed status groups, based on professions.
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and boys is today on the Islamists' agenda all over the Muslim worId. This is not
necessarily so, however, among the Sufi leaders. It is true that knowledge of
Arabie, being the religious language, is prestigious and increasingly winning
ground also among the Sufis. But the Mourids stil con sider their religious identity
as closely linked to W olof (ethnic) identity and to the use of the W olof language.
Poor families, and paricularIy the girIs and women of poor familes, remain
iliterate and ignorant, something which contributes to their subordinated position
in relation to men in religion.
Religious blessing (Wolof barke, Arab baraka) is a comparatively unique male
quality, linked to male descent through the maraboutic lineages. Concerning the
religious blessing, women from maraboutic families do inherit baraka, like men,
but to a lesser extent, and they have access to it and get recognition for it on
negotiable and highly varying conditions. Pers on alit y is probably more important
than descent for the recognition of female baraka. The transfer of blessing through
men is a phenomenon whose importanee cannot be sufficiently stressed when
criteria for religious authority, for example, are discussed in a Sufi context. The
marabout's crucial role in a tariqa is intimately connected with his ability to give
ba raka to his disciples. In relation to this, the importanee of tiaba , religious
merit, for women should not be neglected. The work they do and the money they
offer to their marabouts give them religious merit, which is perceived as
something being directly rewarded them by God. Men as well women get tiaba
for their pious acts, of course, but women seem to be more in search of it than
men, as their possibilties of getting ba raka through the mediation of the
marabouts are comparatively more limited. (cf. Buitelaar 1994)
The main purpose of this article is to show how the mentioned concepts
regulate female religious practice in the Mouridism of today. First, I wil present
the Mourid brotherhood in short traits. Then follows an account of the Mourid
gender ideals as manifested in the legends about Mam Diarra Bousso and in the
Mourids daily life. Mourid institutions such as the dara and the dahira2 wil be
introduced, and the Mam Diarra Bousso dahira described in some detaiL. In the
final analysis of the Mam Diarra Bousso dahira, women's practice is not only
seen as linked to the dominant religious ideas and concepts but also interpreted in
terms of women's ability to manipulate the value system without challenging it.
2
Vilalón describes in his book on Islamic society and state power what he calls ' a unique case
in Fatick of an all-women's daira which claims no affiliation with any other order.' (L.A.
Vilalón (1995), Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick,
Cambridge p.162). In New York among the female Murid immigrants there exist Mam Diarra
bousso dairas for women only. So it seems realistic that one should find several 'unique cases'
of female religious associations of different kinds but built on the maraboutic system as a
whole.
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The Mourid Brotherhood
The Mouridiyya is an Islamic brotherhood of great political, economic and social
significance in Senegal. Even if the brotherhood is not the biggest one in terms of
number of disciples, it has many characteristics which are usually considered as
typical for the Senegalese form of Islam and Islamic mysticism or Sufism. The
biggest brotherhood in Senegal is the Tijaniyya; another important one is the
Quadiriyya.
The mourids are effectively organized in a country-wide federation with its
administrative and religious centre in Touba. The most eminent group of the
leaders belong to the same lineage as the founder or are alled to him through
marital alliances. The fact that the leadership is well organized gives the
dominating Mourid leaders a power position in Senegal, which the other
brotherhoods partly lack. This power derives to a great extent from the Mourid' s
active participation in the economic life of the country and their indirect link to
the Senegalese state. The religious ideology encourages economic activities.
Resources from the marabouts' disciples in the form of agricultural work on
maraboutic properties- above all the peanut cultivations- or cash from the urban
religious associations pour in to the great religious leaders. Their political power
is considerable, as the Mourid leader in Touba can mobilize the masses of the
people through proclaiming an order (ndigeul) to his disciples to vote in favour
of the candidate preferred by him.
In the Mourid brotherhood the leader who followed after Sheikh Amadou
Bamba (1850-1927), is called khalifa general. He is recruited patrilineally. The
present khalifa general is one of the two remaining sons of the founder. When
they die, the grandsons of the founder wil be eligible. Other descendants of the
founder, who have his name (Mbacké) or the name of his mother (Bousso), i.e.
related to Sheikh Amadou Bamba both matri- and patrilneally also become
sheikhs or sokhnas (there is just one daughter stil alive) and have theIr own
disciples by right, called talibés. They are about ten in number and constitute les
grands marabouts. Ranked as of lower status in the Mourid hierarchy are the
petits marabauts who are greater in number and more remotely related to the
Mbacké family. (Magassouba 1985:31) The base of the hierarchical pyramid
consists of the Mourid disciples, whose obligations are to show deference and
obedience to the sheikh or the khalifa to whom they are attached. The Mourid
brotherhood distinguishes itself by a total subordination of the disciple to his
leader. This is expressed through the disciple giving his promise of obedience to
the sheikh or, as he is often called in the francophone literature, the marabout. The
link between talibé and sheikh is basic for the existence and functioning of the
brotherhood. It cuts through family ties and ethnic and regional belonging.
Furthermore, it is considered to be a masculine relation: women cannot maintain
such a link with a religious leader except under very special conditions (see
below), as women are not allowed to pronounce the vow of obedience
(wolof:njebelu) to the sheikh. The sheikh's baraka (wolof: barke) wil strengthen
and help the disciple in his life on earth. Through the mediation of the marabout
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and his holiness, the disciple hopes to gain access to an eternal life in paradise.
The link to the marabout also works as a kind of social security net for the
disciple, who wil, for example, be able to count on his sheikh' s support for
marrying his children and for paying the costs in relation to that.
The founder, Sheikh Amadou Bamba, stressed the importanee of the male
disciple's unconditional work duty for his marabout, whenever the latter demanded
it from his talibé. The Mourid emphasis on work as a religious duty was not given
any thorough theological explanation by the founder. It remains clear, however,
that the stress on work refers to work for one's marabout; it does not refer to
being industrious as a general virtue. Already in sheikh Amadou Bamba' stime
agricultural work could replace religious education for the rural disciple. In this
respect Mouridism differs from the Tijani brotherhood, which pays greater
attention to religious formation and to education. Mouridism was and is associated
with the rural areas of Senegal and with the ethnic group of wolof, although there
are many exceptions to this. The Mourid language is wolof; French is not
considered proper to use.The Mourid brotherhood is effectively organized in a
country-wide federation with its administrative and religious center in Touba. The
most eminent group of leaders belong to the same line age as the founder or are
alled to him by marriage. The fact that the leadership is well organized gives the
domInant Mourid leaders a power position in Senegal, which the other
brotherhoods partly lack. This power derives to a great extent from the Mourids'
active paricipation in the economic life of the country and their indirect links to
the Senegalese state. Their religious ideology encourages economic activities.
Resources from the marabouts' disciples in the form of agricultural work on
maraboutic properties - above all the cultivations of peanuts - or cash from the
urban religious associations pom in to the religious leaders. TheIr political power
is considerable, as the Mourid khalifa general in Touba can mobilize the masses
of the people through proclaiming an order (ndigeul) to his disciples to vote in
favour of the candidate preferred by him.
The Ideal Wife and Mother: Mam Diarra Bousso
The Senegalese gender relations seem to be both conflcting and contradictory,
partly interacting, partly clashing with each other in every day life. Two discourses
distinguish themselves paricularIy among many others concerning male - female
relations in Senegal. Gender relations seem to be both conflcting and
contradictory, partly interacting and partly clashing with each other in every day
life. The Islamic discourse underIines a perception of women as subdued and
patient beings, while the ' African' discourse stresses motherhood, the mother
having a strong, powerful as well as a loving and caring personality. As a mother
she is of the greatest significance for the well-being of the children. ParticularIy
as a W olof mother , she is considered to predestine her children to success or
failure in life through her own moral behaviour. (see below) Following the Sufi
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tradition the pious mother is seen as the ideal fosterer of the Sufi saint. Thus, she
is considered to have a great influence on her children's spiritual development,
The mythical mother image of Mam Diarra Bousso, the mother of Sheikh
Amadou Bamba, fulfils both the Wolof and the Sufi ideal expectations. She is
frequently referred to in Mourid women's conversations as an example for all
women to follow. Through the numerous legends about her life and behaviour,
which are transmitted orally from one generation to the next, she occupies a
central place in the Mourid moral universe. Her popularity is immense, not the
least because of her strong my stie al potentials. The women say that Mam Diarra
Bousso gives to them what they ask for within a year. She assists afficted people
who come to her khabru (tomb) in Porokhane asking for her help more rapidly
than even her proper, much more famous son, Sheikh Amadou Bamba, whose
tomb in Touba is visited by over a millon people each July on the biggest of all
the Mourid magals.3 According to the legends, Mam Diarra Bousso's
characteristics as a wife coincide with those of the ideal Mourid and W olof
woman.She is patient (Wolof: mun), she endures without complaint whatever
hardships and injustices that her husband may exposes her to and she finds proper
means of providing for her husband and children in hidden ways, not blaming him
or making him embarrassed for not being able to support his family. The main
concept is soutura, to have or to show soutura. The word has an Arab origin,
indicating a veil or a piece of c10th which is used to hide something, like a kind
of wall. In this case it is mostly the misdeeds or bad luck of the husband which
should be hidden. The wife is expected to conceal unpleasant secrets about her
family life and to appear stoically and bravelyas a happy wife without problems,
which, if exposed publicly, would have resulted in the husband losing face in front
of others. (cf. Ly:252-264).
These ideal female characteristics are vividly ilustrated in the legends, which
are known among most Mourid women, constituting a female oral tradition. One
of them tells about Mam Diara Bousso's unselfish way of financing the family's
expenses for food when her husband was not able to provide his expected share.
The good-hearted woman went without complaints or reproaehes with her necklace
to one of the peuls (nomad) who live d outside the vilage to buy milk and milet
for the husband, the co-wives and the children, each day paying with a pearl.
When Mam Diarra's mother came to visIt her, the old woman asked for the
necklace. Not until then did the daughter tell her mother what she had used the
necklace for. Her mother was impressed by the good behaviour of Mam Diarra
and bought all the pearIs back as a gift to her daughter. This is areally pedagogic
example of soutura shame, wilingness to conceal a truth protecting the hus band
from the blame of others for his inability to provide for his family .
Another popular legend shows the extraordinary patience, mun, of Mam Diarra
and the total submIssion she show ed to her husband. One evening the husband
3 The date for the magal differs a little from one year to another which makes it possible to chose
a Thursday.
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wanted to go outside the homestead to do his ablutions and Mam Diarra
accompanied him to open the gate. On his way back he never told her to dose the
gate and join him to sleep. Instead he forgot about her and went to rest, while
Mam Diarra spent all the night at the gate, the rain pouring down on her waiting
for her husband to call her. Not until early the following morning did he call for
her and aske d her where she had been. When she told him he was astonished over
her patience, obedience and strength to endure hardships.
As a mother, her qualities are also expressed in terms of honesty and
transparency (leer). The general idea is that the fate of the child is strictly
dependent on his/her mother's (moral) behaviour. This places a heavy burden on
the mother, who wil alone be made responsible for her children's actions, their
successes as well as their failures in life. On the other hand, the father' s good or
bad influence on his children in accordance with his own manners as a family
member is reduced to none. Here descent is not mentioned in relation to female
behaviour, but morality, and women's social responsibilities, which seem to be
much greater than men's. Motherhood really means something, and Mam Diarra
Bousso has to be given thanks and glory for raising a son like Sheikh Amadou
Bamba. It is thanks to her own stainless moraIlife, her patience and ability to
endure personal sufferings that Mouridism has got such an extraordinar founder
and religious leader as Sheikh Amadou Bamba.
This is eloquently expressed in one of the legends in the following way: The
little baby learnt miraculously early to talk. Re was just a few years old when he
told his mother in confidence that he was a saint, a prophet, and that it was
because of her that he had got this power. It was due to her submission and
obedience to her parents but most of all to her husband his father, that she had got
a son like him. 'You are worth it and I wil never be anybody else's but yours and
only yours', said the baby boy who was to become the great Sheikh Amadou
Bamba to Mam Diarra Bousso.
Male and Female Mourids
The ideal male Mourid dedicates his physical strength, time and labour to serving
his spiritual leader without complaint. To submit, to obey orders, to be good,
peaceful and hospital are all male Mourid virtues. Women seem to be almost
invisible in such religious structures as brotherhoods of the kind here described.
They have no other task than to provide food to the men working in the
maraboutic fields or to prepare food for the religious feasts. As they are not
supposed to make the vow of obedience and subjection to the sheikh, they cannot
be considered to be proper Mourid talibés. Besides, the women should have the
same relation to their husbands as the husbands have with their marabouts, I.e. a
relation characterized by submission and obedience. This is how women have been
pictured in some of the literature on the Mouridism, probably reflecting the
opinions of the social and political scientists' own male informants (O'Brien 1971,
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Copans 1980, Creevey 1992). However,this is certainly not the female Mourid's
point of view.
When women are asked about how they perceive themselves as Mourids, the
women state that they are the followers of a certain Mourid sheikh because of
their membership in a particular dahira (religious association) which venerates him
or the khalifa general in Touba. They say they often have the same sheikh as their
husband and if not, they have the same as their fathers. Membership in the
religious associations make them feel themselves to be active participants in the
brotherhood.
It is true that the women cannot become imams (religious teachers at the
mosque) just as they cannot, according to prevailing norms, be religious leaders,
have disciples, give vows of obedience to their marabout and sing the khasaid, the
religious songs written by sheikh Amadou Bamba, containing citations from the
Koran. However, exceptions from these prohibitions can easily be found in
Senegalese religious practice. To avoid misunderstandings, however, we have to
distinguish between ' ordinary' female Mourid dahira members and wives and
daughters of eminent religious leaders, the latter being called sokhnas. What is
possible for these women, who bel on g to famous and powerful maraboutic
families, is impossible for the gre at majority of Mourid women. The ideological
reasons presented by the Mourid men fall back on the IslamIc gender ideas about
women as being ritually impure and more over ignorant, laeking religious
education.
One example of a sokhna with exceptional power and influence is Sokhna
Magot Diop who inherited her barke from her father Serigne (title awarded the
great male marabouts) Abdoulaye Niakhep. Already as a child she was chosen by
her father who did not have any son, to become his successor because of her
charismatic personality. She lives in dose contact with the khalifa general in
Touba. Even if she is a woman she has given him her vow of obedience like her
father decided and nobody opposed the decision. Sokhna Magot Diop has
considerable political power in the Thies region where she lives. Thus, this female
marabout has her own male and female talibés ( Coulon 1988; Coulon and
Reveyrand 1990).
It is also true that the 'ordinary' Mourid women from non-maraboutic familes
offer their religious leaders their abilty to make food and in connection with this
their time, labour, and, not least, their money. They also provide sexual services
and reproductive capacity in the maraboutic polygynous marriages. Y oung girIs
are given as brides to the sheikhs by their father' s talibés. These marriages of ten
take place without legal marriage contracts, which means without any possibilty
of getting a legal divorce. Not until a marabout 'frees' his wife by tellng her that
she can leave is the marriage canceled. One often cited example of a sokhna
(daughter of a famous sheikh) with exceptional power and influence is Sokhna
Magot Diop, who inherited her barke from her father Serigne (a title awarded the
great male marabouts) Abdoulaye Niakhep. Already as a child she was chosen by
her father, who did not have any surviving sons, to become his successor because
of her charismatic personality. She lives in dose contact with the khalifa generale
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in Touba. Even though she is a woman she has given him her vow of obedience.
Her father decided that this should be done and nobody opposed. Sokhna Magot
Diop has considerable political power in the Thies region, where she lives, because
of her disciples ' loyalty and her many influential connections. Thus, this female
marabout has her own male and female talibés (Coulon 1988; Coulon and
Reveyrand 1990).
The dara
The Mourid dara is connected with the rural areas and their Mourid population.
The word itself has Arabie origin (dar:house) and was before the rise of the
Mouridism the name of the place of religious education, primarily Koran studies.
In the first phase of Mouridism the dara was an effective instrument of the
Mourid sheikhs' colonization of the rural areas of Kaolack, Thies and
Diourbel.The disciples of the gre at marabouts cleared the land and cultivated large
quantities of peanuts on the maraboutic fields. Today the most frequent form of
dara combines agricultural work and religious education for the sons of the
Mourid farmers, who live in vilages ' owned' or controlled by the sheikhs. There
is certainly social pressure on the farmers to send theIr sons to the daras, as well
as to contribute with their own labour in the maraboutic 'Wednesday field' once
a week. Many of the Mourid farmers came to the maraboutic vilages as landless
peasants, receiving their fields from the hands of their sheikhs. Others got their
land from the marabout or his father after having spent some years themselves in
the dara. There exists a female equivalent to the dara for the daughters of the
disciples' families. The wife/wives (the 3) of the marabout receive/s small girIs
from the age of fourlfive who are given by their mothers to the marboutic
household to live with the sokhna to work for her and to be educated by her as a
sign of their loyalty to and confidence in her. The daughters are gi ven the mane
of the sokhna by their parents who honour her by this tradition. In these female
maraboutic collectives the girIs grow up in larger groups without any close contact
with their mother. She comes and visIts only on certain occasions, like the
religious feast and after childbirth. The mother stoically avoids showing too much
tenderness towards her own daughter on these rare occasions, not to make the
departure too difficult and painful for the daughter. The girls stay with the
marabout' s wife until they become married. It is the sokhna who chooses a
husband for the girI and helps her with the co st of the wedding and its
organization.
The dahira
Dahiras are mostly associated with urban forms of Mouridism. Currently,
however, not only da ras and 'Wednesday field' work but also dahiras are found
in the Mourid countryside. The popularity of the dahiras grew in paralleI with the
urban migration, which started to assume considerable proportions in the 1950s.
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They originated in the immigrating Mourids' need for an instrument in town by
which people could regroup themselves according to the criteria prevalent in the
city without loosing theIr identity as Mourids, even if they were living far from
their marabout. The dahiras, which, as mentioned above, constitute religious
organizations devoted to a certain marabout or to the khalifa general himself, have
an important task in urban political as well as religious life. Dahiras offer a visible
and concrete measure of the influence and fame of a particular sheikh - he is
needed by his disciples because of his ba raka, but he certainly also needs his
talibés to manifest, confirm and maintain his power position in relation to other
sheikhs - and he needs the financial contribution from the dahira members
(Coumba Diop 1981). Members of the dahiras are mostly sons, daughters and
grandehildren of urban migrants. The organizations are divided according to age
and to a certain extent according to sex men and women sit separately although
in the same room. In these dahiras where both men and women are members, men
tend to control the important posts while women have a paralleI structure for
formal representation. Thus, there is a women's president and a men's president
of the same dahira. Women certainly have a great del to say in the dahira' s
operations, even if the Senegalese society including the dahiras, is characterized
by its stratified social structure and hierarchical norms (cf Vilalón 1995:162).
Some dahiras are based on the members having a common profession, others
on common geographical origin, others have members who suffer from the same
handicap - for example being blind. Other dahira members have nothing eÌse in
common than the marabout. Different ethnic groups, 'castes' and 'non-caste'
people and immigrants from different regions of Senegal may be found among the
members in one and the same dahira in Dakar or in any other city. In the rural
vil age all the dahIra members come from the same section of the vilage,
belonging to the same marabout, who usually lives nearby. At the weekly
meetings, religious songs are sung, issues related to the activities of the dahira are
discussed and the weekly sums of money are collected. These sums - the so called
addiya - are given to the dahira 's sheikh and/or to the khalifa general. The two
leading persons, the president and the treasurer, are elected by the members. They
are very important and influential individuals and often the only representatives
of the dahira who have any contact with the marabout. The principal exception
is the yearly pilgrimage to the marabout and/or to Touba (Wolof: maga14), to see
the khalifa general. Then all the members join together for the pilgrimage. The
sheikh has no lists of names of the members, who vary considerably over time.
Many talibés remain active in one particular dahira only for a short time.
Membership in a religious association is more or less voluntary although the
disciples ' participation may be a forced one, due to social pressure from the
neighbourhood. According to information from some social workers in the town
of Mbacké this is actually the case, especially for poor and divorced women.
4 The date for the magal differs a Httle from one year to another which makes it possible to chose
a Thursday for the visit.
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However, membership in a prestigious marabout's dahira means forming part of
a social network, which could also provide poor women with access to otherwise
hidden resources.
Female Participation
Even if the dahira is not a particularIy female phenomenon, it fits very well into
other forms of women's organizations, be they tontines (wolof:nat), saving
associations, or mbotaye, social self help associations. Not only in the Mouridiyya
but also in other brotherhoods, the presenee of women in the dahiras is
remarkably strong and their participation often intense. Women contribute
considerably both with money and work to the practical arrangement of dahira
activities and with the preparation of food for all the religious feasts. They help
actively in the organization of the gammaus, which in the Mouridiyya context
means religious meetings with specially invited guests who sing and give speeehes
on religious subjects. However, due to the fact that they are women and
considered impure or polluting because of theIr menstruation periods (see above),
they cannot perform the most important initiation ritual, the vow of obedience to
their sheikh. Neither do they take an active par in the singing of the religious
songs. Of course they are allowed to sit listening to the mn's singing, which is
what they do for hours. However, there are some songs, not containing citations
from the Koran, which they can and do sing. I am now referring to fertile women;
young girIs and post menopause women obey partly under other laws. They are
not considered impure but are all the same women, polluters-to-be or ex-polluters.
The dahiras are formed by the disciples/members, not by the marabouts
themselves - they take no initiatives and remain in their rural vilages, far from the
urban activities of the dahira. Just once a year they receive their disciples and
dahira members who make a pilgrimage to their marabout to leave him the money
they have collected during the year, the so-called addiyya. He uses it ideally for
giving food and shelter to the poor, to the visitors during the magal(pilgrimage)
and for improvements in the community in which he lives (construetion of
mosques etc). Sadaqa, alms, are given to the khalifa general in Touba during the
yearly magal in July, the greatest Mourid manifestation of the year, when the
Mourids assemble in Touba to celebrate the rnemory of their founder Sheikh
Amadou Bamba.
The Mam Diarra Bousso dahira
The Mam Diarra Boussi dahira in Mbacké was presented to me as a women' s
dahira. This confused me, as I had not previously heard about something similar.5
5 Vilalón describes in his book on Islamic society and State power what he calls ' aaa unique
case in Fatick of an all-women's dahira which claims no affilation with any other order' (L.A.
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Being in a preparatory stage of my fieldwork (Spring 1992) when I did not trust
my own capacity/ability to understand what actually went on, I asked for an
interview with the president, who was a woman. This was not so puzzling, after
all, for the women members of the mixed dahiras have their own president, to
whom the female members address themselves on practical matters. The president,
however, reassured me that this was a female association whose members
celebrated the memory of sheikh Amadou Bamba's mother Mam Diarra Bousso
through their common activities. These consisted in collecting money for the
annual pilgrimage to Prokhane in southern Senegal and to go there together each
January.
My surprise was great to find a female dahira in such a male-dominated
society. This was even more puzzling considering the fact that most women were
iliterate and said to be unable to manage money in any sizeable quantity. Dahira
members acting outside the very intimate and informal context of the household
and the mbotaye 'self-help' groups, where contributions were interchanged
between the women for rites-de-passage purposes in cash, c10th or soap, was
something new. Here other organizational demands were raised. Going on a
pilgrimage to Porokhane required organizational skilIs and abilities: it was a long
journey, comprising two days' absenee from home, which meant hiring a vehic1e,
bringing food etc. There was also a moral component: women should not be
travelling around without men 'for fun'. My assistant laughed at my worries and
said that this was a feminist dahira. These were strong and capable women. But
on my question why they had chosen the Mam Diarra Bousso dahira, not an
association for a nearby sheikh, who could give them baraka and protection, the
president said in a warm and tender voice: 'Because we love Mam Diarra' .
Next time I came back to Mbacké (Autumn 1993) I saw the woman president,
again I and interviewed her,the cashier and some of the secretaries. I also attended
two dahira meetings. The picture became a little c1earer. Finally, during my last
stay in Mbacké from December 1994 to March 1995 many questions were
answered, although there stil remain many obscure points concerning this
religious association and its raison d être. In my second interview with the
president she said to my great surprise that the dahira was mixed and there were
both men and women members. But how could it be that men would like to attend
a dahira for Mam Diarra Bousso, the mythical mother figure who is venerated
primarily by women? The president insisted, however,that there were in fact male
participants. In all they were eighty women members, she said, and around thirty
male members. All the women were from the same town quarter, she continued,
and most of them were petty traders, mainly trading in c10th and toasted peanuts.
Before they traded in smuggled goods from Gambia, but after the devaluation of
Vilalón, 1995), Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick,
Cambridge, p.162) In New York among female mourid immigrants there exists Mam Diarra
Bousso Dahiras for women only. So it seems reasonable to presume that one could find several
'unique' cases of female religious assocIations of different kinds built on the maraboutic system
as a whole.
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the Franc CFA in January 1994, they would buy c10th in Touba, which is a
freetown nearby, or in Dakar, and sell it in Mbacké. The young male participants
had different professions, mostly tailors and artisans. They were all bachelors and
earned some money from singing the qasaids and volunteering also in other
dahiras and occasionally in religious events. Their fame as good qasaid singers
was well established in Mbacké.
EarIier the association used to meet each Friday, but because it was difficult for
the men to come to the dahira after the Friday prayers in the mosque, they had
now changed the meetings to Monday afternoons. That is, the women gathered
each Monday. Once a month the fee for the caisse was collected, the caisse being
absolutely central to the dahira 's activities and called 'the Calebass of Mam
Diarra Bousso'. Half of the money was, as mentioned, given to a Mam Diarra
Bousso family representative (Sokhna Astou Boury Mbacké in Porokhane) while
the other money was used for transportation to the place of pilgrimage and for the
food for the trip. The men did not attend every Monday meeting, but when they
came they sang the khasaid for the women. The men did not make any
contributions in money. The fee was low: the women paid 300 franc CFA each
month (100 franc CFA are equivalent to 1 Franc Franeais). In January 1995 the
fee was increased to CF A five hundred due to increased prices on food and
transport.
But why the men in the dahira? 'We need the men', the president explained,
'for three reasons: for singing the qasaids, for heavy work we cannot do and for
protection'. I would imagine they especially need the men for their yearly
pilgrimage to Porokhane. They then go with the money and the bowls with
prepared food. The money can easily be robbed and the bowls are heavy. It is also
more respectable to go with men than with only women. 'To be only women, far
from home, could be provocative,' said the president; 'it is not said but it is like
that. '
The Mam Diarra Bousso dahira used to be both a religious association and a
mbotaye, the form of association mentioned above, which gives contributions to
the women for financing the feasts that accompany marriages, name-givings and
funerals. The same women were members in both associations. The women met
each Saturday, but they did not collect money or clothes more than were needed
on the occasions. The sum on each occasion was thousand Franc CF A. ' And what
about the men?' I wondered. The women said they were also part of the mbotaye.
'But how was that be possible?' I asked really astonished. Well, they were all
young men and lacked the financial means for their mariages. As they helped the
women to keep the dahira going through their physical presenee and their singing
the religious songs, the women tried to help them in cash and c10th as well when
they had their rites of passage feasts. That was the reason for the classification of
their 'participation' in the female mbotaye association.
During my last stay in Mbacké much time was spent with the members of the
dahira in their homes, on regular meetings and on special gatherings planning the
annual excursion to the magal in Porokhane. With the help of two W olof-speaking
assistants complementary data were gathered and checked. This was partly simIlar
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to the work of a detective, as the versions presented about facts like the size of the
sums collected, not to mention the purpose and meaning of the dahira activities,
differed widely. Legends about Mam Diarra Bousso and references to her life were
constantly intermingled in the women's answers to direct questions, which the
women mainly found laeking in interest. As usual in anthropological fieldwork,
only presenee and patience helped us - to some extent - to find out what we
consider relevant information. Likewise the president and her board and members
were trying to find out how to handle our presence. They seemed to be even more
confused than we concerning my and the assistants research roles and eventual
mission in relation to the dahira. The main purpose with the dahira was and is the
Mam Diarra Bousso magal in Porokhane. Much time is spent in the meetings on
planning and discussing the annual trip. Once the great event is over and the
participants are back home, one meets to go through all the details of the
pilgrimage and to inform non-participating members about the mag al. A special
kind of beverage tas ting like bitter coffee is served, called café Touba, which is
considered typically Mourid. The older ladies dominate the conversation. The
younger women sit together on mats in one part of the court yard; the older women
occupy the central part of the yard and the young men, when they are present,
gather around the amplifier in the back of the houseyard.
What are the attractions of the Mam Diarra Bousso magal? Besides that it has
all the characteristics of areally big religious feast with a voluminous market
attached to it, the handing over of the addiya, the money collected during the past
year, to sokhna Astou Boury of the Bousso family and the ziyara, the visit to the
holy places in Porokhane,constitute the two most thriling events of the magal. The
most important part of the ziyara which just cannot be missed is the visit to the
tomb, where the pilgrim formulates wishes for Mam Diarra to fulfil about what
one really needs and wants. Other elements of the ziyara are to collect 'holy'
water from the well, to visit the places where Mam Diara us ed to pound her
millet and her son Sheikh Amadou Bamba used to crawl around in the sand before
he le arnt to walk. The mosque is visited both at night on the day of arrival and
again for afternoon prayers if the sec ond day of the magal is a Friday.(cf.footnote
3)
The marketplace is another essential par of the magal. Friday morning is
usually dedicated to visiting the market where the purehases are of two kinds; the
women by gifts which bring blessing to dose family members who could not join
in on the pilgrimage and they buy other items mostly c10th for trading. Thousands
of people attend the magal the atmosphere is pleasant and the people look happy
to be there. Unlike other magals where one juste sits in the marabouts house for
hours in Porokhane they move around to the different activities and places of the
ziyara. The pilgrims men and women alike imitate Mam Diarra's pounding her
milet by borrowing a mortar from the hands of the Bai Fall disciples,6 who assist
6 The Bai Fall disciples belong to a subgroup of the Mouridiya. They are followers of Sheikh
Ibrahim Fall, Sheikh Amadou Bamba's most well-known and charismatic disciple.
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the visitors and ask for alms from them. The symbolie act of pounding, carried out
by male pilgrims, transgresses ordinary male norms. The imitation of Sheikh
Amadou Bamba's crawling around in the sand as a child which all the visitors do
in hope of partaking with their body and soul in the saint' s baraka also breaks
every day norms. This physical activity in combination with the longing for Mam
Diarra Bousso's miraculous and mystical power provide the magal in Porokhane
with a special dimension of grace, pleasure and excitement.
In late 1994 only thirty women were actual members of the Mam Diara
Bousso dahira. Out of this number, only seventeen had paid their fee (the addiyya)
and were allowed to go on the pilgrimage to Porokhane organized by the dahira
board. The mbotaye association had been dissolved because the president said the
women did not pay to the dahira, only to the mbotaye. This caused trouble and
conflicts among the members. The main activity for the dahira was and remained
the pilgrimage to Porokhane, and it seemed that the interest in this had diminished
among the younger women. The majority of women in the actual dahira were
older women - traders and grandmothers. All members except the cashier (who
was enrolled in another dahira for another marabout through her husband) were
also members of another dahira, called Wilaya (wolof: House) in honour of
Sérigne Mbacké Sokhna Lô, a famous and popular sheikh in his fiftes, living not
far from Mbacké. At the Mam Diarra Bousso Monday meetings a special fee for
him was charged by the members for his addiyya, the sum being fifty Fr CF A
weekly. Each year the members made the magal to his house in Darou Khoudoss.
This was thus the answer to my wondering about how the women could live
without the support and spiritual protection of aliving marabout. He could provide
his members with the longed for baraka. The women as well as the men could
work for him when demanded by him or the khalifa general, and these favours
would give people both religious blessing and merit (wolof: tiaba).
I have chosen to present one member of the Mam Diarra Bousso daira who is
pious, articulate and seemed to enjoy talking about her religious life and practice.
She is a typical member in the sense that she is comparatively old in the eyes of
the surrounding community, her children are grown up and she has passed the
époque of female life that is mainly characterised by hard work She has both time
and money to dedicate to dahira activities. She has no incentive to stay as a
mbotaye member as she is beyond reproductive age and have no further
expenditure on rituals for name giving or marriage anymore. Sokhna Salimatu
Diallo gives her age as approximately fifty when interviewed.7 She is of the
ethnic group Peul (cattle-breeders and milk-sellers who used to be nomads.) She
is geer considered to be of superior status to the east people, and she is mourid.
She lives in a polygynous marriage in a vil age outside Mbacké, but has recently
moved to her brother's house in town where she wil take care of her old mother
who is blind.
7 The interview was made by my assIstant Muskeba Fofona, in Wolof and translated by her into
French. MS.Fofona Dep. de Sociologie Université de Saint Louis.
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Sokhna Salimatu is herself a mother of four children, she has never been to
school but studied the Koran as a young girL. She runs a small business of seIlng
oranges from her house. She buys the oranges from the marketplace and the small
business gives a good excuse to sit outside and chat with neighbours without being
considered idle sometimes she also give children oranges for free. Her husband
and sons do not like her engagement in petty trade; this is not something a Peul
woman should do, it is beneath her dignity and besides she does not need the
marginal income. When I asked her what she did the previous day, she answered
'Yesterday was monotonous because I did not do anything. It is the wife of my
older brother who goes shopping in the market place and it is the domestie help
who c1eans in the house. I sat down outside in front of the table as soon as I got
up and then I extended myself on my mat and took my rosary to tell my prayers.
You know, now that I am old I follow nothing but the prescriptions from God.'
Like the other members, Sokhna Salimatu is a member of both the Mam Diarra
Bousso dahira and the one of Séringe Mbacké Sokhna Lô - to distinguish him
from all other Séringe Mbackés that are found in Senegal, his mother's name is
added to his. Sokhna Salimatu has joined the Mam Diarra Bousso dahira because
she wants to ' approach God do the Ziyaras and also come doser to my marabout.
She thinks one gets much more blessing if one joins a religious association and
together with fellow members dedicates oneself to religious activities such as
singing and listening to religious songs and collects money each month to prep are
for the magal. Moreover, she tries to lead a modest and pious life. As an example,
she mentioned that she never went anywhere;'you know, I have never attende d a
tam-tam8 nor gone to a cinema, for I know that those activities willead you on
to bad roads; they distance you from God.' 'And what about blessings, how do
you get it?' Sokhna Salimatu answered that barke blessings begins with the parents,
that is the individual starts to get barke from her parents by showing them
submission and most of all by helping them in all ways ' because it is thanks to
them that one lives.' Also, she added 'when the marabout came and ordered his
disciples to follow the khalif' s ndigeul to go to Khelkoum9 then the whole dahira
went because we have chosen Séringe Mbacké Sokhna Lô as our Sheikh. He is
also a disciple of the khalif so we had to obey the order of the marabout and that
is why we all went and stayed there for a week in order to do agricultural work.
Certainly we earned blessing because of om work for the marabout in exchange
we wil have barke as reward for the work.'
8 Tam-tams are afternoon gatherings held outside the house, where people dance and amuse
themselves, accompanied by drums and music the latter mostly from cassette-players with big
amplifiers.
9 Khelkoum refers to a big 'forêt classifié' (protected forest) which was situated in central
Sénégal. The Khalif generalordered all the Mourid disciples to cut down the forest in 1992.
The fores t had been preserved and protected since the time of the French colonialist. Since then
he annually gives an order to the disciples to go to Khelkoum for a period of about five days
to harvest the milet that is cultivated where the forest used to stand.
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, Concerning the pilgrimage to Porokhane' she said' I insist on going there every
year because it is a holy place and because that is the place where Mam Diarra
Bousso rests. This was the fourth time I went to Porokhane (in 1995) thanks to
God, had it not been for him I would never have put my feet there. Between
Mbacké and Porokhané there are kilometers and kilometers and it is a long and
though journey. Only if you really decide to go there and believe in God the
Merciful you wil arrive whatever the hardship you encounter on your way. The
first time I went together with my husband with a horse and a carriage. The other
three times I have been going together with Mam Diarra Bousso dahira.
In Porokhane I went to Mam Diarra's tomb first on Thursday and then on
Friday to again make the ziyara and ask for many things that I need in my life.
The others went to the market place on Friday morning, for no matter if the magal
is in Porokhane, in Touba or in any other place, lots of traders wil come with
their goods to make money. In Porokhane lots of vendors come from the Gambia
amnd sell towels, cloths, matches, jewellery, shoes indeed, many things. What
interested me most was the cloth. So I went to the market to buy myself a
khartoum (a special type of cotton cloth) to were on next magal besides a
10inc1oth for my mother-in-law as a gift- I had no intention of going there for
commercial purposes. When all of us hade made our purehases we went together
to Sokhna Astou Boury's room once again and together we sang the Qasaid
(referring to the Mam Diarra Bousso songs) and talked about things concerning
Porokhane. Around two o'clock in the afternoon we went to the mosque, stil in
the company of Sokhna Astou Boury to say the Friday prayers. As the magal was
on the night between Thursday and Friday, this gave us a great occasion to pray
together Thursday and Friday so this was really good luck for us. After the prayer
we returned immediately to Sokhna Astou's house to prepare the return for
Mbacké. And even if the magal is exhausting I wil always ask God to take me
to Porokhane each year with the Mam Diarra Bousso daira and also to see to it
that all Muslims who would like to go can do it.'
Summing up: Female Religious Participation- The case of the Mam
Diarra Bousso dahira
It is obvious that the women, who for ideological reasons are considered
second-rate as Muslims in the most important rituals to the men, need the presenee
and support of the young men to be able to keep a female dahira like Mam Diarra
Bousso going. In this case young men are brought in to mediate between the
female dahira participants and the surrounding society. That the men are young
and mostly not married makes them more accessible for the women; they would
hardly have older, married men coming is as 'helpers' in a female dahira. That
would certainly have been below their status. The young men thus in a sense help
women to holiness. The qasaid can only be sung by the young men and they are
heard widely from the presidents house-yard. These songs are in Arabie, and as
mentioned written by the founder of the Mouridiyya, Sheikh Amadou Bamba. The
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fact that the songs are based on citations from the Koran explains why women as
impure beings cannot sing them. For the dahira members it is good that not only
the less holy and less prestigious songs about Mam Diara Bousso, that the women
sing themselves in Wolof, are presented. Without the men, the young girIs' task
would have been to sing for the women, as they did on those occasions where the
men did not attend the meetings. Another important fact is related to the men's
voices: they are expected to sing loud and they do, fortifying their voices by
electronic equipment. The women, on the contrary, are expected to be silent, or
in the case of the Mam Diarra Bousso songs, to sing them in a low voice- ' not to
distract the men', as the saying goes. In line with this, it can be said that women
need men because of the latter' s ritual purity; they need men as performers of
Mourid rituals for them. The singing of the khasaids is the main religious activity
of a dahira. Women are not allowed to sing them nor to dance to them.lO
Women should be the listeners. Women's lack of religious knowledge and
iliteracy makes them dependent on men who read prayers for them and interpret
the legends about Sheikh Amadou Bamba and his mother. Women also need men
for the baraka that these songs give besides prestige in the town's quarter where
the women live (remember that most members are neighbours). The membership
in the Sérigne Mbacké Sokhna Lo dahira provides the women with access to the
baraka they cannot get through their own dahira's mythical figure, as Mam Diarra
died about 130 years ago. The men' s role as mediators between marabout and
women in the Mourid brotherhood supplements the responsibilities is of the
husbands, who are not interested in letting the women penetrate too deeply into
their domain. Y oung men could provide some of these services, traded against
material help in the form of money and collective ritual services.
In the Mourid case, the religious authority rests with the marabout. The
leadership of the Mam Diarra Bousso daira is held by the President who has an
important and influential position. Her greatest asset is her social network and her
reputed piety. Also, she and the cashier have controlover the money, which is
collected in the Mam Diarra Bousso calebass. Usually, the president belongs to the
group of non-casté (geer) which is considered a superior group. The president
becomes the patron for her dahira members, mostly castées women of lower
status, who are her clients. They see her as a kind of social mother, whose many
contacts with prestigious social groups and her connections with one or several
marabouts can be of help. The president herself maintains links of mutual interest
10 To say,as I do, that women cannot sing the qasaids, may be a toa categorical statement, which
I should mitigate as there are a number of exceptions to this rule or norm. As a matter of fact
many marabouts do not mind the women's singing; others do not allow it. While they permit
the women to sing the qasaids separately with no men present. There is also agenerational
difference among the Mourid Marabouts concerning their attitude to this issue. The older ones
maintain that the women should keep silent, while some younger marabouts trained in reading
the Koran and its interpretation hold that it is clearly stated by the Prophet that women should
pray and sing just like the men do. According to my own experience in Mbacké, Mourid
women neither sing the Cheikh Amabou Bamba qasaids alone nor together with men.
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and dep endene e with the marabout of the dahira, or in this case, with the sokhnas
(women of marabout descent or married to a marabout) of the Bousso family.
Through her marabout contacts she may gain the opportunity to travel to Mecca
to become hajja or a get a trading lie ense for trading or other benefits. The Bousso
family needs an active President, as she provides them with members and magal
visitors, who contribute to the image and the material resources of the Bousso
family . And the president needs the members to maintain her position as president
- acting as a mother, who can 'protect' her c1ients/daughters. The participation of
the women in the dahira has to be seen from the Mourid women's and the men's
point of view. The women consider all the things that they do in connection with
the dahira to be religious acts, which wil render them tiaba, religious merit. They
participate by their presence, by their work, by their organizational skils and by
their financial contributions. Many of them, if not all, are devout: they like to hear
the legends about the religious leaders and their mothers; they like the songs and
the feasts; they attend the magal because of the opportunities it affords of going
away on an exciting excursion and of preparing and eating good food. They like
the social events and to dress up in new cloth and in jewelry. The dahira meetings
are, besides the religious aspect, an occasion for social activities and a forum for
the making of marriage strategies (M'Bow 1994 MS). Female Mourid identity is
linked to participation in dahiras, in magals, in the performanee of the ziaras, in
the preparation of food for the religious feasts, the organization of gamma us and
to the work and money they offer their marabouts. What I see as conserving
women's position in Mouridism is the current stress on the female lack of purity,
knowledge and ba raka by the Islamic male activists as well as by the Sufi
marabouts and male disciples. One has to be aware of this and discuss it with the
Senegalese people one meets, in my case in Dakar, in Mbacké, in the marabout's
house and in the market-places and house yards, where the women assemble.
Religious and gender ideas seem to constitute 'tough structures, comparatively
resistant to change and mutually fortifying each other. Nevertheless, of course,
these 'tough' structures continuously adapt to all kinds of change in theIr
surroundings and in so doing undergo many transformations. The whole
phenomenon of a female dahira like the one called Mam Diarra Bousso is proof
of such an adaptation to a newera, in which women are partlyable to overcome
their ideological, culturally constructed handicap in religious life and in the society
at large by involving young men in women's pious activities, trading men's
protection, prestige and baraka against women's financial resources and ceremonial
services. To reach that far, money, age and civil status must work together to
make it possible for women to lead such activities. A good reputation for being
pious, honest and comparatively well off opens up wider fields of religious and
economic activities for women. Added to this as the image of the mother has
positive religious Sufi as well as secular connotations in Senegal, the Mourid
women are especially motivated to become members in a dahira which venerates
the memory of an ideal and almost sacred mother figure like Mam Diarra Bousso.
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Reconstruction of Islamic Knowledge and
Knowing; A Case of Islamic Practices among
Women in Iran
Zahra KamaZkhani
This paper attempts to give some understanding of women's religious activities in
the context of Islamic tradition and modernity in Iran. By modernity of Islamic
practices, I mean a search for new knowledge, a positive stanee toward innovation
and a quest for social and political development which reshape tradition. My view
supports those who argue that Islamism supports mass education and represents
a particular brand of modernity rather a reaction against it (Caplan Lionel 1987,
Eiekelman 1992, Horvatich 1994). This article show some of the consequences for
women's social and political mobility in today's Iran.
A common explanation for the rise of Islamism in general and the Islamic
segregation of the sexes in public spheres in particular is that it expresses a desire
to return to a traditional essentialist Islam of the past as well as being against
social and economic modernity. Furthermore among the conventional scholarship
the Islamic tradition of the past are aften understood as religious marginalisation
of women, patriarchal dominated, with the female segregated and veiled. These
classical Middle East cultural elements of ten viewed as social symbols of political
and economic subordination and segregation by western observers. But Western
observers commonly ignored the existence of women's active religious role. It
would be toa facile to describe the "return" of the women to religious orthodoxy
as simply reactionary or imitating male culture. In my view such a line of
approach neither gives us a comprehensive understanding of contemporary Muslim
women's Islamic awareness, nor provides an understanding of practices and the
innovative nature of Islamic knowledge. Looking at the development of women's
life situations under the new economic and political turbulenee in many Muslim
societies, a new perspective is required to give us knowledge about the increasing
number of women entering into Islamic orthodoxy and intellectualism.
One of ten notices that the discussion of Islamism and 'Islamic fundamentalism'
is restricted to the culture of the male elite and their paricipation in the
movement. Women's relation to the main-stream of Islamic practices remains
largely unrecorded and has not received adequate attention in terms of their
contribution to Islamic awareness and Islamic nationalism in Iran. However, there
is a new Islamic zeal developing in relation to women, which is evident in a
female Islamic movement and involvement. Many aspects of women's life
situations have become the province of the Islamists by means of the educational
control and religious involvement. In particular, this has affected the arena of
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traditional religious rituals, the religious socialization of the new generation and
educational opportunities for the young. (Higgens 1994; Yaganeh, N 1993: 12,
Eiekelman 1992).1
Below I firstly give some examples of Iranian women's religious activity and
secondly, discuss the way in which loe al religious life becomes a locus for the
reproduction of new Islamic meanings and acquires a political dimension.
Women's Religious Activity in 1989
As part of my Ph.D program and for the purpose of anthropological observation,
I planned to follow women's social life in post-revolutionar Iran in 1989.
Although my original research proposal was not concerned with the study of
women's religious life, by the sec ond day of my arrival I had learned that women
were engaged in something of importanee that had escaped my attention til then.
On the sec ond day of my arrival, I participated in a religious meeting in which
the entire Koranic verse anam, the so called khatm-e anam (Koran: sura 6) was
recited. That was a ritual of annual memory (sar-sal) of one of my relatives where
two female preachers were in charge and my relatives were host. There I met
another relative who invited me to her Koran meetings (jales-e Koran) in which
she was in charge of the Koranic lessons. This kind of meeting is open to the
public and a place to meet other relatives, friends and neighbours. A few days
later I went to her Koran lessons which were packed with twenty women,
inc1uding some with their school going daughters or young sons, in the sittng
ro om of a private home. Then I learned about other religious meetings (rowzeh-e
zananeh) where a different host and a female preacher were in charge and that
were carried on in different parts of the town.
I participated in several of these Koran meetings on a regular basis over the
period March-August 1989 (covering the muslim lunar months of Ramazan,
Shawwal, Dhul-Qa' adah,Dhul-Hijj ah, Muharam and Safar). I started with one
meeting and soon I was accepted as a paricipant or acquaintance to a series of
meetings where religious rituals were carried out by one or several female
preacher and was arranged on public holy days or family religious rituals and
extensively on every day during the fasting month (Ramazan) and the mourning
months of Muharam and Safar. Some religious meetings followed the Islamic
calendar, others were performed on auspicious days such as on Thursday evening
for reciting of nodbeh,2 or Friday morning for reading the blessed text of komyl,3
or joshan-kabir from the shi'i book of Mafatieh.
These religious meetings were performed at specific times of the day such as
in the earIy morning or evening, and in specific months of the year such as
Although it has been difficult to determine the exact number of women involved in higher
education, according to Higgens there were five times as many female students at the college
level in 1990-91 as in 1977 (Higgens 1994:32).
2 A verse of Mafatieh that is an appeal to the imam Mahdi or imam-Zaman, the awaited
messianic figure among 12th Shi'imam.
3 A verse said to be named after one of imam Ali's followers called Komyl and full of merit for
it forgives sin.
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Moharam and Ramazan. The annual meetings were on specific days such as the
commemorating of the second Shi'i Imam Hasan, and of his brother, the third
Imam Husain. The most blessed days were considered to be the commemoration
days for Imam Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law and cousin, and the day on which it
is believed that Muhammed nominated Imam Ali as his successor (aid-e ghadir),
a legitimate successor in Shi'i view. Other religious meetings were those
celebrating the last day of the month of fast (aid-e fitr),and the day of sacrifice
(aid-e ghorban). On each of these occasions one can see Koran meetings arranged
in one or other private houses. Motivated meetings were generally carried out
throughout the whole year, but it was thought that the flow of barakat (grace)
would be greatest for one's religious activity on holy months and days/nights.4
Women's Religious Activity in 1994
Recently in my second period of fieldwork in 1994, during the three Islamic lunar
months of Muharam, Safar and Rabi-ul-Awwal (June-August 1994) I participated
in the same local female religious meetings. There I came to know a new religious
meeting, recommended by one of my female informants, said to be a place where
discussions attained a higher Islamic standard than at the regular meetings I used
to attend. The religious meetings were arranged in a newly opened public house
named after the prominent third Shi'i imam Husain (Hosyneh) and was donated
as waghf to the community by its owners who was a religiously oriented elderIy
childless woman from a well-off religious family. Hosyneh is a mosque-like public
religious hall where religious meetings, communal prayers and sermons are
performed. There were three preachers of different rank who gave daily speeehes
and were in charge of ritual on different religious themes. One started at seven in
the morning with preaching and instrueting on problems of ritual and was followed
by the higher ranked preacher who often arrived with several books in her hand
to recommend to the audienee and carried the Koran commentary (tafsir). At the
end it was the turn of the ritual expert who performed the religious tragic and
narrative song (noheh) about one of the prominent Shi'i Imams. This meeting was
arranged at the expense of the host during the entire months of Muharram and
Safar.
On the second day of the month of Safar I was on my way to the rowzeh and
before I entered the house I could hear very clearIy the voice of the preacher who
was reciting and singing a sorrowful song (noheh) in honour of the 12th Sh'Ii
Imam; Imam Mahdi; the awaited messianic figure.5 Although loud-speakers have
be en commonly used sine e the revolution as often a large crowd gathers at female
religious meetings, this was very surprising to me in light of my experience from
other Koran meetings in charge of traditional preachers, who usually made sure
that their voices was not heard outside of the halL. Generally it is forbidden to let
men hear the voices of women reciting the Koran and there was a conservative
4 Arbein, tasoa and Ashora are among the most popular religious Shi'i days when taking and
receiving meals was certain and for that reason my host did not prepare lunch.
5 It is believed that the 12th Sh'i Imam who have gone into occultation in AD 874, wil return
back to his Muslim community when people's life is impregnate with injustice.
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view in this regard among the ritual experts. Later on I found that the song was
a popular greeting text (ziyarat) call Al- Y asin performed by a guest preacher.
There the narrative of the story about the Imam Mehdi in a mourning song joined
together and created a strong emotional performance.
When the meeting was finished I did get a chanee to approach the preacher
who performed the sorrowful song. She was a young student in the final phase at
a high-level girIs' religious school in Shiraz. I expressed my surprise to her that
her loud and effective performanee could be heard outside by the pedestrians
(meaning, by men). She insisted that it was necessary to give merit to all her
listeners on such a holy day. To her the religious message was give priority over
gender segregation and the taboo on women's religious voices being heard in
public. This is viewed more conservatively by traditional preachers who explicitly
ensure that men do not hear their voices. To my surprise a few days later at the
meeting I approached a stall which used to sell Islamic cassettes of male clergy
and Islamic books, and was able to buy the worship do 'a of AI-Yasin, which was
performed the other day by the Islamic student. This was the first time I heard the
recorded voice of a female preacher. Later I learned that there were also other
cassettes that I could borrow after becoming a member of the preacher' s private
library which was located in her home.
All these performances have meant an accumulation of articulated Islamic
knowledge and a sense of cultural innovation. First, to a new graduate preacher
the importanee of religious intention has become an alternative solution to some
of the taboos on women's public religious acts. Second, the importanee of the
development of Islamic ritual practices Hes in the fact that such religious meetings
and this form of family financial endowment have become powerful and popular.
One can also say that to some degree these forms of female religious activities and
family economic contribution are not new and also found place in
pre-revolutionary period.
What is significantly new is the way religious knowledge is mediated to local
audiences by popular means. My religious companion reminded me that the host
couple of the new women's Islamic house (Husyneh) was the same who during
the former shah regime presente d a golde n door to the shrine of the Shi'i third
Imam (Imam Husian) in Najaf in Iraq. She meant they were always earnest
believers. That show ed clearIy the extension of communal religious performanee
and in the integration of female Islamic experts into more public Islamic arenas.
It was also surprising that the large number of learned and young seminary leaders
often attracted bigger audiences than their former elderIy teachers or traditional
local preachers.
In order to explore further some of the modern social dimension of traditional
female religious activity, first I must provide to the reader some understanding of
the customary practices and initiation forms of these Koran meetings.
Initiation of Religious Rituals
These women' s religious meetings were of ten held to fulfil a vow (nazr) expressed
through sponsorship of a saint or the needy. For example, a woman may vow that
if a particular request is granted or a personal or family difficulty remedied, she
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wil sponsor a specific kind of religious ceremony. These votive meetings were
different according to personal desire and ritual form and were initiated by women
of various social c1asses. They were open to women and were of ten arranged
privately in homes or in some of the religious public building such as the Islamic
school or colleges and the female religious house (Hosyneh). Female networks of
kinsfolk, friendship or neighbours, mobilized participants from one meeting or a
local neighbourhood (mahaleh) to another. Some ofthese religious meetings which
were started during my first field- work March-August 1989, stil carried on the
annual Muharam meetings in my sec ond fieldwork in June-August 1994.
The meetings were also arranged in order to receive blessings to protect or
enhance the host' s health and wealth. Giving a religious meeting is often organised
on a regular basis, but is most frequent during the holy days and months. These
are the kinds of religious meetings arranged to honour promises given in return
for a happy completion of a wish. Often several female co-organisers shared the
tasks of serving participants with drinks taking care not to miss any of them. They
expect to receive a gift of merit in return for such a religious work. This type of
task is consider an honourable religious work earning religious merit (sawab), not
least for those young female religious students who stayed in the yards to sell the
religious books of prominent clergy and Islamic speeehes and lessons on cassettes
to those attending. For the host and co-organiser it was mainly the celebrating a
fulfiled vow of family issues and merit-making which was expected to bring
prosperity for this world or after death to oneself and other c10se relatives, living
or dead.The more expensive rituals induded one comprising a communal meal in
honour of the shi'i martyr, brother of the shi'i third imam Husian. The large
votive communal meal was usually given by wives of affluent businessmen and
seldom initiated among lower middle dass familes due to high food prices.
Religious meetings may be divided into three significant parts, l) Reciting the
holy verses either from the Koran or Mafatie6 2) Exegesis of Koran (tafsir), 3)
Narrative of women's lessons of worship (masaleh-go'i) from the book of
solutions to everyday problems (Resaleh halol-masaleh).7
The women in charge of rituals were preachers, either graduates of a
theological school (hyozeh or maktab), and/or brought into such a career as a
res ult of religiously learned parents, or having a c1ergy husband. For a woman to
become a religious leader, knowledge of the Koran is needed of which a minimum
is to be able to recite one of the popular holy verses for example komeyl, nodbeh
or anam, and to give lessons on obligatory prayers. However, it may not be
necessary to have a deep knowledge of Arabie or a religious background through
descent to become a leader of Koran meetings. For instance, the lowest rank of
preacher is that of the so called Anami a title given to one who can recIte the
popular Koran verse of anam, as explained to me by informants. No matter how
limited one's knowledge of the Koran, it brought income and an independent job.
The income earned by these female religious experts varied between several
6 Mafatieh or Mafatieh-il jenan is a Shii book of prayers. It means a key to paradise and it
consists of a collection of sacred verse and the Prophet s collected by Imam Ali and then by
his other successors imams and finally by Abas-Qumi.
7 The issue used in 1989 was a collection of statements by Khomeini.
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hundred and a thousand tomans depending on the significance of the occasion and
the generosity of the host. In general, that often amounted to more than the wage
of an average teaeher at a state schooL.
For those attending the meeting, participation entail both social and spiritual
experiences, spending time with female friends or co-religious seminarians
(ham-jalesi). While the preacher earns respect and income and furthers her
spiritual career, those attending the meetings expect to earn religious merit for
reciting the Koran and initiating vows. The atmosphere of the meetings was
spiritual, relaxed, friendly and flexible- some following a routine of reciting and
chanting and others relating more of the tradition of the Prophets, commentar on
the Koran and reciting prayers.
Political Dimension of Koran Meetings
Those female preachers who were highly educated attracted larger crowds than the
more traditional and less educated preachers in 1994. They were popular for
giving a high standard of Islamic talk and realistie instructions in religious matters.
They were identified as highly knowledgeable (alern), spiritual and skilful
speakers. They could achieve large attendances across social categories including
students, schoolgirIs and higher middle class women. Female preachers are ranked
by their followers as good spe akers according to their knowledge of the Koran,
Arabic language, their form of tafsir and how emotional they are in performing
religious song (noheh). They accept pupils and university students as private
students for giving lessons in the Koran. The popularity of the teaeher has much
to do with the Islamic state's compulsory demands for knowledge of the Koran,
basic prayers and Islamic ideology on the part of those trying to get access to
university or entering a civil service employment. Demands for higher Islamic
knowledge promoted know ing and reciting the Koran from being a traditional
interest among neighbourhood housewives and older local women in pre-
revolutionary times to being the core of the national school curriculum and
university studies.
There are characteristic differences among female preachers. Some project a
stronger association with the Islamic state, according to local categories of being
hezbullahi, while others show no concern for daily polities. By following my
co-rowzeh goer or on my own from one religious meeting to another, it became
c1ear to me that the politically oriented hezbullahi preacher made repeated
references to women's religious modest y, to cover themselves and adopt a modest
behaviour in conservative ways, whereas the politically neutral one (bi-taraj)took
a more moderate view.
The preacher Mostafi was of ten the one who raised the Islamic state's particular
concern of veilng in most of her speeehes in public places or at private homes in
1989. Through story-tellng and reciting words from the Koran the preacher
Mostafi sought to ilustrate the Islamic ideals and framework of meaning. Let me
give a few examples of the way in which she communicated her religious lessons
at two different meetings.
The first one was the case of a widow who arranged an annual memorial Koran
meeting of khatm-e anam for her husband in June 1989. Relatives both distant
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(inc1uding me) and c10se as well as friends and neighbours attended. In such a
meeting the preacher is in charge and the Koran chapter of Anam is read
thoroughly by several attendants. The preacher frequently interrupted her reading
of the Koran to offer tafsir and, whenever there was mention of the terms for
external and internal enemies (monafeghin) given in the Koran. She carefully used
the opportunity to criticize "new Islamic veilng"of those women who were
wearing thin stockings and the fashionable Islamic suit (mantu)8 After the
ceremony, the initiator of the rowzeh complained that she was very disappointed,
and that the memorial ceremony for her husband had been used for political ends,
which was an insult to his memory. The domain of family Islamic ritual activity
has become an arena for intern al social and political discourses of 'true' and
'false' Muslim women's identity.
Criticizing the inconsistent behaviour and distorted practice of "Islamic" veiling
among women, the preacher Mostafi repeatedly requested 'proper' veilng and
gave lesson on its correct application. She often criticized women who adopted
full cover for rowzeh and a loose cover outside in the streets, as being
unconcerned about their prospects for the next worId. Her remarks were directed
at contradictory behaviour of the middle c1ass veiled women who changed veil
from one occasIon to another. Such a change in veil and the adoption of
contemporary fashionable styles of covering garment were considered worIdly
(donyavi), which was associated with the kind of behaviour that classified as
"dolly"; i.e., branded as artificial, exhibitionist, provocative, and westernized. This
reflected Irrationality and materialIsm which should be avoided even in the private
sphere in interaction with bachelor male relatives. She often accused those women
of undermining the Islamic revolution ideology with improper covering and
repeatedly saluted the Prophet Muhammad and his family, requesting participants
to send also blessing to the 1eader of revolution (rahbar-e enghelab) and his
successor (nayeb-imam). Although a 'true' religious covering might seem
unattractive in the present, it would bring rewards in the long after-life. According
to preacher Mostafi, women wearing a proper chador (a full length veil) despite
the warmth and discomfort involved, displayed the quality of their social tolerance,
the firmness of their faith and their superiority in worIdly matters (March 1989).
To her,"true" female Islamic identity was defined by restrictive covering of body
and hair and reserved social behaviour.
The political objective became apparent in the course of such religious
speeehes. Requesting participants to send loud blessings (salvat) at the end of a
religious meeting was another example of such political differences between
preachers. During my first field work after the Iran-Iraq war in March 1989, the
dominant themes at the end of each rowzeh were the bles sin g of martyrs, Islamic
state fighters (Razmandegan-e Islam) and demanding il fortune for those acting
as internal and external enemies of Islam (monafeghin).
A preacher could be identified by some of her students as being affiliated to the
state's Islamic policy; Hezbullahi, if after each sermon she called for a special
8 The latest styles were tight in that time and considered to be provocative as it made bodily
shape clear to men in contrast to the true Islamic styles, which is suppose to be simple, loose
and non-provocative.
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merit to the leader of the revolution Imam Khomeini (imam-e umat), to his
successor Khameini (nayeb-e imam) and to prime minister Rafsanjani. A preacher
was known as neutral (bi-tara.! who extended the salva t to not more than the
leader of the revolution (imam-khomeini). To participants this meant avoiding
political issues but gave her recognition of the central figure to avoid any problem
for her work.
The hezbullahi' s leader used veiling and showed support to the Islamic state by
using both personal and community idioms to signal bein g a "true" Muslim.
Disserninating Islamic Learning through Mass Education
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, it appears that political and socio-religious
reforms have been trans forming some aspects of the cultural 'tradition,' by
reshaping former secular structures of the society with Islamic norms and values
into the post-revolutionary religious, political and social reform system. At the
time of my first fieldwork in Iran in 1989, it was evident that girIs' religious
education had become a central mechanism for the transmission of Islamic
learning and political resistance among young women. The former religious
schools and local Islamic activity had increased in size and numbers five years
later in 1994. For example, a girIs' religious school which was established in 1973
was converted to a theological college for training female preachers and ritual
leaders in 1994. Although Muslims traditionally the prize search for knowledge
and learning idealized in the persian saying 'from cradle to grave seek
knowledge', religious knowledge of a high standard inc1uding Arabic, prayers and
jurisprudenee (jegheh), became a mark of higher standard of one's faith and the
social requisite for getting a job or passing academic exams.
After more than a decade, the Islamic state in Iran has been able to launch
educational reforms that have resulted in building up a system of Islamic
universities, colleges and religious schools9 whose graduates acquire a broader
religious knowledge, which subsequently speeds up access to job opportunities
under the Islamic Republie. This development is part of the Islamisation proeess
that has resulted in the production of new religious meaning and identity within
the recognized frame of the society in which women are mobilzed rather than
marginalised.
The Islamic state aims to disseminate Islamic knowledge that may break down
the classical dividing boundary between popular Islam and textual Islam. The
Islamic state adopts the unit y of education and Islamic knowledge as an important
strategy for developing the Islamic national identity of both men and women. The
IslamIc Republic formulated a series of direct and indirect policies on women's
social participation, including in national polities, education and employment (see
also Nahid Yaganeh 1993:11). through which women were to be incorporated into
the nationalist movement as for example Islamic teachers and educated preachers.
In addition, the relatives of those who gave their lives for their religious
community (martyrs), associated male or female members of religious state organs
9 For a description of male religious school in Quom see Fischerl980, Thaiss 1979.
138
such as the Islamic construetion forces (basiji) and the Islamic guards (sepahi), are
also rewarded by the Islamic state in economic policy and educational recruitment
(Nader Habibi 1989). The maryr's relatives are promoted as first class citizens
and get access to higher social welfare and better jobs. Twenty to thirty percent
of university places and higher standard schools are reserved for male and female
relatives of such groups.
The Islamisation of the educational system by means of moral and political
forces has been one of the prime concerns of the regime in Teheran since the
Revolution in 1979. The growth of Islamic literacy through various means of
education and the transmission of knowledge in nurseries, school, university
curricula, customary Koran courses, religious seminaries and the mass media have
intermIngled with distinctive forms of knowledge which consist of traditional,
ideological, intellectual and textual knowledge under a subject called Islamic
science (ma'ref-e islami).
Concluding Remarks
My approach to Islamic ways of know ing among women has described a form of
knowledge by considering two issues: l) customar religious learning and 2)
post-revolutionary reformulation of Islamic mass education. Firstly, it is clear that
women's exclusive Koran meetings in local areas and as part of family rituals,
represent an Islamic core arena where women mobilise and display distinctive
religious authoritative roles. Secondly, the Islamic elite and Islamisist have
intluenced deliberately the content of customary female rituals.
The development of local religious activity shows that the ways of learning
Islam have changed from bein g a textual knowledge only accessible to a few c1eric
families or IslamIc scholars, to include broader social categories crossing class,
age and gender boundaries. The discourse about Islamic learning and knowing
include both the proeess of every day experiential practices and state based
institutionalized teaching. Such a dual learning approach has empowered both
contemporary Islamic intellectualism and a created new loci for political
mobilisation.
Academic Islamic scholarship focus mostly on the textual and normative
tradition of Islam. That is considered as superior knowledge a 'great tradition' -
to use a Redfield term. Since the superiority of the ' great tradition' classically has
been embodied by public and scholarIy tradition, most scientific reports about
Islamic beliefs and practices concern male religious tradition, not female
participants and religious experts. Men were often considered to be prominent in
IslamIc organization and Islamic rituals.
The traditional nature of Islamic female knowledge has developed from being
publicly invisible and personal to being a focal point of national muslim identity
building under the Islamic republie in Iran. We need to achieve a better
understanding of the role islamic text and literacy play in everyday experience and
not draw an artificial boundary between what people read and what they believe
or practice in everyday life. The traditional Islamic knowledge promoted through
familiar religious events and formal national education plays a crucial role in the
modern political economy of the Islamic Iran. The compulsory orthodox lessons
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such as the perfeet recitation of the Koran, understanding its meaning and knowing
the ritual of prayers, dealing with death, fast, ablution, Friday and communal
prayer, Islamic philosophy, etc., are regarded as an discrete subject to be taught
from a Muslim mature age (for girIs 9 for boys 12) under the national educational
reforms. Modern IslamIc education in contemporary Iran gives a simultaneous
flow of traditional Islamic knowledge and interpretation of its present-day
practices. We can not deny that in the modern Islamic worId, female students are
increasingly aware of global political forces through the information apparatus of
native state. This may foster the forces of resistance and encourage a new Islamic
consciousness among young and educated women. Entering into political and
anti-imperialism debates opens gates to the public area and entering
religio-professional careers.
In contemporary Iran many aspects of women's life situations have become the
province of the Islamist both by means of control and active involvement; in
particular, this has affected the arena of women's traditonal religious rituals, their
socialization and education. The so-called 'popular' Islam often identified with the
nature of beliefs among ordinary muslim in particular women, has become
interwoven with organized higher education and re-articulated both in the local and
national context. The establishment of new theological schools and religious
curricula and the extension of customar religious arenas and events has brought
women more than ever into the active religious field. For me it was a matter of
considerable surprise to discover several new public religious arenas, new
mosques, regular religious meetings in private homes and even two new shrines
in my local city in 1994. Such changes became even visible in the period of my
sec ond fieldwork in 1994, when the merit of giving religious lessons seemed to
have increased even more. Women in general have become more religiously and
politically vIsible in the private as well as in the public arenas, through the
customary channels of religious gatherings and through teaching in state
institutions including schools (semi-secular and religious), universities. mosques
and Islamic cultural centers.
The anthropologists need to pay greater attention to the role of persistent
traditional learning and its reformulation via the local religious spheres and events
in the proeess of Islamisation. In present-day Iran, the Muslim intellectuals and
moderate theologians responsible for the state ideological structure, encourage
women to take an IslamIc role as educated people and display their Islamic loyalty
to the state, community and family more publicly. Women's presenee in
educational institutions was regarded as an urgent political and a modern policy
for Muslim nation building. (see also Paidar 1995:312). This line of
encouragement provided them religious reward and integration as active believers
in the context of competition in a constrained market for economIc and
employment opportunities.
The Islamic Republie imposed a reconstructed national educational system for
the Islamisation of society, but it popularity and strength is not solely dependent
upon that. The interconnection of both traditional Koran meetings, practical
experiences of Islamic learning and recent female Islamic theology training has
brought about a strong sense of cultural accretion and an intertwining of classical
boundaries of textual and popular Islamic knowledge. Thus the Islamisation of
women links customary religious practices and the new educational institutions.
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To me, the nature of Islamism represents a reunion of various modern elements
with a traditional female religious fluidity and a state of socio-economic
modernity. Amongst which is brought into focus the forgotten Islamic culture of
women and a new role in terms of Islamic Republic precept.
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